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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on change in strategic culture. The research studied Swedish strategic culture in its 
normative form as coded in military strategic doctrine. Through a study of strategic norms, the 
research aimed at clarifying if Swedish strategic culture has changed during the Post-Cold War era.  
The aim of the research was thus to identify how change in Strategic Culture can be observed, in 
which way, how and why Swedish strategic culture has changed. 
The research draws from a fourth-generation interpretation on theory of strategic culture focusing on 
subcultures and change. Following an interpretivist approach a constructivist framework was adopted 
where strategic norms and their relationship with state identity, interests, policy and doctrine are 
central. Swedish strategic culture was described through the study of norms regarding threat 
perception, use of force and role of doctrine. Change in strategic culture was analyzed in changes of 
influence from three subcultures: policy, military and academic. The study was structured as a three-
case case study. Subcultures of Swedish strategic culture, as well as the role and position of the 
Swedish military strategic doctrine were defined in order to enable an analysis of norms and their 
subcultural influences in cases constructed around each of the different versions of Swedish military 
strategic doctrine. Thematic content analysis was adopted to analyze the doctrines, and form norms 
from the themes arising from the empirical data. Each norm was interpreted on its main subcultural 
affiliation. The observations of norms and subcultures were then compared in a between cases 
analysis. 
The results of the analysis show that Swedish strategic culture has changed since the end of the Cold 
War. Variation was identified in all three norms as well as their subcultural affiliations. The academic 
subculture seemed to gradually loose its influence while the military subculture grew stronger. The 
military and policy subcultures seemed to gradually strike a balance as the norm on threat perception 
became more concrete and a renewed focus in national defence of Swedish territory was restored.  
The main conclusion of the study is, at the level of analysis adopted, that Swedish strategic culture has 
changed. The change has been encoded into doctrine by an epistemic community of writers as a 
reaction to external changes in the security environment, and internal changes implemented through 
defence transformation. It is however plausible to regard the continuing change in defence matters to 
be normative in itself thus implying that Swedish strategic culture hasn´t changed, rather change is the 
norm and a constitutive factor of Swedish state identity. 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Tämä diplomityö keskittyy strategisen kulttuurin muutokseen. Tutkimuksessa tarkasteltiin ruotsalaista 
strategista kulttuuria sen normatiivisessa muodossa koodattuna sotilasstrategisissa doktriineissa. 
Tutkimalla strategisia normeja pyrittiin selvittämään, onko ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri 
muuttunut kylmän sodan päättymisen jälkeen. Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli selvittää miten strategisen 
kulttuurin muutosta voi havainnoida, sekä millä tavalla, miten ja miksi ruotsalainen strateginen 
kulttuuri on muuttunut.  
Tutkimus perustuu neljännen sukupolven strategisen kulttuurin teoriaan ja keskittyy osakulttuureihin 
ja muutokseen. Tutkielma on luonteeltaan tulkitseva, ja tukeutuu konstruktivistiseen kehykseen, jossa 
strategiset normit ja niiden suhde valtiolliseen identiteettiin, intresseihin, poliittisiin käytänteisiin, sekä 
doktriinin ovat keskiössä. Ruotsalaista strategista kulttuuria kuvailtiin uhkakuvien, voimankäytön sekä 
doktriinin roolia kuvaavien normien avulla. Muutosta strategisessa kulttuurissa analysoitiin poliittisten 
käytänteiden-, sotilaallisen- sekä akateemisen osakulttuurien normiin vaikutusten variaatioiden 
tarkastelulla. Tutkielma strukturoitiin kolmen tapauksen tapaustutkimukseksi. Osakulttuurien sekä 
ruotsalaisen sotilasstrategisen doktriinin rooli ja suhde määriteltiin, jolla mahdollistettiin normien sekä 
osakulttuurien analyysi kolmessa sotilasstrategisten doktriinien ympärille rakennetussa tapauksessa. 
Doktriinien analyysissa käytettiin temaattista sisällönanalyysia, jolla muodostettiin normeja empiriasta 
nousevista teemoista. Normien pääasiallinen osakulttuurillinen kuuluminen tulkittiin. Tehtyjä 
havaintoja sekä normeista, että osakulttuureista vertailtiin tapausten välillä. 
Tulokset osoittivat, että ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri on muuttunut kylmän sodan päättymisen 
jälkeen. Kaikissa kolmessa normissa sekä niiden osakulttuurillisessa kuulumisessa havaittiin 
variaatioita. Akateeminen osakulttuuri näytti asteittain menettävän vaikutustaan samalla kun 
sotilaallinen osakulttuuri vahvistui. Sotilaallisen ja poliittisten käytänteiden osakulttuurit näyttivät 
asteittain löytävän tasapainon samalla kun uhkakuvanormi muuttui konkreettisemmaksi, ja uudistunut 
fokus Ruotsin alueen ja kansalliseen puolustukseen palautettiin.  
Keskeisin johtopäätös on, että tutkielman analyysitasolla tarkasteltuna, ruotsalainen strateginen 
kulttuuri on muuttunut. Muutos on koodattu doktriineihin niiden kirjoittajista muodostuneen 
episteemisen yhteisön toimesta, reaktiona ulkoisiin muutoksiin turvallisuusympäristössä, sekä sisäisiin 
muutoksiin johtuen puolustuksen transformaatiosta. On kuitenkin mahdollista tulkita jatkuva muutos 
puolustusasioissa itsessään normatiivisena. Näin ajatellen ruotsalainen strateginen kulttuuri ei ole 
muuttunut, vaan muutos on itsessään normi ja perustava osa ruotsalaista valtiollista identiteettiä. 
AVAINSANAT 
Strateginen kulttuuri, Osakulttuuri, Normi, Doktriini, Sotilasstrategia, Ruotsalainen turvallisuus- ja 
puolustuspolitiikka 
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SWEDISH STRATEGIC CULTURE IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: A CASE 
STUDY OF SWEDISH MILITARY STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 “Do you not know, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed?” 
- Axel Oxenstierna, 1648 
 
The changes in Swedish defence during the Post-Cold War era have been remarkable. A small 
nation changing its nationally focused Cold War defence posture to relying on an expeditionary 
style defence far from home has been an interesting journey to follow. The fact that the trans-
formation didn´t stop there, but it seems it made a U-turn with regained focus on national de-
fence at home makes it even more intriguing. This thesis is an attempt to broaden our under-
standing of the scope of Swedish defence transformation in the 21st century. Explanations for 
changes in defence policy, strategy and posture of the armed forces describe a nation cashing 
in on the peace dividend of the end of the Cold War. But why did Swedes change their defence 
orientation the way they did? Trying to explain this change implies one needs to understand the 
whole, the context, the rational analysis factors, the political interests and much more. This 
thesis will in no way attempt to cover all of this. It will rather offer an attempt to try to under-
stand one perspective of it all. What is the role of Swedish Strategic Culture in all of this, and 
has it changed? 
 
What is offered here is a narrow insight into a broad subject. As one of the key players in 
Swedish defence the Swedish Armed Forces offers an interesting entry point into studying the 
country´s strategic culture, their Military Strategic Doctrine. This introductory chapter offers 
four topics to describe the logic behind the research.  Firstly, an insight in the evolution of the 
Swedish defence in the Post-Cold War era. Secondly the introduction of a military strategic 
doctrine. Thirdly strategic culture is introduced as an alternative way of understanding the ob-
served change that has happened in Sweden. And finally, the research aim and questions are 
minted. 
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1.1 Evolution of Swedish defence in the Post-Cold War era 
 
The following offers some insight into how Swedish defence has changed since the end of the 
Cold War. It seems so much has changed that it might be difficult to effectively summarize the 
changes in short. But as a broad summary of the evolution of Swedish defence in the Post-Cold 
War era one could say that Sweden has gone from, having the capability of mobilizing close to 
one million citizens for the defence of the country, to lacking the capability of mobilizing a 
planned 50 000 soldiers.1  
 
Now this is of course a change that seems quite large based on pure numbers, but the evolution 
of Swedish defence is more than a sheer numbers game.2 Many of the changes are tied to the 
changing threat perception, the shift from having a monolith threat – the Soviet Union – to 
having no immediate threat of invasion to prepare for,3 which made for an era of change and 
seeking to redefine defence altogether. What came to be a defining change for the Swedish 
Armed Forces (SwAF) was a shift of paradigm from the Cold War´s defence concept to the 
new “insatsförsvar” a reactionary defence concept. Under pressure from the politicians to cash 
in the “peace dividend”4 which arose from the fall of the Soviet Union, and linked to the larger 
Revolution of Military Affairs (RMA) that was influential at the time, Sweden opted to change 
its stance on defence quite radically.5 The new reactionary defence posture based on a slimmed 
down force structure meant that SwAF started opting for quality over quantity. This was inti-
mately linked to the introduction of Network Based Defence concept.6 What made this change 
so rudimentary was that it changed everything from policy, strategy, doctrine, force structure, 
procurement, etc. all the way down to recruitment and training of the soldiers. In a way the 
paradigm shift was a success in that the changes were massive and enforced, but it seems it 
might be less of a success in hindsight if one wishes to shift back, or at least grow and not just 
downsize. 
 
                                               
1 Zetterberg, Kent: Konsten att överleva – Studier i Sveriges försvar, strategi och säkerhetspolitik under 200 år. 
Elanders, Vällingby 2007, p. 261. 
2 Taking into account that the ”one million force” contained documented units which never really existed, see: 
Swedish Ministry of Finance: Försvarets förutsättningar – en ESO-rapport om erfarenheter från 20 år av för-
svarsreformer. Rapport till expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi 2011:2. Stockholm 2011.  
3 No threat in the forth-coming decade, see Börjeman, Carl Försvarets förfall: Konsten att lägga ner försvaret 
utan att någon bryr sig. Santérus, Stockholm 2011, p. 127-128.  
4 Agrell, Wilhelm Fredens illusioner: Det svenska nationella försvarets nedgång och fall. Atlantis, Stockholm 
2010, p. 129. 
5 RMA in Sweden see Agrell (2010) p. 173-174. For a summary of RMA key points see: Freedman, Lawrence: 
Strategy a history. Oxford University Press, New York 2013, p. 214-236. 
6 Agrell (2010), p. 173-174. 
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The new slimmed down version of the SwAF seems to have been equipped and trained with 
expeditionary warfare in mind.7 This of course meant that Swedish participation in peacekeep-
ing and peace enforcement operations were highly valued.8 But at the same time it meant that 
a shift was occurring which changed the focus of SwAF from a territorially fixed homeland 
defence to defending national security interests by operating abroad. The shift came to be quite 
clear with the changes in force structure, abolishing local defence units, selling excess materiel9, 
and letting the Civil-defence fall into a slumber.10 All this then meant that not only did the 
SwAF change to be more operationally capable in the international domain, it also effectively 
meant that the defence of the homeland was put aside and somewhat forgotten.11 
 
The paradigm shift lead to the downsizing of the SwAF in all aspects, one major part of which 
was the downsizing of personnel.  The idea of having an all-volunteer force got support from 
the highest levels of SwAF and the defence commission, which finally lead to the pausing of 
conscription, with the new law of total defence from 2009, and put into effect in 2010.12The 
decision to lay general conscription dormant came at a time when some implications of the 
war in Georgia 2008 had meant a renewed attempt to focus on homeland defence again.13 Due 
to a further deterioration of the security situation the decision to abandon conscription was re-
versed and the draft reinstated in 2017.14 The fluctuation between conscription and all volun-
tary recruitment is as such a good example of rather rudimentary changes implemented and 
then revoked in a relatively short time span.  
 
Regarding organizational changes the Post-Cold War era saw many changes in Sweden, the 
most notable ones are often the types of organizational changes you can see in the table below. 
In such a table you can easily see some changes that have occurred since 1990 and additionally 
see how current policy changes have effectively changed the trend of downsizing to growing, 
but that the rate of growth is quite limited. But apart from a long trend of downsizing, disband-
ment of units and change in defence concepts the Swedish defence organization went through 
another rudimental change in the 1990s.  
                                               
7 Ibid., p 141. see also: Edström, Håkan & Dennis Gyllensporre (eds.): Alike or different? Scandinavian Ap-
proaches to Military Interventions. Santérus, Stockholm 2014. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Agrell (2010), p. 148. 
10 Ibid., p. 189. 
11 Ibid., p. 219. 
12 Swedish Cabinet: Modern personalförsörjning för ett användbart försvar – vissa frågor om Försvarsmaktens 
personal, Regeringens proposition 2009/10:160. Stockholm 2009, p. 191-209. 
13 Agrell (2010), p. 205-206. 
14 Decision to reactivate conscription, see: Swedish Cabinet: Uppdrag till Försvarsmakten och Totalförsvarets 
rekryteringsmyndighet om mönstring och grundutbildning med värnplikt, Regeringsbeslut Fö2016/01252/MFI, 
Stockholm 2017. 
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The creation of a single government agency: The Swedish Armed Forces, which occurred in 
midyear 1996. At the end of the Cold War the Swedish armed Forces were not a single govern-
ment authority, but every regiment was its own agency, and the heads of the Navy, Army and 
Airforce were, during peace time, directly responsible to the Swedish Cabinet, not to the Su-
preme Commander (ÖB).15 This all changed with the reorganization of over 100 authorities 
into one SwAF.16 Interestingly enough the streamlining of the SwAF in the 2000s lead to a 
centralized model with all service-heads and ÖB working in Stockholm, this then was chal-
lenged in 2018 with the reformation of service headquarters located outside of Stockholm.17A 
decentralized model from the Cold War turns into a centralized command with fewer organiza-
tional levels which now is turning into something echoing the past. It looks like also here the 
pendulum has swung from one extreme to the other. 
 
Table 1-1 Main elements of Swedish Armed Forces 1990 – 2015, and plan for 2021 - 2025. 18 
 1990 2009 2015 (2025->) 
Army Brigade (HQ) 21 2 2 5 
 
Army battalions 84 7 9 10 
Territorial defence 
units 
230 0 0 0 
Home Guard soldiers 100 000 22 000 22 000 22 000 
Main surface com-
batants 
30 7 5 5 
Submarines 12 5 5 5 
Fighter aircraft 320 100 60 60 
 
Alongside organizational and conceptual changes, there has been a continuing trend of de-
creased defence spending in Sweden, as displayed in the table below. This may not differ sig-
nificantly from some other European countries in the Post-Cold War era, but in a Swedish con-
text the decrease of spending is also linked to a case of loss of trust between the SwAF and the 
                                               
15 Swedish Ministry of Defence: Delbetänkande av utredningen om lednings- och myndighetsorganisationen för 
försvaret, SOU 1991:112. Stockholm 1991. 
16 Ibid., & Swedish Cabinet: Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/1997 samt anslag för bud-
getåret 1992/93, proposition 1991/92:102. Stockholm 1992, p. 6. 
17 Swedish Cabinet: Inrättande av försvarsgrensstaber, proposition 2018/19:18, Stockholm 2018. 
18 Numbers taken from: Swedish Cabinet, Ett användbart försvar, Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140. Stock-
holm 2009. & Swedish Cabinet, Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016-2020, Regeringens proposit-
ion 2014/15:109, Stockholm 2015. & Swedish Defence Commision: Värnkraft – Inriktningen av säkerhetspoliti-
ken och utformningen av det militära försvaret 2021-2025. Försvarsberedningens rapport Ds: 2019:8. Stockholm 
2019.  
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political leadership Economical considerations seem to have had quite a negative impact on 
Swedish Civil-Military Relations (CMR) in the 21st century. So not only has funding for the 
SwAF declined but a trend of increasing civilian micro-management of the military seems to 
have evolved.19  
 
 
Figure 1-1 Swedish defence expenditure from 1990 to 2018. 20 
 
The existence of Black holes in the defence spending has been used to depict the failures in 
economic control of the SwAF.21 These holes were the result of failed management of materiel 
requisitions, poor budgetary control, and an overall lack of credible management of the eco-
nomic implications of the defence reform.22In the mid-90s the SwAF calculations showed that 
the need for further funds was 10,6 billion Swedish crowns, which equals roughly 25% of the 
annual defence budget. The struggle to find a balance between funding and defence reform has 
continued since then and is currently a topic of debate between the SwAF and the government.23 
All the changes mentioned above can be summarized under the umbrella of defence doctrine. 
The change in Swedish defence doctrine after the Cold War has been extensively studied by 
                                               
19 Regarding the management of the defence reform the Swedish government seems to have been keen on telling 
the SwAF how to implement changes This is in some aspects contradictory to the constitutional basis of Swedish 
government where authorities have autonomy over their actions taken and are guided by ends and means are 
given, the authority decides on the ways. See: Haldén, Eva: Den svåra konsten att reformera – Från invasions-
försvar till insatsförsvar. Elanders. Vällingby 2007, p. 211-251. 
20 SIPRI Military expenditure database 
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex 
21 Haldén (2007), p. 88-102. 
22 Ibid., p. 100-102 
23 Swedish Armed Forces: Försvarsmaktens underlag för försvarspolitisk proposition 2021-2015. FM2019-
20164:6. Stockholm 2019. 
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Håkan Engström and Dennis Gyllensporre.24 Their categorization of different doctrinal eras is 
very telling of how the doctrine has evolved from 1991 to 2014 as shown in table 1-2. 
 
Table 1-2 Swedish defence doctrine 1991–2014. 25 
Year Doctrine Ends 
1991-1994 Death of neutrality Defence of independence and territorial integrity 
1994-1998 Adaptation doctrine Develop ability for international operations 
1998-2002 Operational doctrine Create freedom of action for future challenges 
2002-2006 Development doctrine Defence of societal values, contribute to stability 
and strengthen international peace and security 
2006-2010 Solidarity doctrine Defence of societal values, and interests, abroad 
and at home, together with others.  
2010-2014 Regional doctrine Defence of sovereignty, Swedish rights and inter-
ests as well as societal values. Protection of Swe-
dish freedom of action in case of political, military 
or other forms of coercion. 
 
On the level of defence doctrine, probably the most prominent change in Sweden was changing 
from a Cold War era of neutrality to a doctrine of solidarity.26In the realm of strategic concepts 
this seems to have simultaneously meant a shift from Bandwagoning to Hedging.27 
 
As shown above the changes in Swedish defence has not only meant a change in force structure, 
reorganisation of the defence sector under pressure from economic austerity, but above all a 
conceptual change, a change of defence policy, doctrine and strategy. In order to study the 
changes mentioned above one might focus on a large array of different areas of interest. This 
thesis will focus on the cultural aspects of change. Has the strategic culture in Sweden changed 
during the time period of interest? And if it has changed, then why and how has this change 
occurred? 
 
 
                                               
24 Edström, Håkan & Dennis Gyllensporre: Svensk försvarsdoktrin efter kalla kriget. Förlorade decennier eller 
vunna insikter? Santérus Academic Press, Stockholm 2014. 
25 The table is based on Edström & Gyllensporre (2014) and Westberg, Jacob: Svenska säkerhetsstrategier. Stu-
dentlitteratur, Lund 2015, p. 200-201. 
26 See Bo, Hugemark (ed.): Till bröders hjälp – Med sikte på en svensk solidarisk strategi. Kungliga krigsveten-
skapsakademien, Stockholm 2014. 
27 Edström, Håkan, Gyllensporre, Dennis & Westerberg, Jacob: Military Strategy of Small States. The Nordic 
Countries’ Responding to External Shocks of the 21st Century. Routledge, Abingdon 2019, p. 183. 
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1.2 Introduction of a military strategic doctrine 
 
During the Swedish defence transformation outlined above a Swedish military strategic doc-
trine was introduced. The doctrine itself is a focal point for this thesis. Using the doctrine as a 
starting point for studying changes in strategic culture is derived partly from the explicit way 
in which the first Swedish military strategic doctrine states that it should be viewed as a starting 
point for implementing changes in the SwAF strategic culture. All three doctrines are intro-
duced below followed by an overview of previous research of the doctrines.  
  
In the process of change a new element was introduced in the strategic landscape of Swedish 
defence regulatory processes. The introduction of a military strategic doctrine in 2002 
(MSD02).28 The doctrine was introduced by the SwAF and is as such a military doctrine. But 
the notion of it being a military strategic doctrine meant the introduction of a new type of doc-
trine that hadn´t existed in Sweden prior to 2002. In the introductory words the doctrine states 
that due to the extent of changes in the defence forces as well as the military geography in the 
vicinity of Sweden the need for a new type of doctrine had arisen.29This might in itself be true, 
but more interestingly it states that the introduction of this new doctrine was to act as a starting 
point for a process to change strategic culture in the SwAF.30 The doctrine was as such intended 
as a tool for controlling changes in culture. The stated intent for the change was to more clearly 
ground the activities of the SwAF on military sciences.31 This then implies that there had arisen 
a requirement to somehow justify the actions of the defence forces based on scientific research, 
in contradiction perhaps to primarily basing actions on experience and legacy. But why did the 
SwAF need to change its culture in this way? 
 
The first military strategic doctrine was followed by another one in 2012 (MSD12).32 The re-
lease of a new doctrine 10 years after the first one might well have been needed in updating the 
existing doctrine to be in line with the implemented changes in the first decade of the 21st  
century. The change with the largest implications for SwAF doctrine is stated to have been 
                                               
28 Swedish Armed Forces: Militärstrategisk doktrin 2002. Fälth & Hässler, Värnamo 2002. [MSD02] 
29 Ibid., p. 3. 
30 Ibid., p. 3. ”I och med fastställandet av Militärstrategisk doktrin startar en process för att förändra vår strate-
giska kultur.” The use of the concept strategic culture when addressing the culture of the SwAF can be ques-
tioned. Was the intent to change ”strategic culture” or in fact ”military culture”? Or maybe the strategic culture 
in a military context? 
31 Ibid., p.3. ”Förändringen innebär att grunden för vår verksamhet från och med nu tydligare tar sin utgångs-
punkt i militärvetenskapen.”  
32 Swedish Armed Forces: Militärstrategisk doktrin – med doktrinära grunder (MSD 12). FMLOG APSA 
Grafisk produktion, Stockholm 2011. [MSD12] 
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changing from conscript based recruiting and force generation to an all voluntary force.33The 
new doctrine is as such a doctrine for an expeditionary orientated all voluntary “professional” 
armed force. This is arguably a big change from the context of the previous doctrine. Regarding 
strategic culture the doctrine states that when changes in either policy or economical, ideologi-
cal, geographical or social factors occur there arises a need to change strategic culture and thus 
doctrine.34 The intent to change culture through doctrine is as clearly expressed as in the previ-
ous doctrine. 
 
The third doctrine was minted in 2016 (MSD16) which means there was a period of a mere four 
years between the two doctrines.35 The new doctrine states that it is derived from: Changes in 
the security environment, a new defence policy, allocated resources and the supreme command-
ers need to communicate how he intends to command the SwAF in peace, crisis and war.36The 
aim of the doctrine interestingly enough echoes doctrinal theory in the way it is shown in light 
of being a tool for education, command and change.37 A more interesting aspect of the doctrine 
in connection with the defence reform is the launching of a new strategic concept,38 a concept 
based on a rediscovered need of homeland defence, and the need for an ability to stand alone, 
but prepare to fight together with others in order to win.39With regards to strategic culture this 
new doctrine is more modest than its predecessors. Strategic culture is treated in the frame of 
cultural awareness and no explicit mention is made on changing culture through doctrine.40 
 
All three doctrines have been objects of study by students at the Swedish Defence University 
for some years and different aspects of the doctrines (MSD02, MSD12, MSD16) have been 
studied. Mainly drawing from Harald Høiback´s theory on doctrine attempts have been made 
to identify whether a specific doctrine is a tool for command, change or education.41 Including 
                                               
33 The decision mentioned earlier, (see page 3) of changing from conscription to all voluntary recruitment, see: 
Swedish Cabinet (2009a), p. 191-209. Regarding the need for a new doctrine see MSD12, p. 5. 
34 MSD12, p. 15. 
35 Swedish Armed Forces: Militärstrategisk doktrin – MSD 16. MFV, FSV Grafisk produktion, Stockholm 2016.  
[MSD16] 
36 Definition of Strategic Culture see: MSD16, p. 7. Swedish strategic culture is described as based on a long tra-
dition of neutrality, military non-alignment and intent to keep freedom of action. Making for a more contextual 
and historically based interpretation, MSD16, p.27. 
37 The aim of the doctrine is to (1) clarify a broader military strategic concept (2) give military strategic guidance 
on C2 in peace, crisis and wartime (3) communicate to others the intent of the use of SwAF in the defence of the 
country (4) work as a tool for change (5) educate on the link between strategy and military strategy in the context 
of warfare and crisis management. Ibid., p 9. 
38 Ibid., p. 8. 
39 Ibid., p. 54-55. 
40 MSD16, p. 15 
41 Høiback, Harald: Understanding military doctrine: a multidisciplinary approach. Routledge, London 2013.  
Kling, Rebecca: Svensk doktrinserie: ett verktyg för ledning, utbildning eller förändring? Bachelor´s thesis, För-
svarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017. Persson, Emil: Vad syftar militärstrategisk doktrin 2016 egentligen till? En 
kvalitativ innehållsanalys. Bachelor´s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017. 
9 
 
an attempt to incorporate strategic communication as a cornerstone of doctrine.42The doctrinal 
dilemma of doctrine being either too descriptive or too restrictive has also been an entry point 
for research focusing on quality of doctrine.43 
 
Studies have also been made focused on the influence of theory on doctrine,44 as well as influ-
ence of security and defence policy on doctrine. 45 Both these approaches seem closely linked 
to Høibacks model of doctrine, drawing from two of the cornerstones from his model of doc-
trine: Rationality and Authority.46 Other works include a study of doctrinal effects on operations 
or “operational effectiveness”, 47 how local conditions influence doctrine, 48 if the doctrine 
(MSD02) is relevant for irregular warfare, 49 and ranges all the way to a critical examination 
which sets out to examine the doctrine as set of beliefs.50 
 
In summary the research of the specific Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine seems to be limited 
as the sources mentioned above are primarily bachelor level thesis and none of them cover all 
three doctrines. This thesis sets out to identify change in Swedish strategic culture, it is not a 
study of the quality of the doctrine itself, its connection to operational behaviour or in which 
way it is used or not. The focus is on identifying cultural elements in the doctrine, and then 
analysing in what way they either change or stay the same. The object of this thesis is Swedish 
strategic culture, the military strategic doctrine is used as a gateway to studying cultural ele-
ments. The fact that the doctrines express differences in the definition of strategic culture and 
that the expressed intent to change Culture through doctrine has been left out of the current 
doctrine makes one wonder, did MSD02 and MSD12 change Swedish strategic culture? Why 
is there no need to change culture through doctrine expressed in the currently valid doctrine? 
 
                                               
42 Reimfelt, Gustav: Doktrin som strategisk kommunikation. Thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2018. 
43 Wallenburg, Paula: Miltärstrategisk doktrin – en kompass som behöver revideras? Thesis, Försvarshögskolan. 
Stockholm 2018. and Olsén, Thomas: Är doktrindilemmat verkligen ett dilemma? Bachelor´s thesis, Försvars-
högskolan. Stockholm 2017. 
44 Landewall, Anders: Militärteorins influenser på svensk militär doktrin. Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 
2012. 
45 Strong connection between defence & security policy and doctrine, see: Hellquist, Joachim: Försvars och sä-
kerhetspolitisk resonans i militärstrategisk doktrin, Bachelor´s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2017. 
46 Høiback (2013), p. 56. 
47 Gustavsson, Alfred: En undersökning om doktrinutveckling: Minskad operativ effektivitet i den militärstrate-
giska doktrinen. Bachelor´s thesis, Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2016. 
48 Low degree of influence of local Swedish conditions on doctrine, see: Willers, Rasmus: Små staters doktriner 
– anpassade efter egna förhållanden eller avskilda från staternas verklighet? Bachelor´s thesis, Försvarshögsko-
lan. Stockholm 2017. 
49 Wallentin, Nils: Militärstrategisk doktrin – Är den användbar för dagens försvar? Bachelor´s  thesis, För-
svarshögskolan. Stockholm 2009. 
50 Fredriksson, Madelene: Doktrinen som religion – en undersökning om doktrinens kvalitet. Bachelor´s thesis, 
Försvarshögskolan. Stockholm 2016. 
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1.3 Strategic culture as a way of understanding 
 
As the overview of Swedish defence developments since the end of the Cold War shows a 
multitude of changes have occurred. This opens up for a variety of different studies to analyse 
what has changed, in which way has it changed and most importantly why have these changes 
occurred. All the before mentioned questions have relevance by themselves but it is an interest 
in why the change has occurred the way it has which motivated the research in this thesis. 
  
The concept of Strategic Culture was introduced in the 1970s and has sparked an interest for a 
variety of scholars to study Cultural elements of Strategic behaviour. The study of cultural as-
pects of strategy has been shown to have something to give with relevance to understanding 
how states act. But the study of culture is as any aspect or entry point into a subject worth 
questioning. 
 
"Practical people, a category that should include strategists, will ask that most brutally direct 
of questions, "so what?" So what do we do with greater self- and other- cultural understanding? 
Culture matters greatly, but so do the other dimension of war, peace and strategy." 51 
 
Regarding this “so what” question this thesis strives to further the understanding on how stra-
tegic culture changes. The relevance of any insights provided in this thesis is still nevertheless 
subject to this excruciating question. A cultural viewpoint can nevertheless work as a compli-
ment to other explanations and in this sense contribute to a broader understanding of how and 
why Swedish defence efforts have changed the way they did since the end of the Cold War. 
Greater self-and-other cultural understanding can in the best of worlds offer a means for under-
standing future changes and in some sense help planners and policymakers by making them 
aware of the cultural settings in which they are embedded. Awareness of context, of normative 
behavioural patterns and norms guiding action are elements which are part of socialization into 
working organizations. Being aware of them might lead to understanding them and if necessary, 
challenging them. Here one might find added relevance to the study of cultural aspects of strat-
egy.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
51 Gray, Colin S: Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture. Comparative Strategy, 26(1):1-20, 
2007. 
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1.4 Research aim and questions 
 
This introductory chapter aims at positioning this thesis in the frame of change in Swedish Post-
Cold War defence reform as well as show how the military strategic doctrine could be a way in 
to examine strategic culture. All this leads up to the aim and of this thesis, which is to improve 
our understanding of contemporary Swedish strategic culture. In order to do so the thesis draws 
from theory of strategic culture and will focus on norms connected to the use of force.  In order 
to do this the object of the study is strategic doctrine, and what it can tell us about the strategic 
culture of a small state. This is achieved through a case study of Swedish Military Strategic 
Doctrine in the 21st century.  
 
Research problem:  
Has Swedish Strategic Culture changed during the Post-Cold War era? 
 
Research questions: 
 
1. How can change in Strategic Culture be observed? 
(Answered in chapter 2) 
 
2. What do we know about Swedish Strategic Culture? 
(Answered in chapter 3) 
 
3. In which way has Swedish Strategic Culture changed? 
(Answered in chapter 4) 
 
4. Why has change in Swedish Strategic Culture occurred? 
(Answered in chapter 4 and 5)  
 
5. How can change in Strategic Culture be achieved? 
(Answered in chapter 5) 
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2 THEORY AND METHOD 
 
This chapter outlines the theoretical grounds for the study. Starting with a discussion on epis-
temological and ontological approaches. This lays the foundation for examining different ap-
proaches to strategic culture and which is an essential basis for understanding the theoretical 
and methodological framework used in the analysis. The theoretical debate on strategic culture 
is initially examined based on four different schools of thought. This overview is followed by 
a review of the current state of research, divided into two themes: Context and Continuity & 
Change. This is followed by a discussion about the origins of strategic culture and the role of 
doctrine. All this is structured into a theoretical framework within which the methods have been 
utilized and the research process has been executed. 
 
The second part of this chapter describes the research process itself and the methods used, from 
framing the study, analysing the data, to drawing conclusions. It lays out a pathway for a better 
understanding of some aspects of Swedish strategic culture, namely strategic culture as context, 
and change and continuity in strategic culture. The research process involves using a specific 
approach to strategic culture theory as a point of entry, and then forming the analytical frame-
work based on a merge of theory driven assumptions (deduction) and variables found in the 
empirical data (induction). This results in an abductive research process which aims at further-
ing our understanding of Swedish strategic culture.  
 
The chapter answers the first research question: How can change in strategic culture be ob-
served. 
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2.1 Epistemology, Ontology and Methodology 
 
A key element in order to conduct viable research is trying to understand what one is doing. To 
outline the fundamentals for this thesis the concepts of Epistemology, Ontology, Methodology 
and Method are briefly discussed below. This is not so much an attempt to clarify and/or define 
these concepts as they are the object of what seems to be an everlasting discussion, as it is a 
way of letting the reader know the basic assumptions upon which the research stands. These 
assumptions are summarized in the table below. This is followed by a comment on the research 
attitude which explains the approach in which the research has been conducted. 
 
Ontology addresses what we study, the object of investigation. The philosophical question re-
volving around “the existence of a real and objective or a subjective world”. Pragmatically it is 
the “view of how the world fits together and how we make sense of it”.52 Epistemology defines 
the possibility to know the objective/subjective world and the forms that knowledge takes. The 
philosophical discussion regarding “the nature, sources and limits of knowledge”. Pragmati-
cally it answers the question: Is reality knowable?53 Methodology entails the technical instru-
ments that are used in order to acquire knowledge. The concept of defining in which way meth-
ods are used.54Method indicates the ways of acquiring data and analysing it.55 
 
Depending on one´s approach to ontological and epistemological issues different labels exist to 
categorize researchers and research. The array of categories varies, but one approach is to talk 
about positivism, post-positivism, interpretivism and humanism.56 Another approach could be 
Naturalism, Marxism, Constructionism and Constructivism.57 Such categories are by them-
selves somewhat unpractical and the range of ontological and epistemological approaches 
should perhaps be viewed more as a spectrum of different approaches gliding and fading into 
one another than as discrete categories.  
 
The ontological and epistemological assumptions of this thesis make for what could be de-
scribed to fit into the interpretivist or constructivist category. While the positivists view the 
world in a way where an objective reality exists and is knowable, some interpretivist argue that 
                                               
52 Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael: Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a plural-
istic perspective. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, p. 21. 
53 Ibid., p. 21-22. 
54 Ibid., p. 28 
55 Ibid., p. 28. 
56 Ibid., p. 23. 
57 Davis, Matthew & Sutton, Carole D: Samhällsvetenskaplig metod. Studenlitteratur, Lund 2017, p. 78. 
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there might be an objective reality, but it is linked to the subjective view of the same, this means 
that any research might never reach the objective reality but always mirrors a subjective image 
of it. This then means that while the positivist might aim at finding absolute causality and nat-
ural law, the interpretivist can only aspire to gain a better understanding of contextually defined 
knowledge. 
 
Being in the range of interpretivist studies this thesis draws a main assumption from construc-
tivism (IR).58 This is not to be mistaken for social constructionism.59The main assumption being 
that reality is socially constructed. What we can aim at achieving is a better understanding of 
these constructions, but they are by themselves always subjective in nature. The methodology 
fitting such interpretivist assumptions make for an interpretive research design which focuses 
on contextuality and constitutive causality.60 The methods used could then be either ethno-
graphic, practice focused, discursive, corporeal or material.61 In this thesis the method is in the 
realm of the discursive. 
 
For an interpretive research project focusing on studying culture one also needs to take into 
account the relationship between researcher and the research object in the form of reflexivity.62 
This will be more lengthily discussed in the closing chapter. The basic assumptions for this 
thesis are summarized in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
58 Kratochwill, Keating: “Constructivism: What is is (not) and how it matters” in Della Porta, Donatella & Keat-
ing, Michael (eds.): Approaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2008.p.80-97. & Wendt, Alexander: Social Theory of international politics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1999. 
59 For an overview of differences between constructionism and constructivism see: David & Sutton (2017), p. 
78-80. 
60 Constitutive causality as the “processs whose parts are contingent upon one another, rather than being logi-
cally derivable from codes themselves”, see: Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: Interpretive Research 
Design. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 52. 
61 Guillame, Xavier: Criticality, in Salter, Mark & Mutlu, Can: Research methods in critical security studies. 
Routledge, New York 2013. 
62 Keating, Michael: Culture and Social Science, in Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael (eds): Ap-
proaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 2008, p.99-117. 
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Table 2-1 Ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions. 63 
Ontology Interpretivist approach Approach in this thesis 
Does social reality exist? Objective and subjective 
as intrinsically linked 
Reality is subjective, and the objec-
tive images of reality are socially 
(re)constructed. 
Is reality knowable? Somewhat, but not as sep-
arate from human subjec-
tivity 
Yes, the images of objective reality 
can be studied. But reality is in its 
core subjective. 
Epistemology   
Relationship between the 
scholar and his/her object 
Aims at understanding 
subjective knowledge 
The researcher´s understanding of 
reality and relationship to the data 
affects the conduct of research and 
needs to be acknowledged. (Reflex-
ivity) 
Forms of knowledge Contextual knowledge 
 
Strategic culture is in its core con-
textual. Causality is probabilistic – 
correlation can be observed but not 
determined. 
Methodology and 
method 
  
Methodology Relative with a focus on 
meanings and context 
Abductive process aiming at finding 
meaning and further understanding 
of the object of study. 
Method Seeking meaning, textual 
analysis 
Interpretive case study to further un-
derstanding of strategic culture 
through identifying and analysing 
norms connected to culture and state 
identity. 
Theory based (deductive) 
Empirically grounded (inductive)  
 
 
 
                                               
63 The table is based on Della Porta & Keating (2008), p. 23 & 32 and Schwartz-Shea & Yanow (2012), p. 40-
43. 
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The metatheoretical approach of this thesis is interpretive, which is most clearly shown as an 
aspiration to further understanding which then overweighs the need for explaining. The meth-
odology is abductive and the interplay between theory and empiric data is central. In some sense 
this resembles approaches in Critical Security Studies. For instance, the attitude in which the 
research data is approached might be considered to be wondering.64 The “Criticality” of this 
thesis is however limited. 65 There are limited aspirations to challenging method and methodol-
ogy on a conceptual level. However the use of methods which may seem to be more familiar to 
use in positivistic research and an atomistic model describing how to break down strategic cul-
ture into smaller elements, which will be introduced in a chapter below, doesn´t mean that the 
goal is to explain rather than to understand.  
 
The research in this thesis is descriptive in the sense that it is completely dependent on the 
empirical data in order to be able to analyse and understand the concept of strategic culture in 
a Swedish context. Theory makes for an entry point, the empiric data is decisive in which way 
the analysis can be conducted and what results can be achieved. So theoretically this means that 
there is a balancing act between theory and empirical data, where the discussion between the 
two is more vital than that either one has an upper hand. This basically means that this thesis 
leans more towards empiricism than positivism,66 and has an interpretive wondering attitude 
towards both theory and empirical data.  
 
However irritating it may be to some, sometimes describing something is enough to further 
understanding, the goal doesn´t always have to be an explanation. Or in the words of Andrew 
W. Neal: 
 
 “Sometimes describing something without explaining it is enough to say something politically 
and intellectually important. Sometimes documenting that something exists or is said or done 
is enough to contribute to our understanding of what happens in security politics and prac-
tice”67 
 
 
                                               
64 Lobo Guerrero, Luis: Wondering as a research attitude, in Salter, Mark & Mutlu, Can: Research methods in 
critical security studies. Routledge, New York 2013, p. 25-28. 
65 On Criticality in Critical Security Studies, see: Xavier Guillaume: Criticality, in in Salter, Mark & Mutlu, Can: 
Research methods in critical security studies. Routledge, New York 2013, p. 29-32. 
66 The difference between empiricism and positivism as discussed by Andrew W. Neal, see: Andrew W. Neal: 
Empiricism without positivism; King Lear and critical security studies, in Mark & Mutlu, Can: Research meth-
ods in critical security studies. Routledge, New York 2013, p. 43. 
67 Underlining added to show emphasis as per original source, see Ibid. 
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2.2 Strategic culture, different approaches 
 
The idea of strategic culture as something which defines and effects strategic theory and behav-
iour was introduced during the Cold War in the 1970s. The grounds for a cultural turn in stra-
tegic studies were laid by Jack Snyder who spoke of Soviet strategic culture, and Ken Booth 
who discussed cultures effects on the theory and execution of strategy.68 The concept of strate-
gic culture has evolved since then, and the evolution of studies in strategic culture will be shortly 
outlined in the following. One of the main difficulties with studying strategic culture is the 
absence of a coherent definition of the concept. Snyder defined strategic culture as: 
 
“…the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses and patterns of habitual behaviour that 
members of a national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and 
share with each other with regard to nuclear strategy”69 
 
As scholars set out to use strategic culture the definitions have since varied. Colin Gray exam-
ined American strategic culture in the early 1980s and found that: 
 
“… there is a discernible American strategic "culture": that culture referring to modes of 
thought and action with respect to force, derives from perception of the national historical 
experience, aspiration for self-characterization (e.g., as an American, what am I?, how should 
I feel, think, and behave?), and from all of the many distinctively American experiences (of 
geography, political philosophy, of civic culture, and "way of life") that characterize an Amer-
ican citizen…”70 
 
The quotation above serves as a good example of what later would be considered a first-gener-
ation view of strategic culture.71 The essence of strategic culture as a somewhat monolithic and 
unchangeable or slowly changing concept was central.  The notion of different generations of 
scholars is exemplified in the works of Alastair Johnston who fought a scholarly duel with Gray 
                                               
68 Snyder, J: The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations.  RAND, Santa Monica 
1977. & Booth, Ken: Strategy and Ethnocentrism. Holmes & Meier. New York 1979. 
69 Snyder (1977), p. 8-9. 
70 Gray, Colin S: “National Style in Strategy: The American Example” International Security, 6(2):21-47, Fall 
1981. 
71 Gray later refined this definition to:  “Culture or cultures comprises the persisting (though not eternal) so-
cially transmitted ideas, attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more 
or less specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily unique his-
torical experience.” See: Gray, Colin S. “Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes 
Back”, Review of International Studies, 25(1):49-69, January 1999. 
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in the 1990s regarding strategic culture.72A central issue of the debate was the possibility of 
isolating culture from behaviour in order to form a falsifiable theory of strategic culture. Gray 
views strategic culture as context, while Johnston sees strategic culture as a variable, making 
for an opposite interpretivist and positivistic stance between the two.73 Johnston´s definition of 
strategic culture highlights a structural view of culture a system of symbols: 
 
“Strategic culture is an integrated ”system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, lan-
guages, analogies, metaphors) which acts to establish pervasive and long lasting strategic pref-
erences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in interstate political 
affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the strategic 
preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious.”74 
 
Johnston´s overview of prior studies of strategic culture was outlined in a set of three genera-
tions.75 These have subsequently been followed by a fourth one. The main elements of each 
generation are briefly described below and summarized in table 2-2.76 
 
The first generation sees strategic culture as contextual, drawing from historical and geograph-
ical elements. The definitions within this generation had a problem of perhaps being too broad 
to explain anything, but still seem to have utility in using culture to understand strategic behav-
iour.77 The first generations inability to explain how strategic culture influences behaviour be-
came one of the key points separating first and third generation research.78 A first generation 
concept of strategic culture could be described as a monolithic entity rooted in historical expe-
rience which is slow to change. 
 
 
                                               
72 For an insight into the Gray-Johnston debate, see: Johnston, A. I: “Thinking about Strategic Culture”. Interna-
tional Security, 19(4):32-64, Spring 1995. Gray (1999). Johnston, A. I: “Strategic Culture Revisited: Reply to 
Colin Gray”, Review of International Studies, 25(3):519-523, July 1999. Poore, Stuart: “What is the Context? A 
reply to the Gray-Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture”, Review of International Studies, 29(2):279-284, April 
2003. 
73 Johnston´s positivism and Gray´s interpretivism, see: Bloomfield, Alan: “Time to Move On: Reconceptualiz-
ing the Strategic Culture Debate”, Contemporary Security Policy, 33(3):437-461, October 2012, p. 442-447. 
74 Johnston (1995), p.46. 
75 Ibid. 
76 The overview of the three first generations of strategic culture is based on: Sondhaus, Lawrence: Strategic 
Culture and Ways of War. Routledge, New York 2006. And Johnston (1995). Additional references mentioned 
where applicable. 
77 1st generation see: Snyder (1977), Gray (1999) & Sondhaus (1995), p. 7. Other authors include Carnes Lord 
and David R. Jones. Lord, Carnes: “American strategic culture”, Comparative Strategy, 5(3):269-293. 1985. 
78 Johnston (1995), p. 38. 
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The second generation sees a de-linkage between strategic culture and behaviour.79 With an 
initial focus on social elites the second-generation researchers saw strategic choices made by 
leaders as connected to interests rather than strategic culture.80 The focus here were elements 
such as speech acts and political discourse. With the coupling of identity and interest of states 
later second-generation scholars couple constructivist arguments to strategic culture and the 
definitions include concepts such as identity, community, norms, ideas and patterns.81 This 
made it possible to analyse culture as a whole as well as in its different shapes or parts i.e. 
norms. A more current second-generation concept of strategic culture focuses on the social 
elements of culture, the focus is on the interplay of identity, interest and culture, and how this 
is communicated. 
 
The third generation draws much from A.I. Johnston, who is a self-proclaimed third genera-
tion scholar. Strategic culture is viewed as a system of symbols, and the isolation of behaviour 
from culture is argued to make it possible to build a falsifiable theory of strategic culture.82 This 
implies a very clear positivistic approach to the study of culture. This is well illustrated by 
Johnston in his “central paradigm of a Strategic Culture”.83 Strategic culture as a set of ranked 
preferences implies that the choices and decisions made will in some way be predetermined due 
to a strategic culture. This set of preferences is historically grounded and consists over time. 84 
The persistence of strategic culture over time echoes the view of the first generation which also 
sees change in culture to be rather slow and limited. The third generation focuses on the study 
of the interplay between culture and behaviour. The idea of culture itself changing is not ap-
proached in any detail. 
 
                                               
79 Johnston (1995), p. 40 
80 Ibid., Johnstons view of the second generation was based on early second-generation authors Bradley Klein 
and Robert Luckham. Klein, Bradley: “Hegemony and strategic culture: American power projection and alliance 
defence politics”, Review of International Studies, 14(2):133-148. 1988. & Luckham, Robin: “Armament Cul-
ture”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, 10(1):1-44. 1984. 
81 In the words of Christoph Meyer: “comprising the socially transmitted, identity derived norms, ideas and pat-
terns of behaviour that are shared among a broad majority of actors and social groups within a given security 
community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defence 
goals.” in Meyer, Christoph O:"Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Frame-
work for Explaining Changing Norms" European Journal of International Relations, 11(4):523-549, p. 528. Or 
Edward Lock´s definition: “…expect a strategic culture to enable the articulation of particular understandings 
of the identity of a community, the nature of its relationship with other communities, and the appropriate role of 
force within the context of those relationships.” in Lock, Edward:"Refining strategic culture: return of the sec-
ond generation" Review of International Studies, 36(3):685-708. 2010, p.700. 
82 Johnston (1995). & “Culture has independent explanatory power” see: Kier, Elizabeth: “Culture and Military 
Doctrine: France between the Wars”. International Security, 19(4):65-93, Spring 1995, p.67. 
83 The dimensions of Johnstons central paradigm: (X) Zero-sum nature of conflict, (Y) Frequency of conflict in 
human affairs, (Z) Efficiacy of the use of force. See: Johnston (1995), p. 47. 
84 Johnston (1995), p. 53. 
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The fourth generation grew out of the deadlock set in the Gray-Johnston debate and the ina-
bility of previous research to explain change in strategic culture.85 In the work of Alan Bloom-
field, a new approach to strategic culture is introduced which focuses on ways of analysing 
change in strategic culture. 86Bloomfield sets out to take elements from previous generations to 
build a strategic cultural model that both encompasses the contextual aspects of culture as well 
as the idea of building a falsifiable theory.87 The study of subcultures thus becomes central. 
This combination of an interpretive approach and a probabilistic view of building falsifiable 
theory makes for an interdisciplinary approach which might well be addressed in the frame of 
constructivism. 
  
Table 2-2 The four generations of Strategic Culture.88 
Gen Definition Discipline Focus 
1st  Culture as context Interpretive Historical and geopolitical 
elements 
2nd  Culture as socially transmitted, 
identity derived norms, ideas and 
patterns of behaviour 
Constructivist Social elites 
3rd Culture as a system of symbols Positivist Connection between cul-
ture and behaviour 
4th  Culture provides context and con-
sists of competing subcultures 
Multidisciplinary Change in strategic culture  
Subcultures 
 
Approaches to strategic culture vary, but they all seem to address some main themes such as. 
- Connection to a nation or strategic community (context) 
- Some influence on (strategic) behaviour 
- Cultural attributes (ideas, traditions, values, habits, symbols, languages, metaphors, 
attitudes, identities, norms, practices) 
 
                                               
85 Libel, Tamir: “Rethinking strategic culture: A computational (social science) discursive-institutionalist ap-
proach”, Journal of Strategic Studies, published online, November 2018, p.8. 
86 Bloomfield, Alan: “Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate”, Contemporary Secu-
rity Policy, 33(3):437-461, October 2012. 
87 Ibid., p. 456-457. “…From Gray we take the notion that culture provides context; that it guides and shapes 
interpretation: we just have to accept that culture is a disaggregated thing with contradictory elements 
rather than a monolithic whole. From Johnston we take the goal of building falsifiable 
theory…” 
88 This table and a similar litterature review can be found in: Lassenius, Oscar: Svensk och finsk strategisk kultur 
efter slutet av kalla kriget. Master’s Thesis, Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 2020, p. 8-13. 
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Besides the variety of definitions and conceptual differentiality in approaching strategic cul-
ture, the views on the durability and/or changeability of strategic culture vary. Most authors 
on strategic culture agree (to some extent) that it can change. It is in the manner and form in 
which this change takes place which is the object of debate. The fourth generation of strategic 
culture proposes adding context to the study of change. This implies that knowing the context 
is essential in order to study change. This thesis adopts this notion and the concept of context 
in strategic culture is discussed below. 
 
2.2.1 Strategic Culture and Context 
 
Context is itself a concept which can have multiple meanings, it is therefore vital to try to nar-
row down an approach in which Context89 will be addressed in this thesis. Context is a central 
aspect of interpretive studies.90 In an interpretive view it not possible to completely isolate ob-
jects of study from their context, everything is contextual. Regarding strategic culture, Context 
can be addressed in different ways depending on one´s definition of strategic culture. In this 
chapter the concept of Context in strategic culture is discussed in three different approaches 
Culture as Context, Subcultures and World Culture. This leads to a summary of how Context 
is addressed in this thesis.  
 
The notion of strategic culture rose from the study of nationally framed cultures, as in the ex-
ample of Snyder´s focus on the Soviet Union and Gray´s focus on the USA.91  These have been 
followed by a multitude of nation specific studies by Johnston focusing on China, Longhurst 
on Germany, Kier on France, Farrell on Ireland and Åselius on Sweden, just to mention a few.92 
Strategic culture is often studied in its nationally specific form. 
 
Culture as context relies on a view that strategic culture is in many ways unchanging, nation 
specific and should be studied through historical accounts.93 The study of nationally specific 
                                               
89 Large C intentional when discussing Context as a concept. 
90 Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: Interpretive Research Design. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 53. 
91 Snyder (1977) & Gray (1981) 
92 Johnson I. A: Cultural realism: strategic culture and grand strategy in Ming China. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton 1995. Longhurst, Kerry: Germany and the use of force. Manchester University Press. Manches-
ter 2004. Kier (1995). Farrell, Theo: "Transnational Norms and Military Development: Constructing Ireland´s 
Professional Army”, European Journal of International Relations, 7(1):63-102, 2001. Åselius, Gunnar: "Swe-
dish Strategic Culture after 1945", Cooperation and Conflict, 40(1):25-44, 2005. 
93Lantis, Jeffrey S: "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy", International Studies Review, 4(3):87-113. 
2002, p.95. 
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strategic cultures are per se in many ways descriptive apart from the role of being theory build-
ing. The idea of thick description studies of empiric cases in order to further understanding of 
strategic culture gained some support.94 
 
Longhurst argued that: “The context in which a state finds itself is also crucial in determining 
how a strategic culture affects behaviour...” implying that the national context was dependant 
on a larger context, the external environment. 95 This context of contexts points out the need to 
clarify the extent of any given Context, as such World Culture is discussed below. 
 
But the nationally specific contextuality of strategic culture is captured quite tot the point in 
Gray´s definition of strategic culture, but it also highlights the next topic to be discussed, sub-
cultures.  
 
“Culture or cultures comprises the persisting (though not eternal) socially transmitted ideas, 
attitudes, traditions, habits of mind, and preferred methods of operation that are more or less 
specific to a particular geographically based security community that has had a necessarily 
unique historical experience. A particular community may well contain more than one strate-
gic culture, just as there tend to be military cultures associated with particular missions or 
geographical environments”96 
 
Regardless if one views culture as context or has a more positivistic view, strategic culture itself 
seems to be divisible into smaller parts, subcultures. This is an idea that follows through the 
different generations of strategic culture ending up becoming the focus of attention in the 4th 
generation. Snyder argued that it is very likely that several subcultures exist in a specific stra-
tegic culture. 97 He even defined subculture in the following way: 
 
“A strategic subculture will be defined as a subsection of the broader strategic community with 
reasonably distinct beliefs and attitudes on strategic issues, with a distinct and historically 
traceable analytical tradition, with characteristic institutional associations, and with more or 
less distinct patterns of socialization to the norms of the subculture…” 
  
                                               
94 Poore (2003), p. 284. 
95 Longhurst (2004), p. 21.  
96 Gray (1999), p. 51-52. 
97 Snyder (1977), p. 10. 
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Johnston argued that content analysis of strategic cultural objects, starting from the earliest 
possible point of history, could lead to conclusions whether current strategic culture is the re-
flection of a particular subculture.98 Meaning that the influence of subcultures could be one way 
of explaining the emergence of current strategic culture.  Elizabeth Kier´s study of French mil-
itary culture exemplified a different connotation of strategic culture putting emphasis on com-
peting political-military-subcultures.99 This dynamic between political and military subcultures 
is one of the building blocks of the frame for the empirical study in this thesis. 
 
Colin S. Gray agreed on the existence of subcultures but also argues about the need to distin-
guishing between public culture, strategic culture, and military (organizational) culture.100 The 
idea of strategic culture as a non-unitary umbrella concept consisting of different subcultures 
seems to have gained support through the generations of research.101 
 
For fourth generation scholars the subcultures themselves have become the focus of attention. 
Alan Bloomfield argued that subcultures should be viewed through a model “…which treats 
singular strategic culture as containing multiple co-existing strategic subcultures. These sub-
cultures each present a different interpretation of a state´s international social/cultural con-
text…”102 The study of competing subcultures was introduced as the way in which to study 
change in strategic culture.103 This approach has been adopted in different settings and can be 
exemplified by Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk´s study of European strategic culture.104 Here the 
umbrella concept of strategic culture is European strategic culture, and the subcultures are na-
tional strategic cultures. This encompasses a distinct context of context, World Culture, a view 
that will be discussed more below.  
 
In the study of subcultures an interesting approach has been adopted connecting the concept of 
Epistemic communities to subcultures. Tamir Libel makes such a link and defines epistemic 
communities as: 
                                               
98 Johnston (1995), p. 50. 
99 Kier (1995), p. 72. 
100 Gray (2007), p. 10. 
101 Zaman, Rashed Uz:"Strategic Culture: A "Cultural" Understanding of War", Comparative Strategy, 28(1):68-
88, p. 82. 
102 Bloomfield (2012), p. 437. 
103 For an example of competing subcultures in an Australian context, see: Burns, Alex & Eltham, Ben: “Aus-
tralia´s Strategic Culture: Constraints and Opportunities in Security Policymaking”. Contemporary Security Pol-
icy, 35(2):187-210, June 2014. 
104 Brockmeier, Sarah, Kurtz, Gerrit & Junk, Julian: "Emerging norm and rhetorical tool: Europe and a responsi-
bility to protect", Conflict, Security & Development, 14(4):429-460, August 2014. 
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“…network of professionals with recognised competence and expertise within a defined area, 
and an authoritative claim for policy-relevant knowledge on that topic… an epistemic commu-
nity that gets hold of the policy making process will shape the symbolic discourse of the strate-
gic elite and therefore of strategic culture itself… the core of each respective subculture…”105 
 
Subcultures are a vital part in framing the study in this thesis. The idea of subcultures as epis-
temic communities is also relevant to this thesis and the stance on subcultures will be elaborated 
upon in chapter 2.3 and discussed in depth in chapter 3. 
 
As shown above a nation specific or strategic community specific context can always be viewed 
in a broader context. This becomes the context of contexts. The problem becomes where to 
draw the line. Logically speaking context of context definitions could be never ending.106Stud-
ies with context that are broader than national communities include studies of transnational 
organizations such as the European Union (EU)107, dual context studies differentiating between 
domestic context and operational context in missions108, all the way to studies of common 
World culture.109In this thesis, the approach to the context of context dilemma, is that no stra-
tegic culture is isolated. Interaction between different strategic cultures is possible, and relevant 
to take into account in order to better understand a specific strategic culture. 
 
Based on the observations above, this thesis adopts a multi-layered approach to Context where 
the national Swedish strategic community is central. The notion of a world culture is accepted 
and influence links between world culture and national strategic culture will be addressed. The 
national Swedish strategic culture is divisible into differing sub-cultures or epistemic commu-
nities. Context sets the frame in which continuity and change in strategic culture can be studied. 
A definition of the research specific Context of Swedish strategic culture is described in chapter 
2.3 and discussed in depth in chapter 3. 
 
 
 
                                               
105 Libel (2018), p. 13. 
106 As Colin Gray puts it: “… all context itself has context without empirical limit, Where does one stop?” in 
Gray, Colin S:"Culture: Beliefs, Customs and Strategic Behaviour" in Perspectives on Strategy, Oxford Scholar-
ship online 2013, p 8. 
107 EU strategic culture, see: Norheim-Martinsen, Per M: European Strategic Culture revisited: The Ends and 
Means of a Militarised European Union, Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2007. 
108 Ruffa, Chiara: “Military Cultures and Force Employment in Peace Operations”. Security Studies 26(3):391-
422, May 2017, p. 394-396. 
109 World culture shapes the way states generate military power, see: Farrell, Theo: "World Culture and Military 
Power", Security Studies, 14(3):448-488, September 2005, p.448. 
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2.2.2 Strategic Culture, Continuity and Change 
 
Strategic culture was introduced as a concept to better understanding of the actions of foreign 
strategic communities, or one´s own. As such the idea of strategic culture itself changing may 
not have been central. However the concept of change in strategic culture has been debated 
through the generations of research, ending up being the focus of attention in the fourth gener-
ation. Snyder held that “Culture changes as objective conditions change”110so change in cul-
ture was seen possible. Different stances on change in strategic culture are discussed below, 
ending up with a summary of how change in strategic culture will be approached in this thesis. 
 
Johnston and Gray both saw strategic culture as somewhat monolithic and slow to change.111 
Gray started out by stating the strategic culture is a perpetual lens,112 but shifted to accept that 
Culture can change: “Furthermore, strategic culture(s) can change over time, as new experi-
ence is absorbed, coded, and culturally translated. Culture, however, changes slowly.”113 
Also adding that the timeframe for change should be more than decades, otherwise the concept 
studied should not be held as culture.114 Gray saw the way in which change in culture could 
occur as either evolving, or shifting seismically: “if it is assaulted by a traumatic shock of 
sufficient awesomeness”115Going on to see that culture can change rapidly “…through a pro-
cess of learning and borrowing, when pressure of circumstances provides the motivation.116 
In such an interpretation strategic culture can change, either slowly through evolution, or rap-
idly through the effects of shocks.  
 
David Haglund argues that researchers of strategic culture have gone wrong by holding on to 
either a context view or a causality stance.117 In doing so he directs criticism both at Johnston 
and Gray. Haglund argues that both views hold merit and neither should be categorically dis-
missed. He then sets out to divide strategic culture into context and cognition, drawing from 
political culture. Methodologically Haglund argues that change can be best addressed through 
the concepts of path dependency and identity, thus taking a constructivist approach to the 
                                               
110 Snyder (1977), p.9. 
111 ”In this sense the, central paradigm provides information that reduces uncertainty about the strategic environ-
ment; but it is shared information that comes from deeply historical sources, not from the current environment” 
in Johnston (1995), p. 46. 
112 Gray (1981), p.22. 
113 Gray (1999), p. 52. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Gray (2007) 
116 Gray (2013), p.27. 
117 Haglund, David G. “What good is strategic culture?”, International Journal, 59(3):479-502, Summer 2004. 
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study of strategic culture. Change can be observed through changes in identities and studies of 
symbols is key. Change is path-dependant and changes are slow. 
 
Challenging Haglund´s view, Iver Neumann and Henrikki Heikka argue that strategic culture 
is ever changing and should not be viewed as path-dependent per se.118The authors set out to 
connect strategic culture to practice theory. They offer three practices: Doctrines, Civil-Mili-
tary Relations, and Procurement as a framework for further studies. Strategic culture is 
viewed as a dynamic interplay between Grand Strategy and these practices.119 Change in stra-
tegic culture can best be observed through studying the practices and their interplay with 
Grand Strategy. This conceptualization offers that strategic culture is ever changing and does 
not stand still. Change can occur quickly as it is dependent on practices and is in itself a con-
tinuous interplay between strategy and practice. Their study focuses on small states and they 
go on arguing that poaching or “cultural loans” are key in understanding change.120 
 
With a similar distinction of strategic culture, as fluctuating and under stress of change, as 
previously mentioned Alan Bloomfield set out to study change through subcultures.121 He 
sees merit in Neumann and Heikka´s view on the use of Practice theory, but criticises them 
for opening up for analysis which sees “too little continuity” 122. Bloomfield argues that there 
had been too much focus on “rationalist-materialist-universalist theorizing” and that there 
had been an overly focus on “strategic cultural continuity”.123 Bloomfield set out to frame a 
research agenda that encompasses notions from both Gray and Johnston.  124 Adding epistemic 
communities to this approach as a way of looking into subcultures and study how they change 
makes for an interesting approach.125 Subcultures will be addressed in this thesis as they seem 
to have influence on both Context and Change.  
 
Kerry Longhurst argued in the study of German strategic culture, that: 
 “Change in a strategic culture comes in two principal forms: finetuning and fundamental, 
with the former variant being the more frequent. Change in the form of fine-tuning may occur 
when issues have arisen, from either domestic or international sources, that have challenged 
                                               
118 Neumann, Iver B. & Heikka, Henrikki “Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nor-
dic Defence”, Cooperation and Conflict, 40(1):5-23, 2005, p. 6-9. 
119 Ibid., p. 17. 
120 Ibid., p.19. 
121 Bloomfield (2012) 
122 Ibid., p. 448. 
123 Ibid., p. 438. 
124 Mentioned earlier, see page 20 above, Ibid., p. 456-457. 
125 Libell (2018) 
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or at best sat uneasily with the established foundational elements of the strategic culture… 
…Fundamental change of a strategic culture is a far less common phenomenon. It is more 
abrupt in nature, occurring when trauma is sufficiently severe as to nullify the existing strate-
gic culture, giving rise to the establishment of new core beliefs, leading subsequently to new 
policies and practices…”126  
The degree or extent of change as a dimension of change will be addressed in this thesis re-
garding change in Swedish strategic culture. 
 
Theo Farrell approached change in strategic culture through the study of norms and how the 
transplantation of norms affected the construction of Ireland´s professional army.127 He argues 
that change in culture can occur through norm transplantation. This may be generated in three 
ways: (1) external shock, (2) norm entrepreneurs, (3) personnel change.128 
 
In a similar approach Christoph Meyer focused on explaining how norms change. Meyer ar-
gues that change could be achieved through three different processes. (1) Learning through 
changing threat perceptions, (2) learning through institutions, (3) mediatized crises learn-
ing.129 The focus is on how changing external conditions affect a strategic culture and the pro-
cess in which this is transmitted through changing norms. 
 
But why would the study of norms be interesting in connection to strategic Culture? As Ben-
jamin Zyla puts it, norms are deeply ingrained, identity-derived collective expectations of 
what is appropriate behaviour and the least volatile components of a strategic culture. 130This 
would imply that if a change in norms can be observed then this could mean that strategic cul-
ture has changed. The idea of observing changes in strategic culture through the study of 
norms is adopted in this thesis and draws from this strain of research, mainly found in the sec-
ond generation of research on strategic culture. What norms are, and which particular norms 
that will be studied in this thesis will be discussed in chapter 2.2.3. 
 
 
                                               
126 Longhurst (2004), p. 18. Emphasis on key terms added to original text with in bold. 
127 Farrell (2001) 
128 Farrell (2001), summary and analysis by: Howlett, Darryl & Glenn, John: "Epilogue: Nordic Strategic Cul-
ture" Cooperation and Conflict, 40(1):121-140. 2005, p. 128. The idea of external shocks is echoed by Gray 
(2007), Zyla, Benjamin: "Overlap or Opposition? EU and NATO´s Strategic (Sub-)Culture" Contemporary Se-
curity Policy, 32(3):667-687, p. 682. 
129 Meyer (2005) 
130 Paraphrasing Benjamin Zyla (2011), p. 671. 
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In this thesis change in strategic culture is approached as follows. Change in strategic culture 
is possible. Change can occur in different degrees either as fundamental change or finetuning. 
Change is dependent on context, both national, international and subcultural. Studying norms 
as expressions of culture is a viable option in order to identify change in strategic culture. 
Changes in norms could indicate changes in culture. In this sense this thesis will focus on ini-
tially studying the contextual factors of Swedish strategic culture in order to be able to iden-
tify relevant norms in relation to their specific context (chapter 3). This will be followed by a 
case study of norms emitted from the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine (chapter 4). In or-
der to structure a coherent study of norms and change, the concepts of Identity, Interests, Pol-
icy, Norms and the role of doctrine will be discussed in the following chapter.   
 
The study of norms as influencing culture, but also as a product of culture means attempting 
to break into a circular argument. But the study of norms their influence on culture and the ef-
fect these have on strategies in certain periods of time and vice versa is what is attempted. 
“…those focusing on the nature of any one state’s strategic culture would consider those fac-
tors (such as history, geography, ideas, norms, experiences of conflict and invasion) influenc-
ing the cultural context that gives rise to particular strategies in certain periods and that in 
turn informs successive generations of the population.”131 
 
2.2.3 Strategic Culture, Identity, Interests, Policy, Norms and Doctrine 
 
This thesis revolves around the relationship between Strategic Culture, Identity, Interests, Pol-
icy and Norms. The relationship between these elements and culture as well as the role of doc-
trine is discussed in this chapter. The discussion on the before mentioned concepts is followed 
by a description of the approach to identifying norms adopted in this thesis. 
 
Regarding state identity formation this thesis follows Alexander Wendt´s thoughts of identity 
and its formation as a process of cultural selection which informs change in identity through a 
process of social learning.132 The collective identity formation and interaction between states is 
as such accepted, but not highly relevant for this thesis, as the focus is on a specific national 
identity rather than the identities interaction in the international system.133 The fact that states 
                                               
131 Howlett & Glenn (2005), p. 129. 
132  “To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation…”  Wendt, Alex-
ander: Social Theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 170, Social 
learning see p.326 – 336. 
133 Collective identity formation, see: Wendt, Alexander: ”Collective Identity Formation and the International 
State”, American Political Science Review, 88(2):384-396, June 1994. On the international system, see Wendt, 
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seem to set their identities in contrast to others is also acknowledged, and as such the identities 
may generate interests.134 
 
Regarding the connection between culture and identity this thesis follows an approach like the 
one championed by Peter Katzenstein, “…in attempting to incorporate into the analysis of na-
tional security both the cultural-institutional context of the political environment and the polit-
ical construction of identity… …both factors help to shape the definition of interests and thus 
have demonstrable effects on national security policies”135 
 
The relationship between identity, interests, policy and norms were brought together in a set of 
arguments by Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein in the following man-
ner: 
“1. Effect of norms (I). Cultural or institutional elements of states´ environment – in this volume, 
most often norms – shape the national security interest or (directly) the security policies of 
states 
2. Effects of norms (II). Cultural or institutional elements of states´ global or domestic environ-
ments – in this volume, most often norms – shape state identity. 
3. Effect of identity (I). Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national 
security interests or policies of states. 
4. Effects of identity (II). Configuration of state identity affects interstate normative structures, 
such as regimes or security communities.  
5. Recursivity. State policies both reproduce and reconstruct cultural and institutional struc-
ture.” 136  
 
The relationships are depicted in the figure below. 
                                               
Alexander: “Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics”, International Organi-
zation, 46(2):391-425, Spring 1992. 
134 Neumann, Iver B: “Identity and Security” Journal of Peace Research, 29(2):221-226. 1992. The four basic 
interests or appetites: “1. physical security, including its differentiation from other actors 2. ontological security 
or predictability in relation- ships to the world, which creates a desire for stable social identities 3. recognition 
as an actor by others, above and beyond survival through brute force 4. development, in the sense of meeting the 
human aspiration for a better life, for which states are repositories at the collective level.” Wendt (1994), p. 
385. 
135 Katzenstein, Peter J: The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics. Columbia Univer-
sity Press, New York 1996, p. 26. 
136 Jepperson, Ronald L, Wendt, Alexander & Katzenstein Peter J: ”Norms, identity and Culture in National Se-
curity” in Katzenstein, Peter J: The culture of national security: norms and identity in world politics. Columbia 
University Press, New York 1996, p. 52-53.  
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Figure 2-1 Causal pathways between environment, identity, interests, and policy. 137  
 
In this thesis these relationships are central. The key takeaway is that norms are a part of shaping 
security interests, identity and policy. There is a relationship between norms, policy, interests, 
and identity. Studying norms is in a sense, due to recursivity, studying a circular phenomenon. 
Norms help shape identity, interest and policy, however the former affect and articulate norms. 
As norms will be the focus of the case study in this thesis a definition of what a norm is and 
what kind of norms are to be located becomes key. 
 
How norms relate to culture is of central importance in this thesis. Studying norms is an ap-
proach to studying elements of culture. The connection between culture and norms is described 
in a definition of norms as given by Theo Farrell, and Terry Terriff: 
 
“Cultural norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define ac-
tors, their situations, and the possibilities of action. Norms are intersubjective in that they are 
beliefs rooted in, and reproduced through, social practice… …Norms constitute actors and 
meaningful action by situating both in social roles (e.g., military professionals) and in social 
environments (e.g., interstate war versus intrastate conflict). In addition, norms regulate action 
by defining what is appropriate (given social rules, moral codes, etc.) and what is effective 
(given the laws of science). In short, norms make meaningful action possible by telling military 
actors who they are and what they can do in given situations. In this way, cultural norms define 
the purpose and possibilities of military change.”138 
 
                                               
137 Remake of the figure in: Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p. 53 
138 Farrell, Theo & Terriff, Terry: “The Sources of Military Change” in Farrel, Theo & Terrif Terry (eds.): The 
Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2002, p. 7. 
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Accepting the definition of norms above as such it is relevant to mention the different types of 
norms mentioned in the definition. The constitutive and regulatory norms. as Jepperson et. al. 
put it: “Norms are collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity… some-
times norms operate as rules defining (and thus “constituting”) an identity…  In other in-
stances, norms are “regulative” in their effect.”139 
 
Norms can either constitute, be the building blocks of identity, and as such culture. Or they can 
be regulatory, in the sense that they draw from an identity or interests and regulate actions in 
accordance with these factors. This thesis will try to identify both strains of norms in the study 
of Swedish strategic culture.140 Taking into account that some norms might encompass both 
attributes, being constitutive in nature and regulatory in effect.141 
 
This thesis adopts an initial definition of doctrine according to Harald Høiback which states: 
“… doctrines are authoritative documents military forces use to guide their actions containing 
fundamental principles that require judgement in application.”  
 
The core point taken from Høiback is however not this definition, but his point of military 
doctrine in that it should be viewed from multiple angles. Doctrine, according to Høiback, con-
sists of three elements: Authority, Theory, and Culture. This model of doctrine is depicted below 
in figure 2-2 
 
Figure 2-2 The doctrinal triangle as per Høiback. 142 
                                               
139 Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p.54. 
140 For an institutional approach on studying norms, see: Della Porta, Donatella & Keating, Michael (eds.): Ap-
proaches and methodologies in the social sciences – a pluralistic perspective, Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge 2008, p. 56. 
141 As Wendt sees it: “I assume that norms are norms but that they vary in their balance of causal and constitu-
tive effects. After determining empirically that a particular norm has only causal effects we might decide to call 
it "regulative," but this should be taken to describe a pattern of effects, not a "kind" of norm.” in Wendt (1999), 
p. 165. 
142 Høiback (2013), p. 56. 
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From this model of doctrine this thesis accepts that doctrine has cultural elements. The cultural 
aspect of doctrine is in the notion as Høiback writes, that: “Doctrine tells us who we are…”143. 
In connecting doctrine to norms through the shared element of culture makes for a central as-
sumption taken in this thesis: If doctrine is in some part cultural in its essence, then these cul-
tural aspects could be identified in the form of norms. The connection between norms, identity, 
interests and policy implies that by identifying norms in doctrine, one simultaneously identifies 
norms which either constitute an identity, or regulates action as per influence of current state 
identity. One can find either constitutive or regulatory norms (or constitutive norms with regu-
latory effects). This relationship is depicted in the figure below. 
 
The norms identified reflect a picture of a state identity that is time specific. A continuous 
change of identity occurs in the interplay between state identities in the international system. 
Likewise state internal forces change state identity over time. This means that studying norms 
in a doctrine from 2002 can only further understanding of what the state identity and strategic 
culture looked like at that specific time. A doctrine from 2012 might show other aspects of state 
identity and strategic culture. If there is a difference between the observations of temporally 
different doctrines, this would imply that there has been a change in strategic culture. 
 
 
Figure 2-3 Causal pathways between environment, identity, interests, policy, and doctrine. 144 
 
                                               
143 Ibid., p.57. 
144 The figure is a developed version of the figure by Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p. 53.  
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This thesis draws from the definitions in figure 2-1, adding doctrine as an element and illustrat-
ing the relationship between the environmental structure, state identity, interests, policy, doc-
trine and norms (figure 2-3). The flow of norms is intended to show that there is not a single 
set of norms. Norms can be identified in connection with the different elements. A norm derived 
from state identity might inform doctrine, just as a norm derived from state policy can be a part 
of shaping state identity. Single state norms are also connected with the broader international 
context of interacting states, thus state norms can help shape transnational norms. Any change 
identified can be either fundamental or some sort of finetuning. Deciding over whether observed 
change is fundamental or not is left to be a matter of interpretation. No attempt to operationalize 
change in some gradable scale will be attempted. As previously argued, change in strategic 
culture is also highly dependent on context, both national (organizational), international and 
subcultural. The research process in which context is described and change is identified is de-
scribed in the following chapter. 
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2.3 Research method and process 
 
The research method used in this thesis is based on an interpretive methodology. This means 
that the research is oriented to meaning making rather than measurement. This orientation 
strives to answer why rather than wherefore. This also means that any causality is approached 
as constitutive rather than mechanical. 145 An abductive logic of inquiry is approached through 
basing the initial analysis on theory derived categories of inquiry, but the empirical data pro-
vides the detailed structure. The design evolves as learning occurs through the analysis of em-
pirical data. 146   
 
A case study design is used to form a basic frame for the study. In this case the case study 
design offers an overall design in which the interpretation of empirical data is addressed in its 
relevant context. In this sense a case study approach to design which by default emphasises the 
importance of context seems to fit the purpose of this thesis well.  
 
2.3.1 Case study 
 
This thesis adopts an interpretive case study design. The case study is not used in a “classical” 
positivistic approach where the design of the case study strives to be a mechanism that drives 
the research to reach conclusive generalizable knowledge. 147 A case study is rather used as a 
means of design and structure.148A case study design is adopted to enable the study of the cho-
sen research object in its real life context.149 The involvement of context is relevant as this is an 
interpretive study as well as due to the fact that strategic culture itself is dependant of (or even 
is) context. This case study encompasses three cases and as such it encompasses both in-case 
and between cases analysis. The design of the case study is depicted in the figure below. 
 
 
 
                                               
145 Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: Interpretive Research Design. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 
113. 
Contrasting approaches to research design. Interpretive and positivist methodology compared. 
146 Ibid., p. 32-34. 
147 For a “classical” view on case-study see: George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew: Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences. MIT Press, Cambridge 2004.  
148 This thesis follows the ideas of: Yin, Robert K: Case Study Research and Applications – design and methods 
6th edition. Sage Publications, London 2018. 
149 Yin (2018), p. 9-15. 
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Figure 2-4 Case study design. 
 
Determining and bounding the cases is essential to lay the foundation of a case study.150 In this 
thesis the cases are tied to the three military strategic doctrines that exist in Sweden to this date. 
Each doctrine is treated as its own case. The bounding of the cases is executed in chapter three 
where a description of Swedish strategic culture as a set of subcultures is offered, and also by 
positioning the doctrines in the Swedish strategic landscape. This structure makes for a multi-
ple-case design.151 The three cases offer an opportunity for comparative analysis between the 
cases by which it is possible to reach answers to the research questions.  
 
Regarding collection of data this case study relies solely on documentation.152 The central data 
in the case study is found in the doctrinal texts. While the description of Swedish strategic 
culture is dependent on both public documentation as well as secondary sources of prior re-
search. The frame of each case is also dependant on a combination of primary and secondary 
sources. But as the case study focuses on the doctrinal texts and their relationship to strategic 
culture it is within the texts that the data will be mined. 
 
                                               
150 Yin (2018), Defining and bounding cases p. 28-32. 
151 Ibid., Case design p.60-63. 
152 Ibid., Other sources of evidence might include archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant 
observation or physical artefacts. p. 114. 
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Analysis of the data aims at breaking down the empirical data (doctrines), identifying norms 
and their subcultural belonging to enable a comparative analysis of change in strategic culture 
during the timeframe of the study. The basis for analysis stems from theory, the doctrines pro-
vide the data that structures the analysis, this makes for an abductive approach as the analysis 
is not completely ground-up but neither is it purely deductive.153 The tool used to break down 
and analyse the doctrines is thematical content analysis.154In this thesis thematical content anal-
ysis is adopted through deductive category formation, and inductive forming of themes. The 
categories and the questions asked to the doctrinal texts are listed in the table below. 
 
Table 2-3 Categories and questions to text 
Category Question to text 
Threat perception What is the threat? 
Tasks and goals for the use of force What is to be achieved? 
Time When is this to be achieved? 
Location Where should this be achieved 
Ways of using force How should it be achieved? 
Means for using force With what should it be achieved? 
Preferences regarding cooperation With whom should it be achieved? 
Legal aspects What authorizes the use of force? 
Type of document What type of document is the doctrine? 
Relationship to strategic culture What is the explicit and /or implicit relation-
ship to strategic culture in the doctrine? 
 
Through answering the questions stated and analysing the data found for each category three 
sets of norms have been identified.155 The norms revolve around threat, use of force and the 
role of doctrine. These norms are the “themes” of the thematical content analysis. Each norm 
has then been interpreted as to influences of the three subcultures identified as influential in 
chapter 3, policy-, military- and academic culture. The difference in the norms and in their 
subcultural affiliation is the focus of the comparative between cases analysis. 
 
                                               
153 Ibid., Strategies for case studies. p. 168-169. 
154 Mayring, Philipp: Qualitative content analysis: theoretical foundation, basic procedures and software solu-
tion. GESIS, Klagenfurt 2014, p. 104. 
155 Data collection conducted as a process of reading and re-reading. Data fitting as answers to the questions per 
category have then been axially coded and the results summarized in the text of the thesis. On coding see: Riet-
jens, Sebastiaan: “Qualitative data analysis: Seeing the patterns in the fog of civil-military interaction” in Soe-
ters, Joseph, Shields, Patricia, Rietjens, Sebastiaan (eds.): Routledge Handbook of Research Methods in Military 
Studies. Routledge, New York 2014, p. 129-141. 
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2.3.2 Reference materiel 
 
The reference materiel of this thesis encompasses a variety or document sources. Using docu-
ments as the primary source of data has its strengths and weaknesses. Strengths with using 
documents are that they are stable and can be reviewed repeatedly, they are unobtrusive and are 
not created as a result of this case study. Documents are also specific and can contain the exact 
names, references and details of an event but also be broad and cover a long span of time, many 
events and many settings.”156 Weaknesses with using documentation cover problems with re-
trievability, biased selectivity, reporting bias and access.157 The form of documentation used in 
this thesis is described below linked to its different sections. Regarding weaknesses of using 
documents as sources in this thesis the aspects of retrievability and access is managed by fo-
cusing on studying the unclassified aspects of strategic culture. Undoubtedly the study of clas-
sified information might give a different picture, but this is not for this thesis to cover. As for 
biases the focus will be on reporting bias. The question of bias is addressed in chapter 6. 
 
As this thesis adopts an interpretive approach the relationship to reference materiel and evi-
dence need to be clear. 158 The character of evidence is treated as not being true or false or good 
or bad. The data found in the reference materiel is interpreted by the researcher and the aim is 
to form an understanding, thus the researcher is also a part of creating the evidence. As for the 
form of evidence the goal is to find evidence by collection and analysis of relevant data from 
documentation. Using sources other than documents could enhance the breadth of evidence, but 
this thesis limits itself to dealing with documentation. The reference materiel of this thesis is 
described in 3 different sub-sections: Theory of strategic culture, Context of Swedish strategic 
culture, and Case study references. 
 
The primary sources used regarding the theory of strategic culture are peer reviewed articles 
published in scientific journals. Besides these articles some key books have been identified and 
complement the literature review based on the articles. Peer reviewed articles are treated as 
viable sources to use as they have a certain degree or reliability having gone through an aca-
demic review process which should ensure good quality. The journals in which the articles have 
been published also give some indication as to the quality of the articles. The reference materiel 
in this section of the thesis holds a high standard. 
 
                                               
156 Strengths, Yin (2018), p. 114. 
157 Weaknesses, Ibid., p.114. 
158 On character and forms of evidence see: Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: Interpretive Research 
Design. Routledge, New York 2012, p. 79-89. 
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The primary sources for describing the context of Swedish strategic culture are official Swedish 
governmental documents and policy papers. Secondary sources have been used in order to sum-
marize historical events and developments in Sweden that are arguably of importance for un-
derstanding the historical background of the empirical study of Swedish strategic culture in the 
Post-Cold War era. The reference materiel in this section is selective and may to some extent 
suffer from selection bias regarding the secondary sources used. 
 
The primary source for the case study is the Swedish military strategic doctrine. Each of the 
three cases frames (context) are based on official Swedish governmental documents and policy 
papers. Secondary sources have been used in order to give perspective to the documents ana-
lysed. The use of doctrinal texts as primary sources for data in the case study is a limiting 
choice. However, it is precisely through the breaking down of the doctrines and restructuring 
the data that an analysis can be performed to answer the research questions stipulated for this 
thesis. 
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3 SWEDISH STRATEGIC CULTURE 
 
This chapter aims at uncovering some insights into what is known about the Swedish strategic 
culture. This is achieved through examining organizational factors of the Swedish state, fol-
lowed by an analysis of sub-cultures and their role in defining a comprehensive Strategic cul-
tural landscape. All this sums up to explaining why and how one can use the Military Strategic 
Doctrine to understand strategic culture. The chapter answers the second research question: 
What do we know about Swedish strategic culture. The answer serves as an umbrella-context 
in which change in strategic culture is examined in chapter four. 
 
3.1 Strategic actors in the Swedish state 
 
The political system of the Swedish state and actors relevant to the formation of security and 
defence policy need to be described in order to understand how the state works from an organ-
isational point of view. When strategic culture is examined on state level it encompasses all the 
different actors which work together or in conflict with one another to ultimately achieve policy 
recommendations and the official policy of the state. It is only trough identifying and knowing 
the different actors one can aim at understanding change inside the strategic culture of the state.  
 
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy. This means that the head of state is the King, but the 
executive political power lies with the Prime Minister as head of the democratically elected 
government.159 As a western democracy the legislative power lies within parliament, the gov-
ernment executes policy, and the courts oversee and uphold the justice system.160 The cabinet 
of the government is manned by ministers which oversee a range of specific policy sectors. 
Each sector has its own set of state agencies which are manned by public officials.161 The Swe-
dish model of government is based on a concept of consensus where ministerial rule is specifi-
cally banned in the constitution.162 Decisions made by the cabinet are always made by a number 
of ministers together. The role of consensus in decision making as coded in law and is a basic 
element of Swedish political culture.   
 
                                               
159 Sveriges riksdag: Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform, Stockholm 1974:152, §4-6, §8. 
160 Ibid. 
161 https://www.government.se/how-sweden-is-governed/ (viewed 29.4.2020) 
162 Sveriges riksdag (1974) §3, The lack of central political control over national defence in Sweden compared to 
other western countries, see Åselius (2005), p. 28. 
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State agencies execute policy as directed by the government and hold a rather autonomous sta-
tus.163 A state agency receives annual direction from the government in the form of tasks and 
budgetary means. Each agency is run by a Director General who has complete authority over 
the conduct of the agency. A principal rule is that the government only gives tasks and aims to 
any given agency as well as the means needed to execute the tasks given. The ways in which 
an agency executes the tasks in accordance with Swedish law cannot be influenced by any actor 
outside the agency, not even the government.164 This autonomy over ways of executing policy 
is a central element in the governing of Sweden. The Director General of an agency is appointed 
by the government and can of course as an extreme measure be substituted by another one if 
the conduct of an agency is not to the liking of the government.  
 
One of these state agencies is the Swedish Armed Forces. The Director General of the SwAF 
is in the same position as all other Director Generals, but has an additional task which exceeds 
the running of the SwAF, being Commander in Chief of the SwAF in peacetime as well as in 
wartime.165 It is not the King, not the Prime Minister, but the Commander of the SwAF who is 
Commander in Chief. This has implications on the political oversight of the Armed Forces. The 
principal for directing the SwAF is in accordance with the direction of other agencies, but the 
special characteristics of the authority to use lethal force in defence of the state arguably makes 
the relationship between political leadership and the SwAF unique. 
 
The political control of defence forces resides with the government as executive authority, with 
the ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of defence and ministry of finance as key actors. The 
ministry of foreign affairs controls the execution of international aspects of security and defence 
policy, while the ministry of defence focuses on defence policy aspect. The ministry of finance 
controls the finance of all agencies and therefore also the SwAF. Parliament decides upon de-
fence whitepapers as proposed by the government. Here the parliamentary external affairs and 
the defence utskott are key actors166. Regarding the preparation and drafting of security and 
defence policy the Defence commission organized under the ministry of Defence is the key 
actor. 
 
                                               
163 Autonomy of state agencies introduced in the 17th century by Axel Oxenstierna, see: Åselius (2005), p. 28, 
38. Current state agencies http://www.myndighetsregistret.scb.se/Myndighet In April 2020 there were 250 differ-
ent state agencies. 
164 Sveriges riksdag (1974), Chapter 12. 
165 As decided in 1992, see Swedish Cabinet (1992), p.6. In line with recommendations from 1991, see Swedish 
Ministry of Defence (1991). 
166 In Sweden the term Försvarsutskott refers to a sub-committee of parliament, Försvarskommitté was a separate 
actor. Both translate into Defence committee in English.  
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The first defence commission was organized in 1992 and took the role of policymaker from the 
defence committees which had this task during the Cold War.167 The defence commission was 
structured with government officials as well as experts from all the political parties within the 
parliament. This parliamentary approach was taken to strive for a broad consensus for upcom-
ing security and defence policy. Initially the defence commission worked as a link between the 
government and the political parties of parliament, but soon evolved to be an even more influ-
ential actor with responsibilities regarding consultations and ensuring cooperation between rel-
evant actors.168The defence commission is the key actor in preparing governmental whitepapers 
and ensuring that they will pass to decision by the parliament. This makes the defence commis-
sion interesting from a sub-cultural aspect, as a meeting place for political culture, more organ-
izationally related public servant culture and military culture. Taking one step further one could 
incorporate influences of other sub-cultures such as the defence industry and academia. Map-
ping the sub-cultures at work regarding security and defence policy is therefore the next task at 
hand. 
 
3.2 Subcultures and epistemic communities 
 
The existence of Subcultures has been recognized as a part of strategic culture since the intro-
duction of the concept in the 1970-s. 169 A subculture can be imagined as a sub-unit of a strategic 
culture. A strategic culture is more than the sum of each subculture and might be better ad-
dressed as the product of the interactions between these subcultures.170 If this is the case a dom-
inant subculture could influence the strategic culture more than a non-influential subculture. It 
is therefore the interactions between subcultures that require attention if one is to understand 
change in strategic culture.  
 
Subcultures based on organizational entities is one way of addressing the subject. From this 
point of view some potential subcultures relevant to Swedish security and defence policy could 
be described as per the figure below. Here strategic culture as an umbrella concept consists of 
at least the following subcultures: Political (Policy), Military subculture, Defence industry sub-
culture, Academic subculture   
                                               
167 Haldén (2007), p. 63-64. 
168 Haldén (2007), p. 64 
169 Snyder (1977), p.10, Gray (1999), p.51-21., Bloomfield (2012). 
170 Bloomfield (2012). 
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Figure 3-1 Swedish strategic culture as a set of subcultures. 
 
The political subculture consists of political agents. There are the political parties, the Parlia-
ment, with its committees (utskott) and the defence commission which is a key actor, the Gov-
ernment with its ministries of which the ministry of Foreign affairs, the ministry of Defence 
and the ministry of Finance are central in deciding on security and defence policy.171 
 
The military subculture consists of military agents. The main elements are the Commander in 
Chief (ÖB), the SwAF HQ, the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. The role of the supreme 
commander is central in this layout as he acts as a link between the political and the military 
subcultures. Also depicted in the figure is the military strategic doctrine (MSD). The doctrine 
serves as the Commander in Chief´s strategic guidance to the SwAF and as such is influential 
both within the political and the military subculture.172 The individuals preparing the doctrine 
thus compose an agent acting under the influence of military, political, defence, and academic 
culture. 
 
                                               
171 As discussed in chapter 3.1. above. 
172 On the doctrines (MSD) role in describing the connection between political, military strategic and operative 
levelels, see: Ahlgren, Patrik & Pettersson, Ethel: Utveckling av militärstrategisk doktrin . en dokumentation av 
den pågående processen, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift, nr. 1, p. 37-42. Stock-
holm 2001. 
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The defence industry subculture consists of a variety of commercial companies which supply 
the SwAF with materiel and services.173 Some companies are arguably more influential than 
others, for instance SAAB which provides the JAS Gripen to Swedish Air Force as well as 
Submarines to the Swedish Navy.174However as far as subcultures goes one might rightly ad-
dress the defence sector as an industrial subculture of Swedish strategic culture. A direct linkage 
between the industry and the military strategic doctrine is not identified and is therefore not part 
of the analysis in this thesis. 
 
As a subculture the Academia might be the most resistant to definition. As academics might 
hold themselves to be objective, free of affiliations and guided by academic freedom, not to be 
categorized as a particular anything. The existence of an Academic subculture is however fea-
sible. The Royal Academy of Sciences175 for instance, best known for the Nobel Prize, as well 
as the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences176, are examples of organised influential 
groups of scientists which act within their own subculture. There is no need to consider the 
whole academic field in Sweden to form a united subculture. By narrowing the scope to security 
and defence policy then the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences as well as the National 
Defense University177 arguably are influential even to the extent of a subculture.   
 
Subcultures can, as shown above, be identified through an organizational perspective with a 
centre of gravity revolving around a shared identity by belonging to a specific organizational 
community. This organizational community can be either very specifically defined as struc-
tured governmental entities, or more loosely defined around other commonly shared attrib-
utes. But subcultures can also be approached as formed around specific policies and thus be-
ing cross sectional in a way where different domestic groups such as political parties, ethnic 
groups or institutions promote their favoured subcultures.178 In this sense an institution like 
the Military does not by itself form a subculture of strategic culture, while a specific form of 
security policy does form its own subculture drawing support from different domestic groups 
                                               
173 For a list of companies in the defence sector, see: The Swedish Security and Defense Industry Association: 
https://soff.se/en/  
174 SAAB https://saab.com/ 
175 The Royal Academy of Sciences was founded in 1739: https://www.kva.se/en/startsida 
176 The Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences was founded in 1796: https://kkrva.se/ 
177 The Swedish Defense University, is an independent government agency: https://www.fhs.se/en/swedish-de-
fence-university.html  
178 Bloomfield (2012), p. 452, 438. 
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including the military. This means treating subcultures as epistemic communities179. An ex-
ample of such an approach to subcultures is depicted in figure 3-2 below.  
 
 
 
Figure 3-2 An example of epistemic communities reaching over organizational entities. 
 
As doctrine is often written by a group of experts in different fields which have been identified 
as important for addressing different aspects of the doctrine, one could wonder if such a group 
of experts could be viewed as an epistemic community. As an epistemic community the doctrine 
task force would work together in formulating a commonly acceptable version of what the doc-
trine should compromise of, as well as drawing from the different fields of expertise, what 
message the content should convey to its readers. As such an epistemic community of doctrine 
writers hold the key to the formulating of norms, conveying of cultural elements which are 
encoded in the doctrine as “official truths”.  
 
The process of change in policy from a fourth-generation perspective of strategic culture com-
piled by Tamir Libel suggests a process of policymaking consisting of a triggering event, four 
stages of change and reaching a new equilibrium.180 A policy crisis leads to the collapse of a 
hegemonic subculture which sparks the process of change. The process of change starts with a 
                                               
179 An Epistemic community shares the same core beliefs about a subject, epistemic communities in research tra-
ditions see: Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine & Yanow, Dvora: Interpretive Research Design. Routledge, New York 
2012, p. 130-137. 
180 Libel (2018), p. 13. 
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stage of policy innovation where different epistemic communities position themselves and a re-
definition of subcultures occurs. This leads to a stage of policy diffusion where different epis-
temic communities compete for influence in the policy debate. This stage leads to policy selec-
tion where policymakers chose from proposed options. The last stage is policy persistence 
where policy makers adopt the strategic subculture of one epistemic community. This then leads 
to a new equilibrium of policy as championed by the new hegemonic subculture.181 
 
As the process described above is intended as a conceptual framework for studying policy for-
mation, one comes to wonder if this process is adaptable as a framework for understanding 
change in doctrine as well. The utilization of this process for analysing doctrinal change will be 
discussed further in chapter five.  
 
3.2.1 Military Culture 
 
The existence of Military culture and its role as a subculture closely linked to and part of a 
strategic culture warrants an examination of the concept. Elizabeth Kier defines Military Cul-
ture as an intervening variable between civilian decisions and military doctrine, as: “the set of 
basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective under-
standings”182 The definition as an intervening variable implies that Military Culture affects the 
formation of military doctrine. The way in which a military doctrine translates political deci-
sions and guidance into coded doctrine is dependent on the prevalent Military culture. This 
description manifests Military culture as the organisational culture of a military organisation.183 
This is a holistic view in which the military as an organization interprets political guidance. 
 
Military Culture has been studied on a variety of levels, take as an example Andrew Bell´s 
research into the connection between military culture and armed-group behaviour .184 Here Mil-
itary Culture is “the beliefs, customs, and institutions that socialize combatants to organiza-
tional norms”185 This study is an example of studying military culture and its effects on behav-
iour within the military organization, not the relationship between policy and military action. 
Another example of this kind of study is Chiara Ruffa´s research into military behaviour in 
peace operations where military culture is seen to affect variations in military behaviour on an 
                                               
181 The process paraphrased from Libel (2018), p. 13. 
182 Kier (1995), p. 68. 
183 Ibid. 
184  Bell, Andrew M: “Military Culture and Restraint toward Civilians in War: Examining the Ugandan Civil 
Wars”. Security Studies, 25(3):488-518, July 2016. 
185 Ibid., p. 489. 
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individual level.186 This kind of research into Military culture revolves around military organi-
zations and the actions of individuals or groups within the organization. Regarding the extent 
of studies into Military Culture, Professor Alastair Finlan argues that the present research of 
Military Culture: “… offers a synthesis of pragmatic and theoretical approaches. It defines 
military culture in structural and non- structural terms as an all- embracing social environ-
ment, infused with an explicit martial orientation, in which material and non- material accou-
trements, actions, discourses, practices, symbols and technologies revolve around the suste-
nance of specific identities, histories and traditions.”187 Military culture as such is, much as 
strategic culture, hard to define. The study of internal mechanisms in Military culture, and its 
effect on military behaviour is not pertinent to this thesis, but it is the relationship between 
Military culture and other subcultures that warrants some attention. 
 
The link between Strategic culture and Military culture sometimes makes it difficult to separate 
the two. In a study of Swedish strategic culture professor Gunnar Åselius links the two concepts 
as he offers an overview of developments int Swedish strategic culture between 1945 and 
2005.188 What Åselius finds is that Swedish strategic culture has changed over time. Changes 
have occurred from a concept of peoples defence, via a short period of high-tech defence back 
to a concept of peoples defence in the 1960s and 1970s.189 In the 1980´s and 1990s followed 
changes influenced by globalization and technological advances coupled with demands on ef-
fective administration.190 The loss of a Soviet threat in the 1990s lead to a divergence where the 
larger population still viewed homeland defence as the core task of the SwAF while the leading 
elite in the military profession held international operations as the core task.191 These differen-
tiations between the larger population and professional military officers took place in a time of 
professionalization and social changes for the officer corps. 192 Åselius shows that Swedish 
strategic culture changed from a preference for homeland defence to a preference for interna-
tional operations, while the military culture changed from peoples defence to defence by “pro-
fessionals”. From these observations one can conclude that civic culture affects military culture. 
The link between strategic culture and military culture however seems to go both ways. 
Changes in strategic culture affects military culture as per tasking and policy guidance, but 
military culture also affects strategic culture through the work of higher echelons of military 
                                               
186 Ruffa (2017), p. 393. 
187 Finlan, Alastair: Contemporary military culture and strategic studies: US and UK Armed Forces in the 21st 
century. Routledge, Abingdon 2013, p. 4-5. 
188 Åselius (2005) 
189 Ibid., p.29-37. 
190 Ibid., p. 37-39. 
191 Ibid., p. 40-41. 
192 Ibid., p. 37-39. 
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command as experts regarding policy formation. In a Swedish context it seems that strategic 
culture is not separate from military culture but the two are clearly linked. 
 
 
3.2.2 Political culture – Policy culture 
 
The concept of political culture has its roots in the 1960´s as a subfield of political studies.193 
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba stated that: “The political culture is the particular distribu-
tion of patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation.”194Po-
litical culture encompasses the attitudes, norms, values, beliefs, views of reality, feelings for 
political phenomena, self-perception, and knowledge of political issues.195 All this in the form 
of Political Culture is tied to specific national contexts, and for this thesis it is sufficient to state 
the acceptance of a Swedish political culture. Politics on the other hand is in the context of this 
thesis viewed as the “constrained use of social power"196 The study of politics is therefore: "the 
study of the nature and the source of those constraints and the techniques for the use of social 
power within those constraints" 197. The existence of a Swedish way of political interaction and 
specific traits of Swedish political culture is relevant to acknowledge, as Politics is the greater 
context in which policy is developed. Policy "designates the behavior of some actor or set of 
actors, such as an official, a government agency, or a legislature, in an area of activity such as 
public transportation or consumer protection”.198 Security- and defence policy, as public pol-
icy, is highly relevant to the study of strategic culture and the following case study of Swedish 
Military Strategic doctrine and is viewed in light of the definition: "… a relatively stable, pur-
posive course of action or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a prob-
lem or matter of concern”199 This is the point where we enter to examine the Swedish political 
subculture, in reference to security and defence policy as well as its relationship to doctrine. 
The matter of concern is the defence of Sweden, the course of action is stated in public docu-
ments such as governmental whitepapers. 
 
                                               
193 For an in-depth overview of the study of Political Culture see: Welch, Stephen: The Theory of Political Cul-
ture, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013. 
194 Almond, Gabriel, A., Verba, Sidney: The civic culture: Political attitudes and Democracy in five nations, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963, p.14-15. 
195 Österud, Öyvind: Statsvetenskap: Introduktion i politisk analys, Natur och kultur, Stockholm 2002, p. 226. 
196 Goodin, Robert E. & Klingemann, Hans-Dieter (eds.) A New Handbook of Political Science. Oxford Univer-
sity Press, New York 1996, p. 7. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Anderson, James E.: Public policymaking eight edition. Cengage Learning, Belmont 2014, p.6. 
199 Ibid., p.7. 
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The making of security and defence policy in Sweden in the Post-Cold War era has been ex-
tensively studied by Eva Haldén.200 The before mentioned defence committee is a central secu-
rity and defence policy agent, but the SwAF also has its own role in policymaking. For instance 
the “Perspective Studies” made by SwAF are an influential tool in directing policy.201 The per-
spective studies offer an insight into how defence planning is and will be affected by policy 
decision made. The funding of the SwAF is a central factor which forces the SwAF to adapt its 
structure, armament and tasking sometimes with little or no regard to factual changes in the 
security environment. The funding of defence forces might be a dilemma shared by many na-
tions worldwide, but in Sweden the funding issue has become quite problematic and a focal 
point for policy formation.  
 
Haldén talks about black holes regarding the funding of SwAF.202 The mismanagement of funds 
allocated to the SwAF and a continuing cutting of funds from the political level ultimately lead 
to a loss of trust between the armed forces and their political masters. This has then led to 
changes such as establishing a post for a Director General in the SwAF in 2005.203 The Director 
General is a civilian post with the main task of overseeing the use of funds in the SwAF. But 
the most decisive change is the growing extent of micromanagement of the SwAF in policy 
papers and political decisions.204 In Sweden defence policy does not only guide the SwAF and 
provide it with the funding required to meet its tasks. The policy papers manage the ends, ways 
and means of the SwAF to an extent in which little is left for the agency to manage for itself. 
Thus Swedish policy culture in security and defence issues is coloured by a degree of mistrust 
against the SwAF and a direct by micromanagement approach to political control of the main 
governmental agency tasked with providing security for the state. This policy culture is a part 
of the broader Swedish strategic culture. Such a strong policy culture would then inevitably 
affect the formation of doctrine. The influence of policy culture on doctrine might theoretically 
be either to incorporate policy guidance as given, or be seen as circumventing policy guidance 
in the writing of doctrine all the way to disregarding policy requirements in the doctrinal texts. 
In any event, policy affects doctrine, and policy culture as a dimension of policy could thus also 
affect doctrine. 
 
                                               
200 Haldén (2007) 
201 Haldén (2007), Perspektivstudier p. 67. for examples of perspective studies reports see: https://www.for-
svarsmakten.se/sv/om-forsvarsmakten/dokument/perspektivplanering/ with studies from 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 
2009, 2013 and 2018. 
202 Haldén (2007), p. 98. 
203 Director general for the SwAF, see: https://www.forsvarsmakten.se/sv/organisation/sa-leds-forsvarsmak-
ten/generaldirektoren/ 
204 Haldén (2007), p. 227-248 and Zetterberg (2007). 
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3.2.3 Academic culture 
 
This thesis holds that an academic subculture could exist in the Swedish strategic culture. But 
defining what this academic culture is becomes challenging. Does a generic academic culture 
exist? If yes then the attributes connected to this culture might be drawn from philosophical 
aspects and the relationship to reality knowledge and a systematic approach to conduct re-
search.205 But an academic culture could also be treated as organizational, differing between 
states with independent education systems as well as between universities and colleges.206 The 
academies of the world create and nurture their own academic culture and international coop-
eration in research means that these cultures interact and thus may in some way affect each 
other. But the meaning of academic culture for this thesis is a Swedish understanding of it. 
What is it that the academic world can provide to the enhancement of Swedish defence?  
 
A notion of academization was introduced in Sweden in the 1990s.207The idea was to benefit 
from an academization of the officers´ profession. Reasons for striving for an academic officers 
corps were described as striving to gain individual capability for: “independent and critical 
assessment, distinguish, formulate and solve problems, meet change in the workplace, search 
for and value knowledge on a scientific level, follow the development of knowledge.”208. Con-
necting research with education was thus seen as vital.209 The notion of combining military 
experience with research in order to generate new knowledge was one that the central motives 
expressed.210 But an aspect of better recognition of Swedish officers internationally through 
academization was expressed.211 A better quality of officers became the goal. But the change 
was not necessarily only involved in changing and reshaping the officers profession. As stated 
in a cabinet proposal in 2006: “A university education for the defence sector is to be regarded 
as a tool to meet the new challenges that have been identified in defence, foreign and security 
policy.”212. Broadening the issue to cover the defence sector and leading up to the redefinition 
                                               
205 Such concepts as ontology epistemology, methodology, method can be viewed as “academic” in their own 
right, see chapter 2.1.  
206 An organizational view of academic culture and its management, see: Dill, David D.: The management of Ac-
ademic Culture: Notes on the Management of Meaning and Social Integration, Higher education, 11(3):303-320, 
May 1982. 
207 Nordlund, Peter: Officersutbildning, i Sverige och internationellt, FOI-R-3371-SE, Swedish Defence Rese-
arch Agency, Stockholm 2012. 
208 Swedish Ministry of Defence: Ett reformerat skolsystem för Försvarsmakten, SOU 2003:43. Stockholm 2003, 
p. 72. 
209 Ibid., p. 73, 78. 
210 Ibid., p. 78. Implying that the best way of forming knowledge is through a process of academic research. 
211 Ibid., p. 79. 
212 Swedish Cabinet: Högskoleutbildning av officerare m.m., Regeringens proposition 2006/07:65. Stockholm 
2007, p. 8. 
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of the Swedish Defence University to becoming a University equal to all other Swedish univer-
sities and being moved from under the ministry of defence to the ministry of education in 
2008.213 Currently the Swedish Defence University educates both civilian and military students 
and can award degrees of bachelor, master, and doctor. This academization of the defence sector 
happened at the same time as the introduction of the new military strategic doctrine in 2002 and 
continued as the new doctrines of 2012 and 2016 came into being. The desire to change the 
strategic culture in Sweden to be based more on military science expressed in the first doctrine 
links the two.214 
 
The academic subculture of Swedish strategic culture is thus centralized around the Swedish 
Defence University, but could also contain all and any entities supporting the academization of 
the Swedish security and defence sector. Then most of the universities in Sweden and abroad 
might be included. This thesis holds that academic values, processes and education seem to be 
held at high regard in Sweden. An academization of personnel involved in security and defence 
issues, and mainly the officer corps, has been ongoing since the early 1990s and is still ongoing. 
This means that there are grounds to state that an academic subculture exists. The implications 
of such a subculture are linked with a bettering of the quality of personnel to be able to gain 
and develop knowledge in the support of Swedish defence efforts. This does not however mean 
that knowledge development becomes unproblematic or objective. It is in the interaction of 
policy, military and academic culture that new knowledge and its representations, such as doc-
trines, come to be. Academic culture is a subculture of strategic culture and is defined by the 
academic agents in any given state as well as through the interaction of an international aca-
demic community. Academic culture is a set of values, norms and beliefs that shape a collective 
understanding of standards of scientific research and education, but especially how knowledge 
can and should be generated.  
  
                                               
213 Nordlund (2012), p. 13. & Swedish Cabinet (2007), p. 13. 
214 MSD02, p. 3. 
51 
 
3.2.4 Strategic culture as the sum of subcultures 
 
A national strategic culture can be viewed as composed of a given set of different subcultures 
which interact and sometimes overlap each other. As an umbrella concept a national Strategic 
Culture can be held as either the sum of cross-sectional epistemic communities, or a defined set 
of organizational subcultures i.e. policy, military, industry and academia. In this thesis the focus 
is on the latter one. This division of strategic culture into subcultures is not definite, and not the 
only way of doing it. Any and all of the subcultures used in thesis could be rearranged or divided 
into even smaller sets of subcultures. For instance, the political subculture could be divided into 
differentiated subcultures based on policy affiliations or political parties. The military subcul-
ture is divisible into services, regiments or even smaller groups such as Headquarters, Special 
Forces task groups etc. Any definition of subcultures is always a limiting decision. The path 
chosen in this thesis regarding the division of Swedish strategic culture into subcultures serves 
the purposes of the case study. It is the interaction of a set of subcultures and their relationship 
to the Military Strategic Doctrine which is under examination. 
 
3.3 Swedish Strategic culture and the Military Strategic Doctrine  
 
Previous studies of Swedish strategic culture have focused on Swedish strategic actions and 
decisions. Fredrik Doeser studied Swedish participation in international peacekeeping opera-
tions and found that Swedish strategic culture put international operations before homeland 
defence and uses force based on moral obligations.215 Swedish strategic culture was seen as 
internationally orientated. In another study on strategic actions in international operations Jan 
Ångström and Willem Honig saw that Swedish strategic culture has a distinct national and in-
ternational dimension. Sweden has been able to make strategic choices in multinational opera-
tions based on its own preferences and withheld from use of force in cooperation with great 
powers (US&UK).216 There seemed to be a trait of autonomy in strategic decision making ver-
sus great powers in Swedish strategic culture. Chiara Ruffa on the other hand lifts previous 
neutrality and current military non-alignment as a constitutive element of Swedish strategic 
culture, an element that is under stress as increased international defence co-operation.217 Thus 
a requirement for change in Swedish strategic culture was identified. Studies such as the ones 
                                               
215 Doeser, Fredrik: “Finland, Sweden and Operation Unified Protector:The impact of strategic culture”, Com-
parative Strategy, 35(4)284-297. 2013. 
216 Ångström, Jan & Honig J. W: ”Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture and Escalation in Af-
ghanistan”. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(5):663-687, November 2012. 
217 Ruffa, Chiara: “Sweden” in Biehl, Heiko, Giegerich, Bastian, Jonas Alexandra (eds.): Strategic Cultures in 
Europe Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent 1st edition, Springern Fachmedien. Wiesbaden 2013. 
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mentioned here focus on strategic culture through state behaviour and decisions made in spe-
cific situations. Through examining strategic norms which are identifiable in the Military stra-
tegic doctrine one can gain a holistic view of Swedish strategic culture.  
 
The Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine is a focal point, drawing inputs and cultural influences 
from multiple directions and encoding them into explicit rules and guidelines. Changes in stra-
tegic culture should therefore in some manner be identifiable through the study of the doctrines 
and how they change over time. The doctrine gets its guidance from official governmental pol-
icy, legislation, as well as guidance from the supreme commander. It is through combining 
security and defence policy, legislative guidelines, conceptualizations of the military profes-
sions view on how to provide adequate measures to ensure that politically derived tasks and 
policy that the doctrine comes into being. 
 
Any analysis of military doctrine is dependent on the theory chosen to explain or further under-
standing of the object of analysis. Barry Posen analysed military doctrines based on organiza-
tional and balance of power theory. 218 Regarding organizational theory Posen stresses the in-
fluence of Purpose, People and the Organizational Environment.219 This could be interpreted to 
mean Military organizations form their doctrines based largely of professional attributes, sol-
diers are socialized in their organizational environment and doctrines as heavily affected by 
professional military advice and legacy. This is addressed in this thesis through the analysis of 
the military subcultural influence on doctrine. Posen goes on to state that balance of power 
theory holds explanatory power regarding civilian intervention in doctrine formation.220 Civil-
ian intervention in doctrine formation in this thesis is analysed from two perspectives. The in-
fluence of policy on the military strategic doctrine and how well it is aligned with policy goals 
is one aspect, where the extent to which policy affects the doctrine is analysed.221 The other 
perspective is the extent in which policy directly dictates military ends, ways and means in 
Sweden. Both these aspects are addressed in the case studies by analysing the policy subculture 
and its influence on doctrine. 
 
The theory for this thesis is focused on strategic culture and not explicitly organizational or 
balance of power theory. Thus the statements above about addressing similar issues as Barry 
                                               
218 Posen, Barry R.: The Sources of Military Doctrine – France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars. 
Cornell University Press, London 1986. Organizational theory p. 43-59, Balance of power theory 59-77. 
219 Posen (1986), p. 43-59. 
220 Posen (1986), p. 74-79.  
221 Posen sees that “Military doctrines may or may not be integrated with the political objectives of grand strat-
egy.” Posen (1986), p. 33. 
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Posen did primarily goes to show that research into any given subject can revolve around similar 
phenomena but the chosen theory informs the research and thus makes it possible to reach dif-
fering answers to similar questions. In this thesis it is assumed that a generic Military Strategic 
Doctrine could in some way address the following questions: 222 
 
- What is the threat? (threat perception) 
- What is to be achieved – (tasks and goals for the use of force) 
- When is this to be achieved? (time) 
- Where should this be achieved? (location) 
- How should it be achieved? (ways of using force) 
- With what should it be achieved? (means for using force) 
- With whom should it be achieved? (preferences regarding cooperation) 
- What authorizes the use of force? (legal aspects) 
 
Answers to these questions can be approached as strategic norms. A strategic norm is a corridor 
within which strategic choices are made.223 The stated answer provides an expectation of action 
that will be taken, or an expectation of how other actors actions will be interpreted. These an-
swers thus lay the ground for normative (expected) behaviour. Take for example Threat per-
ception which is constructed as a counter-piece for tasks and goals of the defence force.224 These 
are the result of deliberate choices made based on informed analysis of the threat environment, 
and the ways and means available to counter relevant threats. There is as such no perfect answer, 
only choices made. This thesis draws from the assumption that changing norms signal changes 
in strategic culture. As the Military Strategic Doctrine is a collection of subculturally informed 
strategic norms it is then possible to study these norms, identify changes in them over time and 
analyse why this change has occurred.  
 
In addition to the questions above the following two questions will also be addressed. 
- What type of document is the doctrine? (Academic text / Field manual) 
- What is the explicit and/or implicit relationship to strategic culture in the doctrine? 
 
                                               
222 The categories of analysis are partly similar to the ones used by Christoph O. Meyer who studied: “ Goals for 
the use of force, The way in which force is used, Preferred mode of cooperation and the threshold for Domestic 
and International Authorization” Meyer (2005), p. 530. However Meyer´s focus was not on military doctrine. 
223 Strategic norms as corridors of choice: Meyer (2005), p. 524. 
224 On construction of threat perception see Limnéll, Jarno: “Finnish threat perception policy in the early years of 
the 21st century”. Finnish Defence Studies, National Defence University, Helsinki. 2012. 
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The answers to these two questions help to provide a descriptive image of the academic sub-
cultures influence on the doctrines, as well as establish if the doctrines are shaped with similar 
of differing views on strategic culture. The thematical content analysis of the three doctrines 
structured in a three case-study in the following chapter enables the analysis of subcultural 
influences on doctrine formation as well as furthering the understanding of how Swedish stra-
tegic culture can be understood through strategic norms.     
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4 CASE STUDY: SWEDISH MILITARY STRATEGIC DOCTRINE 
 
This case study focuses on Swedish military strategic doctrine and its relationship with Swedish 
strategic culture. The study encompasses three strategic doctrines which span over a timeframe 
from 2002 to 2016. The doctrines however are the products of changes which occur prior to 
publishing and their influence spans over a changing amount of years since they have been 
published. This means that the timeframe that is studied covers developments from the early 
1990s until 2019.  
 
Initially the case study context is set through placing the doctrine in the Swedish strategic land-
scape which has been described in chapter 3. This is followed by three single case studies which 
each revolve around a specific military strategic doctrine. The context of each case is described 
as a frame based on the time specific relevant security and defence policy developments which 
have affected the forming of the specific doctrine. This is followed by a dissection of the doc-
trine through a thematic text-analysis which strives to identify what norms the doctrine ad-
dresses and in which way. The set of norms are interpreted as descriptive of a case specific 
image of a constructed strategic culture. Finally the results of the three case studies are com-
pared based on context, continuity and change. The final result is an interpretation of strategic 
culture as derived from doctrine answering the third research question: In which ways has Swe-
dish strategic culture changed? 
 
4.1 Positioning the doctrine in the Swedish strategic landscape 
 
The Swedish Military strategic doctrine is per initial definition a military doctrine. It is owned 
and maintained by the SwAF and authorized to be used by the Supreme commander of the 
SwAF.225 The doctrine is organizationally positioned within the frame of the SwAF. In the 
hierarchy of documents, the doctrine is positioned below laws, whitepapers, governmental tasks 
and direction and is at the highest level of normative documents in the SwAF. The doctrine is 
however not given as an order and no sanctions are attached to not following it. The stated 
intent of the doctrine is to work as a guideline for military action in Sweden, not to be followed 
to the letter, rather to guide thinking and give direction.226  The doctrine is tied to a military 
                                               
225 MSD02, MSD12 and MSD16, ÖB signature in doctrines. 
226 Ahlgren, Patrik & Pettersson, Ethel: Utveckling av militärstrategisk doktrin . en dokumentation av den på-
gående processen, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift, nr. 1, p. 37-42. Stockholm 
2001, p. 40. 
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strategic level, which in Sweden links the SwAF to the government via the Ministry of De-
fence.227 The influence of the doctrine, its output, is mainly focused in the SwAF, but other 
actors are affected by it as well. It is through the doctrine that legislators and policy makers can 
see the effects of their work. The translation of policy into guides for action in the form of a 
doctrine informs the political masters of the armed forces general intent regarding the use of 
force in military matters. The doctrine also has a broader audience within Sweden in the form 
of other governmental agencies, students, researchers and defence industry workers. All of 
these actors can study the doctrine to get insights into the presumed actions of the SwAF. There 
is also an international audience for the doctrine, which encompasses friendly actors as well as 
potential hostile actors. The doctrine informs nations seeking to cooperate with Sweden in de-
fence matters what to expect of the SwAF as well as it informs potential aggressors what kind 
of defence they might be up against. 
 
As the military strategic doctrine guides the SwAF in the context of the defence of Sweden its 
inputs come from a broad range of different sources. The different sources stem from varying 
subcultural contexts and thus the doctrine is influenced by a set of subcultural influences. This 
subcultural context, as described in chapter three, positions the doctrine in between two main 
subcultures, the policy and the military. The academic subculture influences the inputs to the 
doctrine either directly or via the political or military subculture. In this way the doctrine is 
positioned as a focal point between three main competing subcultures.228 The inputs to the doc-
trine are funnelled through the authors of the doctrine who make informed choices about what 
to put into the doctrine and what not to. This community of writers of the doctrine form an 
epistemic community which focuses on shaping a normative image of reality shaped by multi-
ple inputs. This image of the expected actions of the SwAF, the what, when, why aspects is 
coded into normative doctrine.  
 
The Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine is thus organisationally fixed to the SwAF and cultur-
ally influenced by multiple subcultures and composed by an epistemic community of writers. 
The doctrine is normative as it describes expected behaviour. Acting according to doctrine is 
expected but there are however different parts of the doctrine. Some parts might be more of 
guidelines while others emphasize strict adherence i.e. national and international law. The fol-
lowing analysis will focus on different strategic norms embedded in the text of the doctrine. It 
is through the study of these norms that a picture of Swedish strategic culture is sketched.  
                                               
227 MSD16, p. 18 
228 See figure 3-1 in chapter three above. 
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4.2 Case A – Military Strategic Doctrine 2002 
 
The first case focuses on the first Swedish Military Strategic doctrine from 2002. As this was 
the first doctrine of this type to be produced in Sweden the context within which the doctrine 
was formed, its frame, might be addressed in different ways. The description of the frame for 
the doctrine from 2002 is limited to the Post-Cold War era. The choice to limit the frame in 
such a manner was made due to the fact that it was only after the end of the Cold War that a 
need for a military strategic doctrine evolved to the point that it came into being. The changes 
in Swedish defence policy and the SwAF in some way lead to a point where this kind of doctrine 
was seen as useful. The frame of the doctrine is described below followed by an abductive 
analysis of the doctrine in the search for strategic norms. The norms are then analysed as per 
where they stem from and what potential subcultural influences they contain. 
 
4.2.1 Frame – From national to international defence 
 
The development of Swedish security and defence policy during the first decade after the end 
of the Cold War can be described as a time of searching for a new purpose. The loss of a stable 
threat as a basis for security and defence considerations coupled with a broader re-arrangement 
of European security and defence arrangements was in a Swedish context a search for meaning. 
Edström & Gyllensporre describe the defence doctrines of Sweden at the time after the end of 
the Cold War until the release of the first doctrine in 2002, as the death of neutrality (1991-
1994), the adaptation doctrine (1994-1998) and the operational doctrine (1998-2002).229 Their 
observations speak for a development where defence of the homeland is substituted by a focus 
on international operations and development defence capabilities to tackle “new” security 
threats. 
 
The loss of the threat from the Soviet Union230 lead to a search for meaning in Swedish defence 
policy. An international focus was introduced at the same time as “new” threats such as terrorism 
international crime, environmental issues humanitarian crises231 became central. International crises 
such as the Gulf War supported striving for quality over quantity in force structure 232 while the 
                                               
229 Edström & Gyllensporre (2014). 
230Swedish Cabinet: Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/1997 samt anslag för budgetåret 
1992/93, Regeringens proposition 1991/92:102. Stockholm 1992, p.8-9, 13-14. and Swedish Cabinet: Totalför-
svar i förnyelse, Regeringens proposition 1995/1996:12. Stockholm 1995, p.3. 
231 Swedish Cabinet: Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret, Regeringens proposition 2001/02:10. Stockholm 2001, 
p. 12-13. & Swedish Cabinet: Totalförsvar i förnyelse – etapp 2, proposition 1996/97:4. Stockholm 1996, p. 58. 
& Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 12. & Swedish Cabinet (2005), p. 8. 
232 Swedish Cabinet (1992), p. 13-16. 
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Balkan conflicts inspired an increased interest in international cooperation, 233 simultaneously in-
creasing motivation for interoperability between Swedish forces and its European and US coun-
terparts.234 A development that continued and got new direction with the 9/11 terrorist attacks 
in New York and the following operations in Afghanistan.235 The international dimension 
helped justify the existence of a Swedish Defence Force which seemed to have lost its require-
ment for national defence. 
 
The use of force in the defence of Sweden changed from the SwAF being the only one to defend 
Sweden in the early 1990s to being part of an international defence of values and rights.236 This 
gradually meant the shift from a conscription based quantitatively large defence force with a 
total defence concept deeply enrooted in national structures towards an internationalization of 
defence and gradual deconstruction of the total defence concept.237 In the mid-1990s the require-
ment for the SwAF was to be able to withstand strategic surprise by a large force but simultaneously 
organize an international force. 238 The concept of neutrality in war was still present in policy in 
1992, but faded from policy papers with the EU membership in 1995 and the introduction of a 
European security dimension in Swedish security and defence policy.239 The increased cooperation 
with NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme also enabled a broadening of interna-
tional cooperation for Swedish defence.240 The developments in the 1990s and the initial years of 
the 21st century depict a process of internationalization and realignment of Swedish defence. The 
first military strategic doctrine was published in the midst of this ongoing process.  
 
The process of academization of the Swedish officer corps was set in motion in the early 1990s 
this process was ongoing when the first military strategic doctrine was published and the intent 
stated in the doctrine to ensure the change of strategic culture to be based more on research and 
military science is indicative of a linkage between the requirements of academization and the 
doctrine.241 The use of doctrine as a tool for education was also stressed by members of the 
team in charge of writing it.242 It is against this frame as described above that the strategic norms 
are to be weighed. 
                                               
233 Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 5, 16. 
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4.2.2 Strategic Norms – need for a defence force 
 
The strategic norms have been identified through a thematic content analysis of the first military 
strategic doctrine published in 2002. The results of the analysis are presented below as norms 
identified within: threat, use of force and role of doctrine. These norms are then interpreted per 
their subcultural affiliation. This in-case analysis is the basis for the comparative analysis be-
tween cases. 
 
Threat – Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter. 
The threats which the armed forces are to prepare for are described in a very overreaching 
manner. There seems to be a wide range of issues that lay the foundation for why an armed 
force is seen to be needed. The abstraction level of the parts of the doctrine which describe 
threats is reasonably high. Starting out with a description of conflict as a struggle of wills where 
the human factor is of vital importance243 and where complexity and uncertainty are aspects 
which have to be managed.244 Any action taken has to take into account the many frictions 
which arise from complex situations filled with uncertainties.245 Time as a factor is linked to 
initiative and the need to act in a timely and decisive manner.246 All these beforementioned 
factors are described as foundational elements of conflict, a conflict that seems inevitable and 
part of human nature.  
 
The description continues with examples of mechanisms which seem to increase the likelihood 
of conflict to arise, these are increased globalization and societal development.247 Where the 
increased globalization develops an increased dependency between nations but also forms new 
vulnerabilities and issues like mass immigration, disease and organized crime become global 
problems. Technological development has led to increased opportunities for various actors to 
gain better ways and means to meet their ends through tools like the internet and cheap world-
wide communication. The ability to strike many targets simultaneously over the globe makes 
for a more complex security environment. It seemed that it was not sufficient only to protect 
geographical areas and borders, security issues are portrayed as global.248 The societal devel-
opment involves changes in values, political will, new actors, technology, external and internal 
                                               
243 MSD02 p. 15-16. A clear connection to the thinking of Carl von Clausewitz. His book “On War” is recom-
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244 Ibid., p. 18-19. 
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246 Ibid., p. 21. 
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relations.249 Violence is seen to be directed at critical societal functions, military forces, the 
civilian population as well as international NGO´s.250 The societal changes are stated to have 
changed the nature of conflict in a way where it is easier to target and affect a variety of different 
societal structures and actors. 
 
There seemed to be different reasons for conflict that were complex, involving multiple actors, 
be material or immaterial have covert goals and even change in character when conflicts 
evolve.251 Threats can be actor driven or without an immediate aggressor, they can be catastro-
phes and even accidents252. All these aspects make for a very broad view on security where 
uncertainties are prevalent all over society and in-between societies. Regarding actors in con-
flict regular and irregular forces are described, as well as the concept of asymmetry between 
differing actors.253 In this asymmetry even moral factors are seen to have a vital role if different 
moral views clash.254Conflict is described as involving different levels ranging from peace via 
armed conflict to war. The dynamics of conflict are seen as scalable from escalation via dead-
locks to de-escalation.255. All of this ends up with an idea of preconditions in the struggle of 
wills where the use of force is the outermost means to be used but should always be used in 
relation to standing regulations.256 The defence force is of course the implied user of force in 
this upcoming struggle. 
 
The description of threat in the doctrine reads as a textbook on conflict, crisis and war set in a 
context of a widened perspective of security. Uncertainty, Complexity and Inevitability are 
themes that form a picture where there is an undisputable need for a defence force. But against, 
what, when and where are left open for interpretation. The loss of a common threat perception 
on a political and policy level is circumvented in the doctrine by the use of a highly abstract 
description of the threat. There is a threat, there will be conflict, we need to prepare for it, but 
no one can say when, where or against whom.  
 
The description of threat summarized as a norm:  
Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter. It involves the whole of society and is global by 
nature. War is the peak of conflict. 
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Use of force – defend the nation 
Regarding the goals and tasks for the use of force the doctrine states that the primary goal is to 
“defend the nation against armed attack in any shape or form it may take”257. This primary 
aim is divided into stages of growing conflict-intensity starting with preventing conflict, con-
tinuing via dampening or suppressing conflict, protecting the nation and its population and 
leading up to defending the nation in war.258 All the before mentioned stages aim at securing 
“freedom of action” for Swedish state actors.259 To meet the requirements of maintained free-
dom of action in all levels of conflict the SwAF´s ultimate task is defined as armed combat260, 
and the aim is to win. The tasks for the SwAF is described further as to deter, prevent, disor-
ganize and destroy the enemy through multifunctional operations.261 The total defence concept, 
which involves the SwAF and all other governmental agencies and civilian society, aims are to 
defend all of Sweden against armed attack, secure territorial integrity, add to peace and security 
in the world, strengthen Swedish society while under great strain. 262 The use of force is thus 
limited to the SwAF regarding combat, but the defence of the nation and its national and inter-
national interests are depicted as a matter for the whole Swedish society. 
 
Reaching the stated goals for the use of force requires continuous action and preparation. To 
this end the doctrine offers an insight into the readiness of the SwAF. Initial operational readi-
ness should be achieved in a matter of hours while rapid reaction forces should be able to act 
within two to ten days. For international operations select units are to be ready in a time period 
of 30 to 90 days, while the main defence forces for national operations should be ready within 
a period of months up to years. Reserve forces for continued fighting require several years to 
be actionable.263 The depiction of readiness and preparedness divided into categories as per type 
of forces is straight forward and descriptive of a continuous readiness for national and interna-
tional operations. 
 
Where force is to be used is described in twofold. Initially the domains of battle and war are 
described as: ground, sea, air and information.264 These domains are depictive of an idea of 
where different assets can be deployed and used to combat aggression and defend the nation. 
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But the same domains are relevant for international operations as the doctrine states that the 
SwAF is to “defend Sweden in all cases and events, in Sweden as well as in other parts of the 
world”265. This clearly defines the use of force as being a matter for national as well as inter-
national concern for the SwAF. 
 
Ways of using force are focused on manoeuvre warfare in joint operations executed under mis-
sion command.266 Force can be used nationally where interagency cooperation is vital. 267 In-
ternationally the use of force is centred around peace keeping operations268 where Civil Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) and conduct of multinational operations is key.269 Other kinds of opera-
tions are described as information and security operations, show of force and CBRN-opera-
tions.270For the conduct of these different kinds operations concepts such as decisive action, 
center of gravity, decisive points, lines of operations, critical vulnerabilities, indirect method, 
initiative, system shock and breaking the enemy´s OODA-loop are introduced.271 Operations 
as differing ways of using force in line with manoeuvre warfare and mission command concepts 
are intended to be implemented with the assets available at the time. However to enable better 
end results the development of a network-based defence concept is introduced.272 The descrip-
tion of ways of using force is straight forward and assertive, but questions to which extent the 
SwAF at the time was equipped and trained to fight according to the concepts in the doctrine 
arises 
  
The means for using force are described as concepts and forces. The concepts are national de-
fence capability, international cooperation, total defence and national service duty.273 The na-
tional defence capability depends on a working total defence concept where the civilian society 
is organized in a manner that supports the efforts of the defence of the nation to the fullest extent 
possible. The total defence concept depends on the national service duty and the involvement 
of a broad part of the population in defence matters, both military and civilian. The international 
cooperation concept is a way of ensuring that the total defence measures get the international 
support they need while also ensuring the protection of Swedish international interests in mul-
tinational operations abroad. The forces to be used for operations are described as operational 
                                               
265 Ibid., p. 117. 
266 Ibid., Manoeuvre warfare p. 75., Joint operations p. 105., Mission command p. 81, 90.  
267 Ibid., p. 105. 
268 Ibid., p. 106-107. 
269 Ibid., p. 105-106. 
270 Ibid., p. 111-112. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN). 
271 Ibid., p. 77-89. Concepts most of which are well in line with NATO Guidelines for Operational Planning at 
the time. 
272 Ibid., p. 123. 
273 Ibid., p. 51. 
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units (Insatsförband), national protection forces, special operations units, local defence units 
(Hemvärnet) and voluntary defence organisations.274 The operational and special forces units 
are the ones with the highest readiness and which were to be used both nationally and interna-
tionally. Whereas the national protection forces were the man asset for national defence, being 
more stationary and not as quick to assemble. As a part of the national protection force the local 
defence units (Hemvärnet) were a relatively rapid asset mainly to be used to protect vital infra-
structure and support combat operations in all domains if required. The local defence organisa-
tions were an asset to ensure that the total defence concept was kept alive and integrated with 
civil society. The means for the use of force can be summarized as all means available and 
covering all aspects of society. 
 
Preferences regarding cooperation with other nations is scarcely described in the doctrine. How-
ever the interoperability of units and troops with “most western European units”275 is descrip-
tive of an intention to prepare for the use of force with troops from NATO- and EU-member 
states. Besides the interoperability claim the concepts of multinational operations, temporary 
coalitions as well as Nordic cooperation are introduced as avenues of international cooperation 
alongside NATO and the EU.276 
 
The authorization of the use of force is described to some detail in the doctrine and is linked to 
international law, human rights, the laws of war as well as national legislation.277 Regarding 
international law the UN-charter and the right to self-defence for nations is highlighted.278 The 
rule of law and compliance with international treaties and law is of vital importance for a non-
aligned small state. The respecting of human rights as well as the requirement for following the 
guiding principles from the Laws of War are stressed upon as well as the requirement to follow 
national law and the Swedish constitution.279 The detail and length in which authorization of 
the use of force and legal aspects are described in the doctrine implies a high level of importance 
of legality regarding use of force at the time. 
 
The norm regarding the use of force in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine from 2002 is 
summarized in the table below.  
 
                                               
274 Ibid., p. 117-119, 199. 
275 Ibid., p. 52. 
276 Ibid., p. 106. 
277 Ibid., p. 41-45. 
278 Ibid., p. 42. 
279 Ibid., p. 43-45. Principles for warfare such as Military necessity, Proportionality, Distinction, Humanity and 
Honor. 
64 
 
Table 4-1 Norm for the use of force in MSD02. 
Question Answer 
What? Deny enemy access to national territory (Nat) 
Deny enemy impact on national interest (Int) 
When? Continuous – readiness levels (Nat) 
Continuous (Int) 
Where? All of Sweden 
UN-led missions (primarily) 
How? Network based defence (to be developed) 
Contingents trained for UN-missions 
With what? Standing and Reserve forces (Nat) 
Standing forces (Int) 
With whom? EU/NATO (Nat) 
UN (Int) 
Authorization? Un charter, laws of war, national law (Nat+Int) 
Norm: 
Force should be used to defend the nation with standing and reserve forces who are available 
at a set degree of readiness with a network-based defence. All of Sweden should be defended 
by SwAF and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations 
to defend Swedish interests.  
 
Role of doctrine 
The doctrine reads more as an academic textbook than a field manual. Concepts are defined, 
suggestions for further reading are offered and there is a relatively high level of abstraction to 
it.280 As such the doctrine fulfils the role as a book for educating the reader and to provide 
direction for military strategic planning.281 The doctrine provides answers to all the categories 
and questions asked in the analysis, and quite consistently on a high level of abstraction. But 
regarding the relationship to strategic culture this doctrine is quite exact, strategic culture is 
defined, and changing strategic culture is stated as an aim of the doctrine.282 So with regard to 
strategic culture the role of this doctrine is to be a tool for change. 
 
Norm: Doctrine is a tool for changing strategic culture. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
280 Ibid., definitions such as: Strategy p. 61, Strategic culture p. 66, policy, doctrine and the strategic process p. 
68, levels of war, p. 69. It seems a lot of work went into defining concepts at the time of MSD02 development. 
Discussion regarding definition of doctrine: Wickbom, Jan: Ny strategidoktrin för Försvarsmaktens omstrukture-
ring, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift, nr. 1, p. 131-134. Stockholm 2001. Military 
strategic ends: Ahlgren, Patrik: Militärstrategisk doktrin – övergripande militärstrategiska mål, Kungliga Krigs-
vetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift, nr. 3, p. 39-42. Stockholm 2001.  Definition of Strategy: Pallin, 
Krister & Anderson, Markus: Militärstrategisk doktrin – strategibegreppet, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademi-
ens handlingar och tidskrift, nr. 3, p. 43-76. Stockholm 2001. 
281 Ahlgren & Petterson (2001), p. 40. 
282 MSD02, Definition of Strategic culture, p. 66. 
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4.2.3 In Case analysis 
 
Regarding subcultural influences the norms show influences from all three anticipated subcul-
tures. The norm regarding threat shows a high degree of influence from an academic subculture 
as the description of threat is very informative but highly abstract. The threat description is 
written in a way as to inform the reader of threats in a wide range of security issues but does 
not provide so much concrete evidence as to which threats are more likely than others from a 
Swedish perspective. This means that the description of threats in the policy papers of the time 
are more to the point than the doctrine. The use of force norm shows a high degree of influence 
from the military subculture. The descriptions regarding use of force are very depictive of the 
SwAF at the time and even goes into details covering ends, ways of means for the use of force. 
The use of force norm does however not keep up with the pace of changes in policy as the 
internationalisation of SwAF accelerates from the late 1990s via decisions in 2001 to a para-
digm change in 2004. As for instance the structure of forces and readiness concepts change 
completely only a couple of years after the release of the doctrine. The military legacy weighed 
heavier than the winds of change in policy. Regarding the role of the doctrine as a whole one 
can see that the doctrine is highly influenced by an academic subculture. The doctrine is de-
picted as a tool for changing strategic culture, and the change should take place through educa-
tion based on military sciences.  
 
In summary the doctrine from 2002 is mostly informed by the academic and military subcul-
tures and the connection to the political level and policy is handled via a high degree of abstrac-
tion. The doctrine was written in accordance to stated goals of changing culture in the SwAF 
but at the same time it works as a book on why Sweden still needed a defence force. The norms 
and the main subcultural influence are listed in the table below. 
Table 4-2 Summary of norms and subcultural influences in MSD02 
Doctrine 
 
Norm Subcultural 
influence 
Threat 
MSD02 
Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter; it involves the 
whole of society and is global by nature. War is the peak of 
conflict. 
Academic 
Use of 
force 
MSD02 
Force should be used to defend the nation with standing and 
reserve forces who are available at a set degree of readiness 
with a network-based defence. All of Sweden should be de-
fended by SwAF and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is 
to be used in international operations to defend Swedish inter-
ests. 
Military 
Role of 
doctrine 
MSD02 
Doctrine is a tool for changing strategic culture. 
 
Academic 
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4.3 Case B – Military Strategic Doctrine 2012 
 
The second case focuses on the second Swedish Military Strategic doctrine from 2012. The 
frame of the doctrine arches over a timeframe from 2002 until 2012. This frame is to be seen 
as a continuum of the frame described in case (A) highlighting changes which have occurred 
with regards to prior developments. Changes in context always lay on a foundation of legacy, 
it is uncommon that everything changes. The description of the frame is followed by an abduc-
tive analysis of the doctrine from 2012 in the search for strategic norms. These norms are ana-
lysed as per where they stem from and what potential subcultural influences they contain. 
 
4.3.1 Frame – Cementing the change 
 
The first post-millennial decade in Swedish security and defence policy can be described as 
cementing the change. A new equilibrium, a new normal, had been found. Defence reforms and 
new concepts were implemented and a time for implementation of the new “new” occurred. 
The evolution of a common European security and defence policy, unitary and multilateral sol-
idarity and an international focus had become the new normative frame for Swedish defence. 
Edström & Gyllensporre talk about the development doctrine (2002-2006) and the solidarity 
doctrine (2006-2010).What they call the regional doctrine (2010-2014) was shaped at the same 
time as the doctrine from 2012 and its therefore interesting to see in which extent the regional 
aspects are addressed in the doctrine.   
 
The “new” threats in Swedish defence policy continued to be relevant, but information-opera-
tions were added as well as an emphasis on the need to be able to handle regional and local 
crisis together with others. 283 International cooperation developed in concord with the EU´s Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which gained a military dimension.284 Cooperation with 
NATO deepened in PfP and the enhanced opportunities program (EOP) and participation in UN, 
NATO and EU led crisis management operations became regular business. 285 The importance of 
international operations and the defence of shared values in a global context grew strong and the 
Swedish unilateral statement of solidarity in 2009 showed a growing interest for defence together 
with others.286 An emphasis on bi- and multilateral cooperation cemented itself in Swedish defence 
policy and a renewed interest for Nordic cooperation was championed. 287  
                                               
283 Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 8. & (1996), p. 58. & (2001), p. 12-13. & Swedish Cabinet: Vårt framtida försvar, 
Regeringens proposition, 2004/05:5. Stockholm 2004a, p. 12, 23. & Swedish Cabinet: Ett användbart försvar, 
Regeringens proposition 2008/09:140. Stockholm 2009a, p. 8. 
284 Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 20-24. 
285 Swedish Cabinet (1995), p. 93. & (2001), p. 23, 62, 67. (2004a), p. 12, 16-17, 29. & (2009), p.9. 
286 Swedish Cabinet (2009), p. 9, 37. 
287 Swedish Cabinet (2009), p. 9-10, 29. 
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These developments took place with new insight from complex warfighting by the US in Iraq from 
2003 onwards, as well as participation in international operations in Afghanistan,288 an operational 
environment that seemed to support the choice to aim for more quality and less quantity in forces.289 
The paradigm-shift which occurred by leaving the conscript based system and opting for a small 
standing force for defence of the nation and its interests manifested itself in 2004.290 At the same 
time the concept of total defence was downgraded.291 The war in Georgia in 2008 sparked some 
mentions in policy papers but did nevertheless not lead to any major change in the downsizing of 
Swedish defence.292 This shifting of focus from the national to the international, from alone to to-
gether is the policy frame in which the doctrine from 2012 is analyzed. 
 
During these policy shifts the academization of the officer corps continued.293 The formaliza-
tion of the academization of the officer corps was achieved in 2008 with the Swedish Defence 
University gaining a place as an equal among other Swedish universities.294 The solution to 
provide the SwAF with officer-education meeting academic standards happened prior to the 
release of the doctrine from 2012. The extent to which the doctrine draws from academic 
formed subculture is under scrutiny below.  
 
4.3.2 Strategic Norms – Security abroad is security at home 
 
The strategic norms in the military strategic doctrine from 2012 have been identified through 
the same thematic content analysis as for case A. The results of the analysis are presented below 
as norms identified within: threat, use of force and role of doctrine. These norms are then inter-
preted a per their subcultural affiliation. This in-case analysis is the basis for the comparative 
analysis between cases. 
 
 
 
Threat - Conflict is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance. 
The description of threat in the doctrine revolves around the nature of conflict and war. Reasons 
for both conflict and war are seen as multiple and complex.295Forces driving conflict and/or war 
                                               
288 Swedish Cabinet (2004a), p. 20-22, 29. 
289 Swedish Cabinet: Försvarsmaktens grundorganisation, Regeringens proposition 2004/05:43. Stockholm 
2004b. 
290 Swedish Cabinet (2001), p. 12-13. & (2004b) & (2009), p.1. 
291 Swedish Cabinet (2001) & (2004a), p. 251-252. 
292 Swedish Cabinet (2009), p. 24. 
293 Swedish Ministry of Defence (2003) & (2007) & Swedish Ministry of Defence: Försvarshögskolan – En 
översyn, SOU 2004:58, Stockholm 2004. 
294 Swedish Ministry of Education: Förordning (2007:1164) för Försvarshögskolan, Stockholm 2007. 
295 MSD12, p. 17. 
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are divided into political or economic factors, poverty and social injustice.296 Different combi-
nations of these forces can lead to conflict or war. Political factors are seen as a driving force 
for most conflicts, while the struggle for resources and economic factors only in some. Eco-
nomic aspects can however prolong conflicts and make them even more complex.297Poverty as 
a factor is not viewed as enough to start a war or incite conflict, it is however viewed as a vital 
factor and also a ground for recruiting people willing to fight for a better life.298 And finally 
social injustice between different groups of people can work as a destabilizing factor and be 
utilized by political actors to instigate conflict and even lead to war breaking out.299 Besides 
these before mentioned factors also social identity in the form of ethnicity, culture or religion 
play a role in conflict dynamics. War can be seen as an expression of ideological, ethnical, 
cultural or religious belonging.300 This description of conflict and war seems well fitted to un-
derstanding conflicts in failed or fragile states. The question is if and in which way this is ap-
plicable to interstate war between developed countries. 
 
Conflict stages and dynamics are described with stages ranging from peace, through crisis to 
war and ending up in a stage of post-conflict.301 Escalation and de-escalation are expressed as 
ways of controlling conflict and steps taken to go from one stage of conflict to another. 302 
Differentiating between different stages of conflict and war is viewed as blurred, it seems dif-
ficult to assess in which stage one is while a conflict is ongoing.303 
 
War is described explicitly drawing from Carl von Clausewitz as a struggle of wills. 304 War is 
a human activity encompassing extraordinary strains and frictions.305 Even an interpretation of 
Clausewitz trinity is explicitly adapted to the doctrine to depict the relationship between poli-
tics, the people and the defence force.306 The reliance on Clausewitz continues with descriptions 
of war as limited or unlimited.307 This ends up with a description of regular war as an affair 
between states with organized military forces in direct confrontation.308  Irregular warfare is 
                                               
296 Ibid., p. 18. 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid. 
299 Ibid., p. 19. 
300 Ibid. 
301 Ibid., p. 20-22. 
302 Ibid., p. 21. 
303 Ibid., p. 21-22. 
304 Ibid., p. 22. The struggle of wills analogy is similar to the one in MSD02. 
305 Ibid., p. 23-24.  
306 Ibid., p. 26. The adaptation of the Clausewitz trinity of people, army and government could be challenged by 
some as not the true trinity, or not what Clausewitz actually meant. However the interesting part for this thesis is 
the reliance on Clausewitzian theory as a foundation for doctrinal understanding of War. 
307 Ibid., p. 26. 
308 Ibid., p.27. 
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depicted inspired by NATO standards as irregular actions or activities. These can take the form 
of insurgency, terrorism, organized crime, riots or piracy.309 Leaving Clausewitz strain of 
thought behind the concepts of hybrid warfare and unconventional warfare are described as 
well as special operations all in some part connected to the notion of asymmetry in conflict.310 
This description of conflict and war draws from Clausewitz but tries to expand it by adding on 
the asymmetrical and irregular aspects of warfare as something new or at least current and 
relevant.  
 
Globalization and the developing information technology seem to challenge a more conven-
tional image of war,311 making it more complex, more agile and more difficult to define. Com-
pression of geographical distance and time due to technological advances and ongoing global-
ization seem to make conflicts more likely to have an effect on nations far away.312 The spec-
trum of conflict and degree of state involvement paint a picture of a highly complex conflict 
dynamics that can affect any nation at any time. Conflicts are seen to range between high in-
tensity to low intensity and from high state involvement to low state involvement. 313 This glob-
alized, technologically driven complex conflict environment forms a picture of conflict and war 
as multifaceted global and in some part inevitable. The internationalization of conflict in the 
threat perception on a political and policy level is adopted in the doctrine but on a high abstrac-
tion level. There are multiple threats abroad, there will always be conflict, we need to be con-
tinuously prepared for international conflict prevention against a multitude of different state 
and non-state actors. 
 
The description of threat summarized as a norm:  
Conflict ranges from high to low intensity and state involvement, is global by nature and can 
affect any nation at a distance. War is the continuation of politics by other means, but its evolv-
ing nature is blurring the line between war and peace. 
  
Use of force – Defend the nations´ international interests 
The tasks and goals for the use of force in the doctrine is set at a high abstraction level and 
covers the whole scale of conflict. 314 Here the SwAF represents the utmost means to exert 
power in the military dimension, although is clearly stated not to be able to reach political ends 
                                               
309 Ibid., p. 28. 
310 Ibid., p. 30. 
311 Ibid., p.31. 
312 Ibid., p. 32. 
313 Ibid., p. 38. 
314 Ibid., p. 13. 
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but to be treated as a vital part of security political means.315 And as the ultimate tool for use of 
military power the SwAF is to sustain and develop Swedish military defence and defend the 
nation nationally as well as internationally.316 The overreaching aim for the military defence of 
Sweden was stated as “preventing and managing conflicts and war to ensure Sweden´s exist-
ence, survival and independence. This should happen alone or together with others, through 
operations on our own territory, locally, regionally and globally. Sweden must thus be able to 
give and receive military support.”317 The goal for use of force is to sustain Swedish interests 
on a spectrum ranging from national to the fully international. The tasks of SwAF are to main-
tain sovereignty and territorial integrity, dampen and prevent the spreading of conflicts, protect 
Swedish society and ultimately to defend the nation against armed aggression, alone or together 
with others.318 
 
The use of force is temporarily described linked to different concepts while the readiness-sys-
tem is stated to be “under development and ready in the next doctrine”319. Force is to be used 
if necessary in all stages of conflict, ranging from peace through crisis to war.320 The use of 
force is tied to the concepts of escalation, de-escalation, armed conflict, war and post-con-
flict.321 Here the use of force is to be planned and executed in accordance to which stage of 
conflict one is in. The concept of time-compression is introduced as a mechanism where con-
flicts can change between stages very rapidly depending on the dynamics of the conflict.322But 
with the readiness-system and reaction times missing from the doctrine the matter of time and 
when to use force is not extensively examined in the doctrine. 
 
Regarding where force is to be used the doctrine describes geographical as well as conceptual 
dimensions. The geographical aspects cover use of force in national and international operations 
and introduces geographical compression as a concept linking the two.323 The spreading of con-
flict from far abroad to home is either factual in physical events taking place nationally with 
international roots such as terrorism and international crime or through other effects i.e. eco-
                                               
315 Ibid., p.75. Other means are i.e. diplomacy, economical etc. 
316 Ibid., p.76. 
317 Ibid., p. 76. The reference to giving and receiving military support can be seen as closely related to the Swe-
dish unilateral declaration of solidarity in 2009. To give and to take. 
318 Ibid., p. 77. Prevent is again used instead of to deter and has a softer connotation.   
319 Ibid., p. 110. Unfinished chapter on readiness. 
320 Ibid., p.19. 
321 Ibid., p.19-21. 
322 Ibid., Time-compression p. 32. conflict spectrum p. 38. 
323 Ibid., National and international operations p. 76, geographical compression p. 32. 
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nomical or humanitarian aspects. This dualistic operational environment (national and interna-
tional) is described as consisting of five domains: ground, air, sea, space and information.324 
All of which are domains in which aggressors might act against Swedish interests and thus 
Sweden is obliged to be able to counter threats in all these domains. To be able to do this the 
notion of giving and taking military support325 becomes vital as building security in all these 
domains both nationally and internationally might arguably be too much for a small nation to 
handle. Linking to international support the concept of expeditionary warfare is also introduced 
as something SwAF is to conduct.326 The international aspects of where force is to be used is 
very much in the forefront with the word international mentioned 98 times in the doctrine com-
pared to 68 times for national. 
 
Ways of using force are described as dependant on physical, conceptual and moral factors.327 
The basic abilities which are seen as central to Swedish warfighting are command, mobility, 
effect (kinetic), intelligence, security/protection.328 And it is through the interaction of the op-
ponents and one´s own basic abilities that one can succeed and win a fight.329 The conduct of 
warfighting should address eleven (11) principles of war and an additional five (5) principles 
for irregular warfighting.330 And generic operations should follow a routine of intelligence gath-
ering, conduct of operations and leading up to development of forces, tactics and concepts.331 
Operations and special operations should cover regular and irregular warfare, and be based on 
effect thinking.332 Operations are to follow a direct or indirect approach, be based on manoeuvre 
warfare, led through mission command and implemented as combined arms fighting.333 It is in 
the timely change between defensive and offensive orientation that decisive action can be taken 
and success achieved.334 A comprehensive approach for operations where all actors in a desig-
nated conflict are involved and managed is required for conflict management and prevention to 
                                               
324 Ibid., p. 33. 
325 Ibid., p.76. Giving and taking military support. 
326 Ibid., p.137-140. Expeditionary warfare brings into mind great power competition and historical Swedish ex-
peditionary warfighting during an era of being a European great power. Not something one would instinctively 
combine with building security for a contemporary small state. 
327 Ibid., p. 56. Mentioned as warfighting capabilities. 
328 Ibid., p. 58. 
329 Ibid., p. 60. 
330 Ibid., p. 62-68. The eleven principles: Set up and stick to objectives, concentration of forces, surprise, free-
dom of action, initiative, security, high spirits (esprit de corps), simplicity, economic use of force, maintenance, 
coordination. And the five principles for irregular warfare: Legitimacy, Restraint, Impartiality, Transparency, 
Credibility. 
331 Ibid., p. 78. 
332 Ibid., p. 104. The required or wanted effect on the enemy dictates the actions to be taken.  
333 Ibid., p. 119-135. 
334 Ibid., p. 145. 
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succeed.335 The increased need for cooperation with armed forces from other nations forms a 
requirement for the SwAF to have a high degree of interoperability.336 
 
The means for using force are described both as conceptual and more concrete. The conceptual 
means are the total defence concept with the requirement of a working civil defence.337 The 
main means for the use of force are warfighting units which are divided into standing units and 
contracted units.338The before mentioned are divided into army, navy and air-force units, and 
additionally into command, intelligence, information warfare, logistics, home guard, special 
operations and reserve units.339 In addition to the set of units mentioned also the voluntary de-
fence organizations are still counted as means for the use of force.340 The conceptual change of 
relying on contracted instead of conscripted soldiers makes for a big change in the way means 
for the use of force are addressed.341 Fewer units, but with higher readiness and degree of pro-
fessionalisation seems to have been deemed as an appropriate response to the perceived changes 
in the security environment. 
 
The different parts of the doctrine all seem to support international cooperation and bring it to 
the forefront. However the doctrinal text is quite silent regarding who this international coop-
eration should be conducted with. But as an example the comparison of command structures in 
the doctrine brings up NATO and the EU.342 It seems to be left up to policy to dictate whom to 
cooperate with and for the doctrine to describe how.  
 
The authorization of the use of force is linked to international law, human rights, the responsi-
bility to protect (R2P), the laws of war as well as rules of engagement.343 The international law 
aspect highlights the UN-charter, article 51 on self-defence as well as the whole chapter VII 
regarding conduct of peacekeeping operations as well as the concept of responsibility to protect 
which emphasizes the international responsibilities of all UN-member states.344 The laws of 
war, human rights and rules of engagement are all addressed in close connection to one another. 
                                               
335 Ibid., p. 86. 
336 Ibid., p. 79. 
337 Ibid., p. 80-81. 
338 Ibid., p. 99. Note that reserve units are not a part of the main defence concept where availability of forces and 
high readiness is key. The change into having standing units and contracted units is central in distinguishing this 
doctrine from its predecessor. 
339 Ibid., p. 100-106. 
340 Ibid., p.84. 
341 Ibid., p. 108-109. 
342 Ibid., p. 53. 
343 Ibid., p. 71-72, 96-99. 
344 Ibid., p. 71-72. Responsibility to protect as a concept can in some sense work as a tool to justify military oper-
ations in international arenas. 
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The notion that every conflict is unique and that legislative and regulatory measures depend on 
the operational environment echoes an emphasis on international operations in changing con-
texts rather than preparation for conflict in Sweden with a very specifically highly defined set-
ting. The norm regarding the use of force in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine from 2012 
is summarized in the table below.  
 
Table 4-3 Norm for the use of force in MSD12. 
Question Answer 
What? Quick reaction to enemy threats (Nat) 
Secure national interests abroad (Int) 
When? Continuous – standing forces (Nat) 
Continuous – rotation of forces (Int) 
Where? Areas of Sweden affected by threat 
NATO, EU and UN-missions 
How? Operational defence concept (Insatsförsvar) 
Rotation of all standing forces for international missions 
With what? Standing forces (Nat) 
Standing forces (Int) 
With whom? NATO, EU (Nat) 
NATO, EU, UN (Int) 
Authorization? Un charter, R2P, national law (Nat+Int) 
Norm: 
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected with operational standing forces, 
which are available at all times. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and 
supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in international operations to secure 
Swedish interests. 
 
Role of doctrine 
The doctrine from 2012 has a higher resemblance to a field manual and what one could consider 
a tool for command than its predecessor. The doctrine contains a high degree of concept defi-
nitions and even covers moral and ethical aspects of warfare.345 The doctrine is well aligned 
with the implemented policy changes and as such gives an appearance of cementing the change, 
providing normative guidance as how to position oneself as a Swedish officer in the “new” 
SwAF. The doctrine has an inverted approach to strategic culture compared to its predecessor, 
as it states that changes in strategic culture require new doctrine.346 The implemented changes 
in the SwAF are said to have changed the culture and thus new doctrine is required. Interestingly 
concrete changes in force structure, abolishment of conscription, a new operational defence 
                                               
345 Ibid., definitions such as: Military doctrine as a means of teaching, p.9., security policy dimensions, p. 77. 
War and forces of War, p. 22-23, 25. Strategy p. 43-45. Overall aim of military action, p.45. Levels of War, p. 
47. Moral factors and the military profession, p.89. 
346 Ibid., p. 15. 
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concept, an increased dependence on international cooperation and the unilateral solidarity dec-
laration are expressed as factors that have changed the strategic culture.347 This is a clear and 
explicit connection between doctrine and strategic culture, but inverted compared to MSD02. 
Norm: Changes in strategic culture requires new doctrine. Doctrine is a tool to translate and 
transfer environmental changes into normative guidelines for the SwAF. 
 
4.3.3 In case analysis 
 
The norms identified in the analysis show influences from all three subcultures. The norm re-
garding threat shows a high degree of influence from the academic subculture as it mostly stays 
on a high abstraction level. The threat described is different from the threat in MSD02, but the 
way in which it is described is similarly vague as to which threats are more likely to occur than 
others. The widening of the security concept is well depicted and the blurring of the line be-
tween war and peace coupled to an international stance makes for an academic description of 
how the threats are global and Sweden can be affected from afar. The threat description in the 
policy papers once again offers a more concrete threat-description than the doctrine. The norm 
covering use of force seems to show a balanced influence of both military and policy subcul-
tures. The changes that had taken place during the start of the 21st century had been put into 
effect and the doctrine describes the use of force very much in line with policy papers. The 
internationalisation of use of force is central. As for the role of the doctrine it seems the aca-
demic influence is still strong, but the military subculture shines through more clearly. Using 
the doctrine to cement the changes and as a normative tool for command. The norms and the 
main subcultural influence are listed int the table below. 
 
Table 4-4 Summary of norms and subcultural influences in MSD12. 
Doctrine 
 
Norm Subcultural 
influence 
Threat 
MSD12 
Conflict ranges from high to low intensity and state involve-
ment, is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance. 
War is the continuation of politics by other means, but its evolv-
ing nature is blurring the line between war and peace. 
Academic 
Use of 
force 
MSD12 
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, with 
operational standing forces, which are available at all times. 
Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and 
supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in interna-
tional operations to secure Swedish interests. 
Military and 
Policy 
Role of 
Doctrine 
MSD12 
Changes in strategic culture requires new doctrine. Doctrine is 
a tool to translate and transfer environmental changes into nor-
mative guidelines for the SwAF. 
Academic 
(Military) 
                                               
347 Ibid., p.15. 
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4.4 Case C – Military Strategic Doctrine 2016 
 
The third case focuses on the third, and currently in-service use, version of the Swedish Military 
Strategic doctrine from 2016. The frame of the doctrine arches over a short timeframe from 
2012 until 2016. This frame is to be seen as a continuum of the frame described in cases (A) 
and (B) highlighting changes which have occurred with regards to prior developments. The 
short period of time means that the span of influential policy describing and guiding sources is 
quite limited. This however does not mean that the changes are in any way smaller or less 
relevant than if the changes had occurred over a longer period of time, rather the opposite.  The 
description of the frame is followed by an abductive analysis of the doctrine from 2016 in the 
search for strategic norms. These norms are analysed as per where they stem from and what 
potential subcultural influences they contain. 
 
4.4.1 Frame – Re-nationalization 
 
A reshaping of Swedish security and defence policy occurred swiftly halfway in to the second 
decade of the 21st century. Due to the deterioration of the security situation in Europe a shift of 
focus occurred making homeland defence take point over the international focus of the previous 
decade. Edström & Gyllensporre talk about the regional defence doctrine (2010-2014).348 What 
to call the Swedish defence doctrine from 2014 onwards is in itself an interesting definition to 
make.349 The re-alignment of European security and defence policy, NATO´s new stance and 
need for hard power led to a realignment of Swedish security and defence policy. 
 
The re-emergence of military threat against Swedish territory meant a shift of focus.350 A na-
tional focus for defence emerged while the international aspects developed into an aspiration 
for some form of an allied defence of Swedish territory than to international crisis manage-
ment.351 Important partners such as Finland and the USA make for core players in this alliance 
without an alliance.352 And the cooperation with NATO grew even deeper via the EOP and 
Host Nation Support (HNS) treaty making it easier to receive military support.353 It was un-
doubtedly the Russian aggression towards Ukraine in 2014 and the illegal occupation and later 
                                               
348 Edström & Gyllensporre (2014). 
349 Following Edström & Gyllensporre´s line of thought one could venture to talk about the national doctrine 
where defence of the homeland and Swedish territory is central. 
350 Swedish Cabinet: Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016-2020, Regeringens proposition 
2014/15:109. Stockholm 2015, p. 46-47. 
351 Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 1-2, 62. However still claiming military non-alignment. 
352 Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 37, 56. 
353 Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 37-38, 56. 
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annexation of the Crimean-peninsula that sparked and fueled these changes.354 Sweden was in 
a situation with a legacy of a small standing force for the defence of the nation, and a new cyber-
domain which required attention in a security environment with a restless Russia.  355 It is clear 
that the changes in the Swedish security environment were felt to require a new doctrine. The doc-
trine from 2016 is analyzed in a frame of renationalization of Swedish defence. 
  
 
The new requirements of the changing security environment which led to a need to grow the 
SwAF also led to a change in the academization process. The requirement for a larger number 
of officers opened up for alternative ways in to the profession.356 Allowing for persons holding 
academic degrees to be enabled a “fast-lane” to becoming an officer with a shorter time of study 
required at the Swedish Defence University. This is a change that has been implemented, but 
only after the release of the doctrine under examination. The academization has as such reached 
its peak and the requirement for academic degrees has become mandatory for commission as 
an officer in the SwAF.357 
 
4.4.2 Strategic Norms – Complexity and national defence  
 
The strategic norms in the military strategic doctrine from 2016 have been identified through 
the same thematic content analysis as for case A and B. The results of the analysis are presented 
below as norms identified within: threat, use of force and role of doctrine. These norms are then 
interpreted per their subcultural affiliation. This in-case analysis is the basis for the comparative 
analysis between cases. 
 
Threat – The grey-zone and nuclear weapons. 
The threat description in the doctrine starts of on a high abstraction level but quickly continues 
to address more concrete threats with a close geographical proximity to Sweden. The character 
of future conflicts is addressed two-folded as a matter of conflicts regarding Swedish interests 
close to home as well as part of crisis management and international operations far from home. 
Any antagonist is seen to use both conventional and unconventional methods as well as ad-
vanced capabilities and weapons-systems.358 Different ways and means of action are depicted 
                                               
354 Swedish Cabinet (2015), p. 22, 42-43. 
355 Swedish Cabinet (2004b) & (2009), p. 52-53. & (2015), p. 71-79, 111. 
356 Swedish Ministry of Defence: En robust personalförsörjning av det militära försvaret, SOU 2016:63, Stock-
holm 2016, p. 110-111. 
357 The discussion on the academization of the officer corps is however still ongoing at the time of writing this 
thesis, as the first graduates of the Higher Joint Command and Staff Programme graduated as Masters of War 
Studies in June 2020. For contemporary discussion, see: Sandberg, Ola: ”Akademiseringen av officersutbild-
ningen”, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift, nr. 2, p. 145-151. Stockholm 2020. 
358 MSD16, p. 29. 
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as ranging from deception and cyberattacks to usage of long rage weapons-systems and highly 
mobile qualified combat units.359 The goals for the use of force might include taking and hold-
ing terrain, but this is not seen as an end in itself. The expected aim for an aggressor is to deny 
Swedish forces physical access to deployment and manoeuvre areas but also deny access in 
cyberspace and space.360 This description draws a picture of preparing for defence of the home-
land against a well-equipped qualified aggressor. The struggle of wills from previous doctrines 
is thus depicted quite differently and more to the point. 
 
Consequences of globalization are addressed through an overview of actor dynamics, global 
and local flows, cyberspace and social dynamics. The state actor is seen as a leading force in 
the international system. But the influence of non-state actors is on the rise and they can be both 
autonomous as well as front organizations for state actors. The global and local flows of trans-
ports, energy, economy and trade are depicted as vital for the survival of the state. A just in 
time concept adopted by Sweden and many of its European neighbours builds a vulnerability 
which needs to be protected. The developing dimension of cyberspace into a global avenue of 
influence and aggression makes for a multifaceted vulnerability.361 While changes in social 
dynamics such as increased travel and larger migration flows open up for conflicts to spread 
globally.362 The globalization of threats sums up to a set of vulnerabilities which are partly or 
wholly outside the reach of any single state to address fully. 
 
The consequences of limited military resources and the Swedish military strategic context is 
described in connection to the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. The downsizing of military assets in 
many European states is a shared concern. While the close proximity to Russia which Sweden 
shares with Finland is a matter of concern. The possibility to use long-rage weapons systems 
directly at Sweden makes for a great concern. Regarding the Baltic sea control of sea- and air 
lines of communication through control of the larger islands i.e. Gotland as well as control of 
the narrow passage through the Gulf of Finland are concerns with regards to Russia. The Arctic 
is seen as an area of possible heightened tensions through the economic gains which might 
come from the opening of a new sea line of communication. The increased Russian military 
activity in the area is of concern.363 Also the notion that not all European states share the same 
security concerns as Sweden is highlighted as concern for ensuring security in areas close to 
                                               
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid., Quoted as Anti-Access (A2), Area-Denial (AD). 
361 Ibid., p. 30. 
362 Ibid., p. 31. 
363 Ibid., p. 31. 
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and relevant to Swedish interest.364 The concerns raised summarize a picture of great interest 
in security issues close to home. 
 
Conflict dynamics such as escalation, de-escalation and deterrence are addressed as vital for 
controlling the security situation. The threat of de-escalation through the use of nuclear weap-
ons is introduced.365Consequences of nuclear weapons is more thoroughly examined as a part 
of deterrence between great powers, but also in the form of use of tactical nuclear weapons. It 
is in the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a means for de-escalation that forms a direct threat 
to Sweden.366 The nuclear dimension of the threat re-emerges as something forgotten since the 
cold war. The threat has arguably always been there but its re-emergence as a threat to Sweden 
in stated doctrine is interesting as it shows a renewed interest, and worry, about Russian nuclear 
capabilities.  
 
Hybrid threats, covert action and differing ways of coercion or direct aggression is addressed 
in a concept called the grey-zone. The grey-zone is identified as an area between peace and war, 
an area which allows for a wide range of actions to be taken without stepping over the threshold 
of war. Ultimately the grey-zone means uncertainty. Uncertainty of whether actions are aggres-
sion, who the aggressor is and what their goals are. The blurring of internal and external security 
and peace and war makes for a difficult and highly challenging context for conflict.367 The grey-
zone has been introduced as a concept to describe just how complex the threat environment 
seems to be. The threat is not so much the preservation of peace or the fighting of war as it is 
depicted as the ability to take decisive action in a grey-zone of uncertainties. There are multiple 
threats close to home including nuclear weapons, conflict might already be ongoing, we need 
to prepare for it. Russia is the main security concern. 
 
The description of threat summarized as a norm:  
Conflict has a national as well as an international dimension, is global and affects nations with 
little distinction. The dichotomy of war and peace is overshadowed by a grey-zone of uncer-
tainty. Swedish interests are threatened close to home by potential overt and covert action by 
Russia including the use of nuclear weapons. 
 
 
 
                                               
364 Ibid., p. 32. 
365 Ibid., p. 32. 
366 Ibid., p. 34. 
367 Ibid., p.35-38. 
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Use of force – Defend the nation, together with others  
The goals for the use of force are depicted as conceptual in a military strategic concept and in 
relationship to conflict stages. The military strategic concept states that “Sweden is to be de-
fended… an armed attack shall be met swiftly in order to win time and establish freedom of 
action. This shall be followed by defensive operations, in cooperation with others aiming to win 
the war, alternatively unaided operations aiming at avoiding losing the war.”368So the ultimate 
goal for the SwAF is to defend Sweden, hopefully in close cooperation with other partner na-
tions. As a part of this main goal a deterrence aspect is introduced as a requirement for the 
SwAF of building of a threshold to deter aggressors.369 To deter a potential aggressor is a main 
message of this doctrine. The goals of controlling conflict through escalation and de-escalation, 
which have both been central for the doctrines from 2002 and 2012, remain.370The requirement 
to be able to shift between conflict levels through escalation or de-escalation is however de-
picted from a deterrence viewpoint. Here the ability to quickly escalate might be just as forceful 
a deterrent as an ability to de-escalate.371’ 
 
The core tasks for the SwAF is to defend Sweden and promote Swedish security and Swedish 
interests through conduct of operations in Sweden and abroad.372 This task is divided into six 
subtasks which cover the ability to: counter armed attack, defend Sweden’s territorial integrity, 
conflict management both nationally and internationally, interagency and international cooper-
ation, support the civilian society. And finally, the ability to mobilize and use all warfighting 
units to meet any military aggression against Sweden and Swedish interests.373  
 
As for the temporal dimension of the use of war this doctrine describes a continuous need for 
preparedness. Strains on society, threats to security, the threat of war and armed attack are all 
different stages in time when the use of force may be required.374 The blurring of the imaginary 
line between war and peace is described in the grey-zone concept where the uncertainty of 
action and state of conflict demands a continuous readiness to act against a wide range of 
threats. The distinction between war and peace becomes more of a legislative and political 
                                               
368 Ibid., p. 6. Winning together or avoiding losing unaided is the core message of the doctrine from 2016. As 
such this is an interesting statement to make as it can be interpreted in the sense that SwAF will not even attempt 
to win a war alone. A statement of realities on one hand as the resources and capabilities of the state to win a war 
might rightly be insufficient. But on the other hand the notion of fighting on not to lose, but with no way of win-
ning alone might be noble, but is a rather grim statement.  
369 Ibid., p. 6. Building a threshold through offensive action in peace and wartime. 
370 Ibid., p.32. 
371 Ibid., p. 6. The conceptual requirement for swift action and ability to shift between offensive and defensive 
modus operandi can be seen in the light of building an ability to de-escalate through rapid escalation.  
372 Ibid., p. 41. 
373 Ibid., p. 40-41. 
374 Ibid., p. 22. 
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problem, than a factor for the SwAF regarding readiness for operations. The grey-zone implies 
that some threats are imminent or already active, inaction is not a viable option.   
 
Where force should be used is described divided into geographical aspects and domains. The 
geographical aspects cover homeland defence, regional defence and operations far away from 
the homeland.375 The national defence focus is on maintaining territorial integrity which might 
include cyberspace.376 Domains that require attention and ability to act are defined as: ground, 
sea, air and cyberspace.377In summary the SwAF should have the ability to defend Sweden and 
its interests nationally, regionally and internationally on the ground, at sea, in the air and in 
cyberspace. 
 
Ways of using force are described based on type of operations, basic abilities and the concepts 
of manoeuvre warfare, systems- and comprehensive approach to warfare. Operations are to be 
conducted as joint operations, rely on combined arms fighting and be led through mission com-
mand.378 The systems approach indicates a treating of units and capabilities as interlinked and 
the interaction between a friendly (own) system and a hostile (enemy) systems are what battles 
are about.379 The battles and operations should be conducted on the principles of manoeuvre 
warfare and concepts such as centre of gravity and culmination points are seen as essential..380 
The aggressor´s point of culmination is stressed to be essential to identify.381 A comprehensive 
approach to warfighting is also stressed, as part of crisis management operations, while national 
defence should rely on manoeuvre warfare.382 On the highest abstraction level it is the shifting 
between offensive and defensive stances that a military strategic balance is to be achieved.383 
This balancing act is a key element of deterrence and threshold-effect which are sought after. 
The means for the use of force are described on a conceptual level, but not in the form of tan-
gible assets such as units or forces. The main concepts of the means for using force are the will 
to defend the nation and a total defence concept.384 Other means are not described at any length 
as it seems this military strategic doctrine intends to leave the means part to be described in the 
                                               
375 Ibid., p. 29. 
376 Ibid., p. 55-56. 
377 Ibid., p. 60. 
378 Ibid., p. 6, 58. 
379 Ibid., p. 62. 
380 Ibid., p. 41, 58. 
381 Ibid., p. 42. The aggressors culmination point is described as decisive for Swedish warfighting. 
382 Ibid., p. 58, 63. 
383 Ibid., p.6, 58. 
384 Ibid., p.44-45. The will to defend the nation is described as a means by its own right. It seems the will to fight 
is conceptualized into something one has to focus on, how to build it, maintain it and use it. This is tightly con-
nected to the total defence concept where all of society has to work together to meet all the different threats. 
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operational level doctrine for joint operations.385 But undoubtedly the means to be used in ac-
cordance with the doctrine are the available forces at the SwAF disposal. It seems a choice was 
made not to list them in the doctrine.386 
 
The preferences regarding cooperation revolve around partnerships with high relevance for the 
military defence of Sweden. The explicitly named partners are the EU, USA, NATO and the 
Nordic countries.387 The spectrum of international cooperation is described according to 13 
different ways of cooperation.388Solidarity seems a vital part of the international cooperation 
described in the doctrine. Showing of solidarity and ultimately relying on the solidarity of others 
to help Sweden in its defence efforts is a key ingredient of the military strategic concept the 
doctrine champions. Cooperation is viewed with respect to the military defence of Sweden, not 
as something primarily to do with international crisis management.  
 
The authorization of the use of force is not described in detail or at great length. Only a few 
mentions regarding legislation are to be found in the doctrine. A mention of the right to self-
defence as based of the UN-charter and the right to defend Swedish interest internationally as 
part of crisis management operations are mentioned in connection to the right to use military 
force.389 Besides this some legislation references to national Swedish law are made in connec-
tion to a comprehensive approach to crisis management.390No mention of the laws of war or 
rules of engagement are reiterated, but a mention of the need for ethical leadership in battle and 
war is offered.391 It seems the rule of law and the legislation are to some extent taken for granted 
and a more detailed description of legislation or rules regulating the use of force has been 
deemed unnecessary. 
 
The norm regarding the use of force in the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrine from 2016 is 
summarized in the table below. 
 
 
                                               
385 Ibid., p. 9-10. see also Swedish Armed Forces: Doktrin för Gemensamma operationer – DGO20, FM HRC, 
Stockholm 2020. 
386 Any user of the doctrine within the SwAF is undoubtedly aware of which assets are available at any given 
time. But leaving out the means part is an example of trying to keep MSD16 on a military strategic level and 
more abstract. The concepts seem important, but linking them to concrete measures is left up to the reader. 
387 MSD16, p. 48. Partners that are deemed important for the military defence of Sweden. 
388 Ibid., p. 48-49. (1) Treaties, partnerships and cooperation (2) Visits (3) Defence attaché networks (4) Capabil-
ity development (5) International exchange of personnel (6) Observers (7) Contributions to international crisis 
management (8) Training and mentoring of other nations defence efforts (9) Internationally recognized training 
programs (10) Security Sector Reform (11) Combined exercises (12) Defence industry cooperation (13) Main-
taining territorial integrity and show of solidarity. 
389 Ibid., p. 50.  
390 Ibid., p. 64-65. Laws regulating civil military and interagency cooperation. 
391 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Table 4-5 Norm for the use of force in MSD16. 
Question Answer 
What? Deny enemy freedom of action in and against Swedish territory (Nat) 
Protect national interest (Int) 
When? Continuous – ongoing (Nat) 
Continuous – ongoing (Int) 
Where? Areas of Sweden affected by threat including cyberspace (Nat) 
Vital crisis management operations (Int) 
How? Operational defence concept, winning together avoiding losing alone 
Rotation of standing forces for international missions 
With what? Standing and reserve forces (Nat) 
Standing forces (Int) 
With whom? NATO, EU, USA and the Nordic countries especially Finland (Nat) 
NATO, EU, UN (Int) 
Authorization? UN charter, national law regarding comprehensive approach (Nat+Int) 
Norm: 
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, at all times, with all available 
forces. Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and supporting partners 
(NATO, EU, USA, Finland and other Nordic countries). Force is to be used in international 
operations to protect Swedish interests. 
 
Role of doctrine 
The doctrine from 2016 could be described as a military strategic field manual. It appears in its 
essence to be a tool for command providing normative guidance for the SwAF on a military 
strategic level. The doctrine as its predecessor contains a high amount of concept definitions 
and has a baseline of keeping a rather high abstraction level through the text.392 The doctrine 
seems to be well aligned with implemented policy changes and appears to be a normative guide 
for implementation of the realignment of the defence of Sweden. The doctrine has a much more 
implicit relationship to strategic culture than its predecessors. Strategic culture is approached 
as something that does exist, and influences doctrine, but not as an essential tool for changing 
behaviour.393 Factors such as a long experience of neutrality, military non-alignment as well as 
will to preserve freedom of action are mentioned as central parts of Swedish strategic culture 
and identity.394 This description is very fitting with a first generation interpretation of strategic 
culture where contextual slowly changing factors are the central elements of strategic culture.  
The doctrine also clearly aims at separating the military strategic level from the operational 
which can be seen among other things in the shallow description of means for the use of force.  
 
Norm: Doctrine is culturally influenced and is to be used as a command-tool to provide norma-
tive strategic guidance for the SwAF regarding defence of the nation to be implemented as per 
operational and tactical level doctrine.  
                                               
392 Ibid., definitions such as strategy, military strategy p. 16-17, warfighting ability p. 25.etc. 
393 Ibid., p. 15. 
394 Ibid., p. 27. 
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4.4.3 In case analysis 
 
The norms identified in the analysis of the doctrine mainly show influences from the military 
and some from the policy subculture. The norm regarding threat shows a high degree of influ-
ence from the military subculture as it is quite concrete and to the point. The threat description 
is tied to clear areas, actions and actors. The threat description is also in line with the contem-
porary policy papers. The introduction of the grey-zone as a concept bridges the gap between 
the policy and military subculture as all state agencies are and can be influenced by hostile 
actions at any given time. Regarding the norm of the use of force there seems to be a balanced 
influence of policy and military subcultures. Here the military strategic concept shows how the 
military strategic level intends to do what policy demands.395 As for the role of doctrine the 
military subculture seems to have the main influence on the norm. Doctrine is seen as culturally 
influenced but strategic culture is not considered to be something as instrumental as a tool. The 
downplaying of the academic subculture regarding this doctrine is also partly due to the manner 
in which it is written. The to the point summarized expressions of normative truths echoes more 
of a military order than academic insights. Academic influences are however plentiful even in 
this doctrine. A good example is the military strategic direction given in the doctrine which 
reads as a list of problems to solve and the implications of these problems.396 Defining what the 
problem is and asking the right questions can be seen as an academic way of addressing com-
plex issues. The norms and the main subcultural influence are listed in the table below. 
 
Table 4-6 Summary of norms and subcultural influences in MSD12. 
Doctrine 
 
Norm Subcultural 
influence 
Threat 
MSD16 
Conflict has a national as well as an international dimension, is 
global and affects nations with little distinction. The dichotomy 
of war and peace is overshadowed by a grey-zone of uncer-
tainty. Swedish interests are threatened close to home by poten-
tial overt and covert action by Russia including the use of nu-
clear weapons. 
Military 
(Policy) 
Use of 
force 
MSD16 
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, at 
all times, with all available forces. Sweden should be defended 
by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (NATO, 
EU, USA, Finland and other Nordic countries). Force is to be 
used in international operations to protect Swedish interests. 
Military and 
Policy 
Role of 
doctrine 
MSD16 
Doctrine is culturally influenced and is to be used as a com-
mand-tool to provide normative strategic guidance for the 
SwAF regarding defence of the nation to be implemented as per 
operational and tactical level doctrine. 
Military 
                                               
395 The expression of not losing alone might be interpreted as a statement aimed at the political masters. 
396 MSD16, p. 55-57. 
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4.5 Comparative analysis 
 
This chapter contains two different aspects of a comparative analysis of the doctrines examined. 
Initially the difference in context (the frames) of the doctrines are analysed. This is followed by 
an analysis of continuity and change within the strategic norms identified in the cases. These 
two sets of analysis are then summarized in the final chapter, comparing the different points of 
view describing the changes in strategic culture and outlining arguments for why the changes 
have occurred. 
 
4.5.1 Context 
 
Changes is contextual elements with reference to strategic culture as context might well follow 
the definition adopted in MSD16 where strategic culture is viewed as historical experience of 
neutrality, non-alignment and a pursuit to maintain freedom of action as a state. Such factors 
including geographical, historical and in some way formative of a Swedish experience have not 
been the focus of attention in this thesis. The contextual factors compared here are the changes 
in what has been depicted as the frames of the three cases. Observations of changes in threat 
perception, ways of using force and a developing academization count as contextual factors 
which have changed in the timeframe covered by this thesis. The change in threat perception 
during the Post-Cold War era in Sweden is observed to have changed from a loss of a concrete 
national threat, through a widening of security threats and internationalization to a renewed 
experience of a military threat to the nation and its territory. The changes observed are seem-
ingly closely related to changes in doctrine which mirrors and evolves according to the docu-
mented changes in the security environment in the policy papers and political direction provided 
to the SwAF. Change in perceived threat seems to affect policy which drives change in struc-
tures and concepts which then are documented in normative form in the military strategic doc-
trines.  
 
Change in the use of force with regards to policy decisions were also observed, an internation-
alization of use of force ranging from peacekeeping and crisis management all the way to an 
explicit description of expeditionary warfare has been noted. A perception of quality of forces 
as more relevant than quantity was also observed in connection to the internationalization of 
the use of force. The changes in the use of force do not follow the same logic as the changes in 
threat perception. As the downsizing of SwAF units had continued for decades the legacy of 
few, small operational units doesn´t enable a quick return to large units and greater quantities. 
Either the image of war has actually utterly changed since 1990 rendering a larger mass of units 
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unnecessary, or the fact of legacy and slowness of rebuilding caught up with the norms. The 
use of force norm did not change as a requirement for mass increases in SwAF means as much 
as it changed into a requirement for military support from friendly nations in order to stand a 
fighting change in a future war close to or at home. 
 
The process of academization that was observed does not seem to have had direct implications 
to the degree of influence of the academic subculture. The attempt in MSD02 to change culture 
and push for academization through education faded with MSD12 to completely vanish with 
MSD16. The observations actually indicate that the further the academization of the officer 
corps evolved the lesser the impact of the academic subculture was on doctrine. Now these 
observations are undoubtedly challengeable. There is a difference between basing doctrine on 
knowledge gained from scientific research coupled with practical knowledge and the way in 
which one documents this. One might argue that all the doctrines draw from research-based 
knowledge and it is only the way the information is presented that changed.  
 
Contextual factors have changed in Sweden since the end of the Cold War. Geographically 
Sweden is in a different position surrounded by friendly nations as compared to the times of the 
Soviet Union. European security arrangements have evolved, the EU membership, NATO PfP, 
EOP, HNS, bi- tri- and multilateral agreements and a unilateral solidarity declaration. However 
the historical experience of the nation has arguably not changed that much yet. There is most 
certainly something to gain in looking into the transfer of norms between nations, the transna-
tional norms. Observations of internationalization and downsizing of armed forces seem to have 
been more the rule than the exception in Europe since 1990. This was however not covered in 
the case study but will be discussed to some extent in chapter 5. 
 
4.5.2 Continuity and Change 
 
The continuity and/or change aspects of norms connected to the military strategic doctrines 
show a clear evolution of the norms connected to threat and role of doctrine.397 The evolution 
of the main subcultural influence on the norms in the doctrines is depicted in the table below. 
 
Table 4-7 Evolution of subcultural influence on the Swedish Military Strategic Doctrines.  
Norm MSD02 MSD12 MSD16 
Threat Academic Academic Military (Policy) 
Use of force Military Military and Policy Military and Policy 
Role of doctrine Academic Academic (Military) Military 
                                               
397 A summary of the observed norms and main subcultural influence is listed in appendix 2. 
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The most stable norm is shown to be the use of force norm where the military subcultural in-
fluence is clearly influential in all three cases. The alignment of policy and military cultural 
influences in the doctrines from 2012 and 2016 can be interpreted as a deliberate attempt to 
align policy and doctrine to give an image of factuality, legality and clarity to the use of force. 
As the analysis of the use of force norms in the three cases show, there have been clear fluctu-
ation in most of the categories analysed regarding use of force. However the interesting obser-
vation here is the seemingly clear alignment between policy and doctrine. The changes made 
have been expressed in a growing degree of harmony between policy and doctrine starting from 
MSD12. 
 
The threat perception norm seems to have had a stable academic influence in the two earlier 
doctrines while a flip to military influence occurred in MSD16. This observed change includes 
a change in the relationship between strategic culture and the doctrine. The first two doctrines 
have a clear definition of strategic culture and its utility in change while MSD16 holds a con-
textual understanding of strategic culture. This does not by itself account for the change in 
subcultural influence, but is an interesting observation. The change from academic to military 
subcultural influence can perhaps best be understood through examining MSD16 as a whole, 
where the military subcultural influence is strong regarding all norms and the doctrine is very 
much a tool of command rather than of explicit change in strategic culture. This does of course 
not mean that a new stance to doctrine doesn´t in reality inflict the same kind of change to 
cultural elements as did the doctrines which explicitly aimed at changing culture or cementing 
change. The role of the doctrine seems to have gradually changed from an academic venture in 
MSD02, an academic but militarily coloured normative document in MSD12 to a military tool 
of command in MSD16.  
 
The fluctuation in subcultural influences observed can also be explained as expressions of 
choices made by the team of writers who wrote the doctrine. The manner in which the text is 
written, the disposition, the level of abstraction, alignment with policy and normative or in-
formative degree of the doctrine are undoubtedly all choices which are made either intentionally 
or unintentionally. As the threat perception becomes clearer and more to the point all the norms 
align in accordance with a military influence and a balance between military policy culture is 
found. The clearer the threat, the more militarily influenced the doctrine. 
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4.5.3 Summary: Context, Continuity and change 
 
Both the context and the norms that have been observed share a commonality in that they seem 
to have changed more than shown signs of continuity. Contextual changes might lead to re-
definition of norms and thus change ripples through the strategic cultural system of a nation. If 
one is to single out a single defining trait of Swedish strategic culture based on the observations 
in this case study it is: Swedish strategic culture is prone to change. One can address this state-
ment in two different ways. The initial way follows the logic presented in MSD02 and MSD12 
where strategic culture is considered to some extent as a tool for change. Then change in stra-
tegic culture is something central and descriptive of Swedish strategic culture. But another way 
of viewing the same statement is that Swedish strategic culture actually is stable. It is rather 
that the culture nurtures and drives change. Change in interests, change in policy, change in 
doctrine, change in concepts, ends, ways and means. The changes always manifest themselves 
as new sets of norms, norms which are coded in doctrine, policy papers and legislation. Such a 
view of Swedish strategic culture puts emphasis on the connection between identity and culture. 
Perhaps the Swedish state identity is in some way opportunistic and allows for flexibility on 
lower levels such as interests and policy leading to a continuous variation and what has been 
observed as a tendency to embrace change. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
This chapter provides conclusions from the case study, linking the observations to the theoret-
ical framework as well as evaluating the research process itself. First the conclusions made of 
the Swedish military strategic doctrines role in changing Swedish strategic culture are dis-
cussed. This is followed by a discussion regarding using doctrine as a tool for changing strategic 
culture. Finally a critical examination of the research process is delivered as well as some pro-
posals for further studies. In addition to serving as a critical examination the chapter aims at 
answering the fourth and fifth research question: Why has change occurred? And how can 
change in strategic culture be achieved? 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
The study of Swedish strategic culture in this thesis ultimately aimed at finding answers to if 
Swedish strategic culture has changed during the Post-Cold War era. The summarized answer 
to this research problem based on the observations in the case study is yes, and no, it depends. 
At the doctrinal level you can identify change in norms and extend this to be change in strategic 
culture. The norms identified at this level are most likely to be regulatory norms which regulate 
action, but do not constitute identity.398 The use of doctrine as a tool for change where MSD02 
aimed at changing the strategic culture of the SwAF, which might more precisely mean that it 
intended to change the way SwAF approaches strategic matters as a part of its Military culture. 
And the MSD12 set out to convey changes in strategic culture through a new set of norms for 
the SwAF. Then finally the MSD16 stated not to aim at changing, but embracing strategic cul-
ture, thus for the third time changing the definition and normative approach to strategic culture 
for the SwAF. An interpretation of change on this level implies that Swedish strategic culture 
has changed more than once since the end of the Cold War. Some of the changes can be regarded 
as finetuning while the change of defence concept which occurred in between MSD02 and 
MSD12 might even be considered a fundamental change.399 
 
However, when the analysis shows a high degree of change and fluctuation on several indicators 
this can itself be interpreted as normative behaviour. By treating proneness for change as a 
constitutive norm one ends up concluding that Swedish strategic culture has not changed since 
the end of the Cold War, rather it has nurtured and driven change in Swedish defence issues 
quite successfully. Such an interpretation means that there are some other elements on the level 
                                               
398 Constitutive and regulatory norms. Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein (1996), p.54. & Wendt (1999), p. 165. 
399 Kerry Longhurst on finetuning and fundamental change. Longhurst (2004) 
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of state identity that might well be contextual and historically stable. Such elements have not 
been studied in this thesis. This dualism in interpretation shows that different levels of analysis 
can lead to different answers. This thesis has however focused on the relationship between 
norms, the military strategic doctrine, and three subcultures thus exploring a mechanism of 
change where the initial answer “yes Swedish strategic culture has changed” becomes valid.  
 
Change in strategic culture has been observed through the comparing of strategic norms and 
their relationship to three different subcultures. Swedish strategic culture has been shown to be 
divisible into subcultures and that the norms coded into the doctrines differ over time. The case 
study shows that an initial academic influence on the doctrine has been replaced with a military 
cultural influence and that a balance between military and policy subculture has been reached 
in the latest doctrine. The loss of a clear connection of the academic subculture on the doctrine 
does not mean that such a subculture doesn´t exist, but the further the academization of the 
officer corps got the lesser the doctrine resembles an educational and “academic” text.  
 
As for why the Swedish strategic culture has changed the processes of learning through changes 
in threat perception, institutions and crises can account for changes in security and defence 
policy.400 The changes in policy have led to concrete changes in the SwAF. The changes in 
policy as well as in the organization has sparked a need for normative guidance which has been 
coded into the military strategic doctrines. As circumstances in the policy and military dimen-
sions have changed need for a new doctrine has arisen. The difference in norms between the 
doctrines can be explained by differing external shocks in the security environment leading to 
recoding of the doctrine. But the team of writers writing the doctrine at any given time are 
central for both why and how Swedish strategic culture has changed on the military strategic 
level. The doctrine writers can be held as an epistemic community conveying their own inter-
pretation of new norms to be adopted as per doctrine, even working as norm entrepreneurs in 
some cases.401 This community selects which subcultural influences will prevail and be a part 
of the doctrine. To the most part this should be an intentional process and not happen by chance. 
402 In summary Swedish strategic culture has been changed through doctrine by an epistemic 
community of writers as a reaction to external changes (the security environment) and internal 
changes (defence transformation). 
                                               
400 Meyer (2005), These mechanisms of learning work on an international level. The World context, the EU and 
NATO contexts as well as the bi-, tri- and multilateral defence agreements mean that some degree of norm trans-
fer has occurred to and from Sweden via transnational norms. 
401 External chocks and norm entrepreneurs. Farrell (2001), Howlett & Glenn (2005), Zyla (2011) 
402 Libel (2018), p. 13. Process of change in policymaking. 
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5.2 Using doctrine as a tool for change 
 
The case study focusing on Swedish military strategic doctrine shows that attempts to change 
strategic culture (MSD02), convey changes in strategic culture (MSD12) as well as adopting a 
neutral position towards strategic culture have been made. Doctrine at its purest could be a 
collection of normative guidance for its audience. In some ways a new doctrine will always 
entail new or changed norms and this will in some way affect cultural aspects, among others. 
Therefore, using doctrine as a tool for change can be held as logically sound, but there is hardly 
any way of controlling the actual change in culture a doctrine sets into motion. 
 
 
Figure 5-1 The relationship between policy, military advice, research and doctrine.   
 
The conclusions from the case study outlines a model of doctrine as a point where policy, aca-
demic research and military professional experience and legacy meet. Doctrine is on one hand 
informed by policy which is shaped by political opinion and opportunity. On the other hand, 
doctrine is informed by military advice which stems from military professional experience and 
legacy. Between the two there is a third factor which is the objective analysis provided through 
the process of academic research. These three subsets, as depicted in the figure above, all play 
varying parts in doctrine formation, where the weight of each pillar depends on choices made 
by the team writing the doctrine.  
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But the interaction between the three pillars makes the seemingly straightforward process more 
complex. As political opinion as well as military professional experience and legacy both may 
affect any given research project in various aspects depending on how the research is conducted. 
Funding, tasking, ownership issues as well as researcher bias may influence the research pro-
cess which might lead to biased results. Research results may inform policy as well as military 
advice which makes it difficult to separate the research pillar to an independent entity. The 
relationship between military personnel and policy makers might lead to policy informing mil-
itary advice and vice versa. All these aspects make for a complex model in which the military 
strategist finds himself involved in a balancing act. Or as Colin S. Gray put it as a keeper of the 
Strategy Bridge.403 Any strategist as part of a team working with doctrine development will 
find himself entangled in this strategist’s dilemma. Which influences are to be considered, 
which aspects weigh heavier than others, what are the biases and where do they come from? 
 
In writing doctrine one can choose between chasing perfection or going for good enough. But 
what is good enough? This question becomes key. Is it good enough to write a doctrine to 
provide the intended audience with the knowledge and direction one wishes to convey? Trying 
to change culture through doctrine might be a bit overreaching.404 Be this as it may, arguably 
the only perfect doctrine is the one that will never be finished. And only a finished doctrine can 
enforce change. It seems no matter whether the doctrine writers in Sweden expressed an intent 
to change culture, inform of cultural change or imply that cultural change is slow and not in the 
scope of the doctrine, strategic culture can be said to have changed between each doctrine mak-
ing two of three doctrinal statements on strategic culture to the point. On the other hand, if 
Swedish strategic culture is unchanging and upholds continuous change then all the doctrine 
writers were wrong. This strain of thought supports the notion that control of cultural change is 
difficult if not impossible to gain and maintain. Using doctrine to change strategic culture will 
work. It is however not certain the change will be what the writers expected. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
403 The strategists role as keeper of the bridge between policy and military strategy, see: Gray, Colin S.: The 
Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice, Oxford University press, Oxford 2010. 
404 Even though doctrine and culture share a connection, the control over the cultural changes that actually occur 
by implementation of new doctrine is not easily maintained. Doctrine developers in the US and UK have ex-
pressed that doctrine can be based on science, but the main gain of doctrine is as a coordinating tool for military 
organizations to reduce friction and manage uncertainties. see: Thunholm, Peter & Palmgren, Anders: “Dok-
trinutvecklares syn på doktriners roll och syfte”, Kungliga Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar och tidskrift, 
nr. 2, p. 15-33. Stockholm 2018. 
92 
 
5.3 Evaluating the research 
 
This thesis attempts to study the relationship between strategic norms that are indicative of a 
strategic culture and doctrine. The concept of strategic culture is multifaceted and shares dif-
fering definitions. The chosen interpretation of strategic culture highlights subcultures as ele-
ments of a strategic culture. The competition between subcultures can lead to change. To ob-
serve culture a theory which states the connection between state environment, identity, interests 
and policy was adopted. This theoretical framework was then developed to contain doctrines 
and show an indicative picture of how norms flow in this system. All these theoretical assump-
tions combined with the ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions lay the 
ground for this interpretive case study. The study and its results are to be evaluated in the con-
text of this framework. 
 
An interpretive multiple-case case study of single documents is to some extent limited right 
from the outset. The analysis relies heavily on the interpretation of data in each document. The 
method of thematic content analysis was adopted to provide for a systematic approach to cate-
gorizing data and construct thematical norms. But the description of differing subcultures in a 
Swedish strategic context and the positioning of the doctrinal documents in their context aimed 
at adding depth to the analysis. The choice to analyse the doctrines based on three different 
subcultures was made in order to observe change and the dynamics at work on the level where 
military doctrine and policy meets. Even though the case study is in some way complex it was 
possible to draw some relevant conclusions from it.  
 
The sources used in the research were addressed in chapter 2.3.2. As mentioned above the main 
sources were the military strategic doctrines and this led to a heavy reliance on researcher in-
terpretation of single documents. Secondary and supporting sources were used to some extent, 
and the internet sources were treated as supportive not decisive, even though they mostly hold 
a high reliability. But based on the sources used and the focus on military strategic doctrine of 
one small state there is little to say about generalization on a higher level. As this was an inter-
pretive study this is self-evident, as all observations rely on the context in which they are ob-
served.  
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In evaluating the research concepts such as validity, reliability and replicability become prob-
lematic. 405 If one were to criticise the validity of this study one might question whether the 
strategic norms and subcultures studied actually are indicator and elements of strategic culture. 
How valid are the definitions of the subcultures? Reliability might be addressed by asking in 
which way it would be possible for a different researcher to perform the same analysis in the 
case study and reach similar results, while replicability is connected with the possibility of re-
peating the whole study. All these aspects are however challenged in an interpretive study by 
allowing for different interpretations in the study of any given object. A view of subjectivity of 
knowledge and reality means that in some sense all results are subjective, in some form biased, 
and different interpretations are thus inevitable. The flexibility of the research frame allows for 
interpretation but at the same time softens any conclusions made away from central positivistic 
concepts such as causality and generalizability.  
 
This thesis should however be evaluated on its trustworthiness, systematicity, reflexivity, trans-
parency and engagement with positionality.406 The trustworthiness can be evaluated depending 
on to which extent the study is conducted with a clear systematicity. The systematic reporting 
of observations, transparent argumentation, clear disposition and structure of this thesis aims at 
showing a degree of systematicity clear enough to strengthen its trustworthiness. Besides sys-
tematicity a central concept to engage with here is reflexivity. Reflexivity addresses issues such 
as how the researcher affects the research and its results. The identity of the researcher, the 
reasoning, relationship to data-generation and analysis, as well as the coherence of sense-mak-
ing are to be addressed in some way.407 Of these elements the identity of the researcher might 
bring about at least two forms of author bias. Firstly the nationality of the researcher, being 
Finnish, might bring about a national bias as the research is about Swedish culture and doctrine. 
This form of bias has been attempted to be mitigated via a transparent documentation of the 
argumentation behind explanations and conclusions.408 The other form of author bias is con-
nected with the researcher´s identity as an officer in the Finnish Defence Forces. The role of 
being an officer opens to bias in connection with interpretation of policy with what can be 
perceived as negative effects on defence matters, but also with the interpretation of how defence 
forces act in relation to political agents. A civil-military relations bias. This bias has also been 
attempted to be mitigated by keeping the research process as transparent as possible.  
                                               
405 On validity, reliability and replicability in interpretive studies see: Schwartz-Shea & Yanow (2012), p. 92-95, 
113. 
406 Comparing evaluative standards between positivistic and interpretivist research. Ibid., p.113. 
407 Ibid., p. 99-100. 
408 Transparency in documentation as a way of mitigating bias. Ibid., p. 100-101. 
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The conduct of data-generation and analysis also affects the trustworthiness of the research.409 
Admitting to weaknesses, such as limits in source materiel with a focus on a few doctrinal 
texts, but also opening up to differing results of the analysis are ways to try to enhance the 
transparency of the research process. This includes opening up to potential source bias, as 
many of the documents studied might themselves emit conscious or unconscious author bias. 
The problems with this kind of source bias was mitigated by avoiding treating the data as true 
or false, good or bad.   
 
Finally, the coherence of explanations should be addressed. 410 Any explanation is as good as 
its coherence and the soundness of argumentation that lies behind it. Different forms of argu-
mentation bias might develop when choosing a theoretical and methodological framework in 
which to work. On one hand the framing of the study allows for limiting the scope of it thus 
making it manageable. On the other hand, this process might lead to a proneness to only see 
explanations that fit the problem, but also only see problems that fit the explanations. This 
form of argumentation bias has in one way been mitigate by admitting to tensions in the con-
clusion of the thesis and opening up for rival explanations. Swedish strategic culture has and 
has not changed since the end of the Cold war. As such different interpretations are central in 
interpretive studies, which interpretation that is more right, or more wrong, might best be 
evaluated through a weighing of the trustworthiness of the research which led to the different 
explanations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
409 Sense making in Data generation and analysis. Ibid., p. 104-106. 
410 Explanatory coherence. Ibid., p. 107-109. 
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5.4 Proposals for further studies 
 
The study of strategic culture has evolved trough different generations of research and as such 
deal with the problem of having one too many definitions. Much of the theoretical work on 
strategic culture calls for more empirical studies to put the theories to the test, but also generate 
descriptive data of different strategic cultures. From this point of view small states such as 
Sweden have much to give and the Swedish strategic culture is yet to be described in the sense 
of “thick-description”. An initial proposal for further research might thus be conducting a thor-
ough descriptive study of Swedish strategic culture. Such a study might be well of by adopting 
a contextual view of strategic culture. This could then be complemented by a mapping of sub-
cultures of Swedish strategic culture. Any such could be highly informative as well as lay the 
grounds for further research on the mechanisms of change in strategic culture. In a broader and 
more general approach the development of theory connecting norms with doctrine and finding 
clarity into if there are different levels of norms, and if they might be connected to state identity, 
interests, policy and doctrine in similar or differing ways. In addition to these proposals for 
further studies, some comparative work on strategic cultures of small states might enable shed-
ding light on what drives continuity and change in different national contexts, and how these 
may or may not interact with each other. In summary the work in this thesis have led to propos-
ing the following research projects: 
  
- A thick-description study of Swedish strategic culture.  
- Mapping of the subcultures of Swedish strategic culture.  
- Norms in strategic culture: Exploring the relationship between identity, interest, policy 
doctrine and norms. 
- A comparative study of small state strategic culture 
 
Continued research in strategic culture can still have much to give to further the understanding 
of strategy in many of its forms. This said, one can still question the relevance of the study of 
strategic culture and answering the “so what?” question remains central. The answering of why 
strategic culture matters might be the hardest research project to attempt. 
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List of observed norms and main subcultural influence 
 
Table A2-1 List of observed norms and subcultural influence. 
Doctrine 
Norm 
Norm Subcultural 
influence 
Threat 
MSD02 
Conflict is a complex but inevitable matter. It involves the 
whole of society and is global by nature. War is the peak of 
conflict. 
Academic 
Threat 
MSD12 
Conflict ranges from high to low intensity and state involve-
ment, is global by nature and can affect any nation at a distance. 
War is the continuation of politics by other means, but its evolv-
ing nature is blurring the line between war and peace. 
Academic 
Threat 
MSD16 
Conflict has a national as well as an international dimension, is 
global and affects nations with little distinction. The dichotomy 
of war and peace is overshadowed by a grey-zone of uncer-
tainty. Swedish interests are threatened close to home by poten-
tial overt and covert action by Russia including the use of nu-
clear weapons. 
Military 
(Policy) 
   
Use of 
force 
MSD02 
Force should be used to defend the nation with standing and 
reserve forces who are available at a set degree of readiness 
with a network-based defence. All of Sweden should be de-
fended by SwAF and supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is 
to be used in international operations to defend Swedish inter-
ests. 
Military 
Use of 
force 
MSD12 
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, with 
operational standing forces, which are available at all times. 
Sweden should be defended by SwAF operational units and 
supporting partners (EU/NATO). Force is to be used in interna-
tional operations to secure Swedish interests. 
Military and 
Policy 
Use of 
force 
MSD16 
Force should be used to defend the nation in areas affected, at 
all times, with all available forces. Sweden should be defended 
by SwAF operational units and supporting partners (NATO, 
EU, USA, Finland and other Nordic countries). Force is to be 
used in international operations to protect Swedish interests. 
Military and 
Policy 
   
Role of 
doctrine 
MSD02 
Doctrine is a tool for changing strategic culture. 
 
Academic 
Role of 
Doctrine 
MSD12 
Changes in strategic culture requires new doctrine. Doctrine is 
a tool to translate and transfer environmental changes into nor-
mative guidelines for the SwAF. 
Academic 
(Military) 
Role of 
doctrine 
MSD16 
Doctrine is culturally influenced and is to be used as a com-
mand-tool to provide normative strategic guidance for the 
SwAF regarding defence of the nation to be implemented as per 
operational and tactical level doctrine. 
Military 
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Key definitions 
 
Identity 
To have an identity is to have and understanding of oneself in any given situation.  411 State 
identities are shaped in the interaction between states but has an internal dimension which 
shapes and is shaped by norms constructed in the interaction of government and its agencies. 
 
Interest 
An interest defines what one wants for a certain reason. State interests stem from self-interest, 
something the state wants for itself. State identity generated interests are: physical security, 
ontological security, recognition as an actor by others, development for a better life.412 
 
Policy 
Policy designates the behaviour of a government agency or a legislature and is a relatively 
stable. Policy is a purposive course of action or inaction followed by an actor or set of actors in 
dealing with a problem in a matter of concern.413   
 
Norms 
“Cultural norms are intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define ac-
tors, their situations, and the possibilities of action.”414A norm describes what is expected and 
is the basis for social rules and expectations. Norms can be confined to single states or multiple 
states as transnational norms. 
 
Strategic norms 
A strategic norm is a corridor within which strategic choices are made.415 The stated answer 
provides an expectation of action that will be taken, or an expectation of how other actors ac-
tions will be interpreted. These answers thus lay the ground for normative (expected) behaviour. 
 
                                               
411 “To have an identity is simply to have certain ideas about who one is in a given situation…”  Wendt, Alexan-
der: Social Theory of international politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, p. 170 
412 Wendt, Alexander: ”Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, American Political Science 
Review, 88(2):384-396, June 1994, p. 385. 
413 Paraphrasing Anderson, James E.: Public policymaking eight edition. Cengage Learning, Belmont 2014, p.6-
7. 
414 Farrell, Theo & Terriff, Terry: “The Sources of Military Change” in Farrel, Theo & Terrif Terry (eds.): The 
Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London 2002, p. 7. 
415 Strategic norms as corridors of choice: Meyer, Christoph O:"Convergence Towards a European Strategic Cul-
ture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms" European Journal of International Rela-
tions, 11(4):523-549. 2005, p. 524. 
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Strategic culture 
Strategic culture involves the culture of a given strategic community, often a nation state. It 
affects strategic choice and has contextual roots in geography and historical experience. Stra-
tegic culture is divisible into competing subcultures and is also constituted by state internal 
organizational elements. State identity, interest and policy are connected to strategic culture 
via norms.  
 
Policy culture 
Policy culture is a subculture of political and strategic culture. Policy culture is shaped by the 
social behaviour of government agencies and legislators and is relatively stable. Policy culture 
influences policy making and sets a standard for interaction between government and its agen-
cies.  
 
Military culture 
Military culture is a subculture of strategic culture and is defined by social interaction in mili-
tary organizations.  Military culture is a “set of basic assumptions, values, norms, beliefs, and 
formal knowledge that shape collective understandings”.416 Military culture is informed by or-
ganizational legacy, affects military advice and influences strategic culture. 
 
Academic culture 
Academic culture is a subculture of strategic culture and is defined by the academic agents in 
any given state as well as through the interaction of an international academic community. Ac-
ademic culture is a set of values, norms and beliefs that shape a collective understanding of 
standards of scientific research and education, but especially how knowledge can and should 
be generated.  
 
Doctrine 
Doctrine tells us who we are, it conveys values as well as norms and is a part of identity shaping 
of both individuals and organizations. Doctrine can be coded into normative documents which 
regulate the activities of a given actor. As such, a doctrine encodes norms that are aimed at 
controlling or guiding the actions of personnel affiliated with the organization which the doc-
trine represents.  
 
                                               
416 Kier, Elizabeth: “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars”. International Security, 19(4):65-
93, Spring 1995, p.68. 
